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Abstract 
This thesis explores how rights to the Barbadian flyingfish fishery are understood, 
legitimated, and contested. It addresses three overarching research questions: 1) who gets 
the fish and on what basis; 2) how is this system of allocation governed and why in this 
way; and, 3) is this governance challenged? Answers to these questions matter to coastal 
communities in Barbados and for the analysis of resource governance more broadly. The 
existing literatures on fisheries tends to study governance from the top-down. Omitted 
are the social motivations of actors targeted by such governance. Furthermore, these 
accounts fail to recognise both the legitimacy gaps created by top-down governance, and, 
the alternative forms of bottom-up governance practiced by fisherfolk and local 
communities.    
This thesis adopts an ethnographic methodology situated within an International 
Relations critical constructivist theoretical approach to capture these localised 
perspectives. My key argument is that to understand how this resource is governed, and 
by extension, the rights afforded to Barbadian fisherfolk, there is a need to be attentive 
to socio-political norms that have shaped what is deemed appropriate. This study’s 
empirical findings foreground regional and development norms  as the two areas most 
pertinent. Tensions between the norms of regional community and national sovereignty 
have undermined attempts to formally demarcate regionally-shared distributive rights to 
the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery, though fisherfolk have enacted their own kind 
of informal regionalised governance. Tensions within the norm of sustainable 
development have left unresolved the issue of whether fisherfolk should have access 
rights to valuable coastal spaces occupied by the luxury tourism industry, with local 
communities using the language of social sustainability to make the case that they should 
have access to preserve their livelihoods and associated cultural traditions.  
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
The distribution of communally-held resources, like fisheries, has long been at the centre 
of debates in international politics, for example, on air (cf. Soroos, 1988); on forests (cf. 
Iwamoto, 1995); the internet (cf. Hess, 1995); and oceans (Delaney and Hadjimichael, 
2017). These debates often surround conflicts and tensions regarding: who should own 
and have access to these resources; if these resources should be viewed as property with 
associated rights; what do these property regimes and associated rights look like and who 
do they represent; and, how best to conserve these resources for future generations? 
These debates often boil down to concerns related to resource governance, and, have 
been addressed from economic and environmental bases with emphasis tending to be 
placed on managing the resource itself rather than the resource users. This is noteworthy 
because while having measures in place to manage natural resources like fisheries is 
important, what is often overlooked are the social interactions between actors that makes 
governance work or not, and by extension, the allocation of rights to these resources 
legitimated or not.  This study is significant in that it is grounded in an unconventional 
social sciences approach to investigating fisheries governance. McConney (1995, pp. 43) 
suggests that the argument for integrating social science approaches in fisheries 
governance rests on the fact that the implementation of policy involves social change. 
This is certainly a sound argument given that “one doesn’t manage fish, one manages 
people” (Orbach, 1986, pp. 105). Consequently, in this study I explore the political 
tensions related to communally-held resources like fisheries, particularly the under-
researched social aspects of governance. This is accomplished through a case study on 
the politics of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. 
Barbados1 and its’ flyingfish fishery present an interesting case as a small Anglo-Caribbean 
island nation in the North Atlantic, lying as the most easterly of the Lesser Antilles entirely 
surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean2.  Fisheries, particularly, its flyingfish fishery, are of 
significant traditional, cultural, environmental, and economic importance to the country 
(Mohammed et al., 2015, pp. 1). Known as the land of flyingfish, Barbados and its flyingfish 
fishery operate in one of the most compact multi-national archipelagos of the world 
(CRFM Secretariat 2014, pp. 10). Furthermore, governance of its flyingfish fishery has 
                                                          
1 Please see Appendix A for a list of statistics on Barbados’ People, Economy, Geography and Government. 
2 Barbados is the only Caribbean/CARICOM country entirely surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean. The other states are in or touch 
the Caribbean Sea basin. 
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been riddled by political tensions on global to local scales especially over the past three 
decades. 
On November 28th 2011, the Daily Nation, one of Barbados’ most prominent news 
sources, reported the statement by the Acting Attorney General of Barbados, Michael 
Lashley: “THE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT of ten Barbadian fishermen who 
allegedly strayed into Tobago’s waters is a slap in the face of regional integration” (Daily Nation, 
2011a, emphasis mine). This statement is significant because tensions particularly have been 
premised on the long-standing dispute between the neighboring Anglo-Caribbean states, 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, to formally demarcate distributive rights to their 
regionally shared Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. Despite this lack of resolve, 
Barbadian fisherfolk have continued to normalise the practice of catching flyingfish in 
Tobagonian waters. These concerns raise questions about how the norms of regional 
community and national sovereignty have influenced political tensions regarding: 
traditional rights to resources; defined borders; transnationality; and, the interface 
between regional and national identities. 
Consider also, on September 22nd 2014, Nation News, one of Barbados’ other prominent 
news sources reported the headline “Rally Behind Six Men’s folk” and that “it is up to 
the rest of Barbados to defend the residents in Six Men’s, St. Peter, who have been told 
they are squatters” (Nation News, 2014). This headline is significant because Barbados 
was the first black British slave society, and therein exists deeply embedded stratifications 
of race/colour, and class. This has led to a present-day political agreement between blacks 
controlling the state and whites the economy, and ultimately, socio-political tensions 
relating to “white privilege” particularly regarding the uneven distribution of productive 
land resources (Beckles, 1990, 2004a, 2004b). The highly uneven distribution of 
productive land resources has been prevalent on the island’s north-west coast, described 
locally as the platinum coast, and has influenced the development of the island’s fishing 
communities in its north-west, like at Six Men’s.  
It is noteworthy that where other Caribbean British colonies supplemented the diets of 
the enslaved and poorer classes mainly with imported salt fish, it was flyingfish that 
supplemented the protein requirements of poor and disenfranchised Barbadians. 
Essentially, flyingfish became a part of  Barbados’ social structure as a “slave fish” with 
the traditions and cultural values attached to flyingfish cemented as a food that has 
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sustained the life and diet of the “ordinary” Barbadian— of whom about ninety percent 
are of Afro-Caribbean and mixed descent (McConney, 1995; Welch, 2005; World 
Population Review, 2017). These facts matter because locals with an interest in fisheries 
have expressed concerns that despite several political promises to develop northern 
fisheries over the past three decades, their livelihoods have been marginalised because of 
white Barbadian interests in luxury tourism. Moreover, local communities (mostly black 
Barbadians) have expressed that their socio-cultural traditions are at risk of being lost, 
because luxury tourism, which is visibly more lucrative than fisheries, is competing for, 
and getting preferential access to, valuable coastal space. These concerns raise questions 
about how development norms framed within discourses of sustainable development have 
influenced political tensions regarding: maintaining cultural traditions and heritage; 
distributive justice claims of access to resources based on divisions in race/colour and 
class; and, the importance of placing socio-cultural concerns as a significant facet of 
overall development planning.  
 
Research Aims and Approach 
This study explores the above stated political concerns by addressing three overarching 
research questions:  
1) who gets the fish and on what basis;  
2) how is this system of allocation governed and why in this way; and, 
3) is this governance being challenged? 
 
This study’s empirical chapters answer these questions by interpreting how regional 
norms framed between understandings of national sovereignty and regional community, 
and, development norms framed within discourses of sustainable development have 
shaped the governance of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. Answering these questions 
matter for the livelihoods of coastal communities in Barbados and for the analysis of 
resource governance more broadly.  This is because in the existing literature on resource 
governance, approaches to governing resources, like fisheries, are couched largely within 
prescriptive rationalist assumptions. I argue that particularly in the context of 
International Relations (IR), these perspectives do not provide an adequate understanding 
of the social motivations of actors in enacting governance, and by extension, rights (see 
chapter 2). Rooted in IR constructivist theory, I therefore adopted a critical constructivist 
theoretical approach in this study as the way to get to the root of these social motivations. 
4 
 
This study’s critical constructivist research agenda is based on uncovering and 
understanding legitimacy gaps in governance and is grounded on an IR critical 
constructivist stance of “norms mattering”. I accomplish this by building on Wiener’s 
(2014) A Theory of Contestation, which is useful in locating legitimacy gaps in governance in 
international settings and explaining how norms emerge and come to be accepted and/or 
contested. However, Weiner’s, and other dominant IR critical constructivist accounts to 
investigating the function and effects of norms are top-down. I therefore make the case 
for adjusting Wiener’s typology of norms by including local norms in this study’s 
conceptual framework to capture actors’ social motivations in enacting governance (see 
chapter 3). I employ the use of ethnographic methods along with archival document 
analyses to capture these localised perspectives as well as the way in which shared and 
contested social meanings are understood (see chapter 4).  
It is important in introducing this study’s research approach to emphasise that it has broad 
implications for governing fisheries in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This is 
because most SIDS are tropical and surrounded by the marine environment. Thus, fishing 
and fisheries are extremely important components of traditions, culture and economy. 
Tropical SIDS are the smallest countries in the world in terms of both land area and 
population. Those in the Western Central Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea, the 
geographical area of this study, are some of the smallest. Therefore, their small size and 
‘island-ness’ have undoubtedly influenced how fisheries and fisherfolk are placed as part 
of the SIDS development agenda. Most SIDS lack the enabling institutional and 
infrastructural environment for fisheries governance, particularly in the era of extended 
jurisdiction and sovereign claims to marine resources. Their fisheries are mainly classified 
as artisanal or small-scale commercial—with the former tending to be traditional, while 
the latter have developed or expanded with the introduction of extended maritime 
jurisdiction (Mahon, 1996, pp. 298-299, 301; COFI, 2014). Fishing and fisheries are a 
significant source of food security in SIDS and provide livelihoods for poor and 
marginalised communities. Despite this, the economic and particularly the socio-cultural 
contributions of fisheries in SIDS have been largely overlooked and/or undervalued as 
part of the development agenda and on policy and political platforms in the IR literature. 
This is striking when one considers that fishing and fisheries are, more often than not, 
classified by locals in SIDS as one of the most important industries contributing not only 
economically but also to social welfare.  
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The geographical area of this study, i.e., the Caribbean sea, is generally classified as a 
region with low fisheries productivity, meaning that fewer fish are caught compared to 
the global average3. The most productive waters are off the coasts of Venezuela, the north 
point of Trinidad, and the Brasil-Guianas shelf, otherwise known as the South and 
Eastern Caribbean sea (Ballah, 1992; Fanning et al., 2009). The region’s fishery resources 
have been characterised as among the most overexploited in the world with fifty-five 
percent of commercially harvested fishery stocks being overexploited or depleted4 and 
forty percent of stocks currently fully exploited5 (FAO, 2014). A 2014 FAO report noted 
that “the growing population and reduced fish production in the Eastern Caribbean states 
results in more than forty percent of fish consumed being imported” (FAO, 2014, pp. 1). 
Despite the region’s generally low productivity, the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery 
is by far one of the most important fisheries in the region. Apart from being commercially 
lucrative to all Eastern Caribbean states, but particularly to Barbados as a source of food, 
it is also a part of an ocean pelagic multi-species fishery with the principal species being 
flyingfish and dolphinfish (mahi mahi)6. Scientific reports indicate that in all cases “these 
resources are shared on either a regional or international basis” and are classified as 
“straddling and migratory pelagic stocks” (Mahon, 1990; Ministry of Agriculture 
Barbados, 1992, pp. 99). 
Given this high dependence on fisheries, it is surprising that Caribbean governments have 
been struggling to develop cogent and coherent policies and political institutions both 
nationally and regionally to properly conserve and replenish these resources, and, support 
the people who depend on them. Indeed, a general sentiment shared by foreign as well 
as regional and national practitioners is that Caribbean fisheries, fishing and fisherfolk sit 
low on the development agenda. My interest in exploring the disconnect between the 
importance of fisheries to Caribbean livelihoods and the lack of visibility of the sector 
and its people is fuelled by my being a descendant of the Caribbean. Given that fisheries 
governance is often addressed from economic and environmental purviews in academic 
IR literature, this study seeks to capture the oft-overlooked and under-researched human 
experience of Caribbean fishing. The actors who are in the business of developing 
                                                          
3 For more information (cf. Heileman, 2007; Fanning et al., 2009; Heileman and Mahon, 2015). 
4 A stock is considered “overexploited” if it is being exploited above a level that is believed to be sustainable in the long term, evident 
from the steady decline of the stock. A stock is said to be depleted if catches are well below historical levels, irrespective of the amount 
of fishing effort exerted (World Ocean Review, 2010).  
5 The term “fully exploited” means that a fishery is operating at or close to an optimal yield level, with no expected room for further 
expansion (World Ocean Review, 2010). 
6 Oxenford et al. (2007) explain that the large ocean pelagics are predators of juvenile and adult flyingfish and are typically harvested 
on the same fishing trips as flyingfish, and/or for which flyingfish are the primary bait (cf. Mahon et al. 1986). These large ocean 
pelagics consist of wahoo, tuna, swordfish, billfish and shark (Ministry of Agriculture Barbados, 1992). 
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Caribbean fisheries governance are usually foreigners aligned with international agencies 
and mandates, whereas, regional and national practitioners are largely natural scientists or 
resource management specialists. What this study contributes to the fisheries governance 
literature is a unique assessment of the social aspects of Caribbean fisheries that is 
explored on the basis of knowledge of the scales of governance (international to local) as 
well as indigenous knowledge of human interactions in the Caribbean. As explained above 
and demonstrated throughout this study, the Barbadian flyingfish fishery is extremely 
complicated and politically charged within local, national and regional spheres of 
influence. As such, this case of the politics of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery is well-
matched to provide insight into the social motivations of actors’ in constructing 
governance and rights to communally-held resources, like fisheries.  
 
Key Findings  
Governance assessments7 for Barbados’ flyingfish fishery by any standard international, 
regional, national or local are virtually non-existent (cf. CERMES, 2012). The key 
argument of this study is that to understand how this resource is governed, and by 
extension, the rights afforded to Barbadian fisherfolk, there is a need to be attentive to 
socio-political norms that have shaped what is deemed appropriate. As mentioned earlier, 
the thesis argues that regional norms framed between understandings of national 
sovereignty and regional community, and development norms, framed within discourses 
of sustainable development are particularly pertinent in constructing governance of the 
fishery. The study’s key findings and how they collectively constitute a contribution to 
knowledge then are as follows. 
 
The first key finding of this study is a significant socio-political insight into how norms 
become propagated. My research reveals that the regional and development norms 
pertinent to this study have been forged through the social relations of race/colour, class, 
nationality and gender. This finding provides a socio-political dimension often absent in 
research on the Barbadian flyingfish fishery, i.e. the essential ‘human dimensions’ of the 
fishery. This led to the study’s second key finding: how the evolution of these social 
relations underpins both the present-day governance of the fishery, and the political 
tensions surrounding the distributive rights and access rights to the fishery being explored 
                                                          
7 Governance assessments can come from many sources and for many reasons and vary according to the interests, needs and culture 
of the assessor.  How the assessment is conducted and who is included often depends on the interests and ideas of the group, 
organization or champions that initiate the process. For more information on governance assessments (cf. UNDP, 2009). 
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in this study. The study’s third key finding speaks to the wider literature on resource 
governance. Rooted in International Relations (IR) constructivist theory, the critical 
constructivist research agenda utilised in this study provides a way to demonstrate how 
top-down and bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve or frustrate governance goals 
via my typology of norms. A major finding of this study therefore is how practices of 
informal governance are enacted within a top-down and bottom-up governance regime. 
These key findings collectively constitute a contribution to knowledge theoretically, 
methodologically and empirically.  
 
Main Research Contributions 
The study’s main research contributions are rooted in revealing localised perspectives on 
enacting governance and the social motivations for them via an IR critical constructivist 
framework. Theoretically, my work is grounded in the importance of understanding 
norms at the level of the locale, to truly analyse how norms are understood, legitimated, 
and contested (see chapter 3). Methodologically, to be thus embedded in the local, I used 
ethnographic methods triangulated with archival document analyses, rather than 
discourse analysis which is the more conventional IR critical constructivist approach. I 
was able through empirical analysis to generate insights into localised perspectives of 
governance that could not be gleaned solely through the written word. In this way, the 
thesis provides insights into how the social motivations behind local norms influence 
actors’ ways of enacting governance (see chapter 4). This approach provides a framework 
for studying local/bottom-up governance, which the thesis argues is needed to better give 
recognition to and understand the perspectives of actors who are often marginalised in 
the policy making process but are expected to implement policy (see chapter 2).  
 
The study’s main contributions to knowledge are also found in its distinctive empirical 
analysis of Barbadian fisheries by focusing on normative tensions around ‘the region’ and 
‘development’. First, the study had a significant contribution to knowledge by expanding 
on the sparse literature that can account for essentially the ‘human dimensions’ of the 
fishery (see chapter 5). Regarding constructing governance of a regional fishery, I argue 
that tensions between the norms of regional community and national sovereignty have 
undermined attempts to formally demarcate regionally-shared distributive rights to the 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery from the top-down, though fisherfolk have enacted 
their own kind of informal regionalised governance from the bottom-up. The significant 
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empirical contribution here is that enactments of bottom-up governance illustrated 
informal acts of reciprocity constructing governance of the fishery, in that, Barbadian 
fisherfolk indicated that they have been able to co-operate in demarcating shared 
distributive rights to the fishery based on their shared identity as a regional community 
of fisherfolk with shared interests in the multi-pelagic flyingfish fishery (see chapter 6). 
Regarding constructing governance of Barbadian national development priorities, I argue 
that tensions within the norm of sustainable development have left unresolved the issue 
of whether fishing communities should have access rights to valuable coastal spaces 
occupied by the luxury tourism industry in the island’s north-west. The major empirical 
contribution here is that enactments of bottom-up governance suggest that the principle 
of social sustainability and the inclusion of culture factor highly in the local discourse, 
with local communities using the language of social sustainability to make the case that 
they should have access to preserve their livelihoods and associated cultural traditions 
(see chapter 7). These research contributions also highlight how this study contributes to 
key debates in international politics. 
 
In emphasising the need for localised perspectives of governance and advocating for 
empirical analysis as the methodology for revealing the underlying social motivations, I 
have chosen to intervene in the pragmatic debate surrounding how small-scale fisherfolk 
should be included and integrated as part of the development agenda and in policy and 
political platforms. This brings into scope a related policy debate about who controls 
governance, and by extension, what governance regime is believed to be better, i.e., 
bottom-up or top-down. Essentially, this study makes the argument that top-down 
(hierarchical) governance is often the preferred form of governance regime. The thesis 
makes the case that particularly small-scale fisherfolk and fisheries are often not included 
as part of the development agenda or in policy and political platforms. In contributing to 
these pragmatic and policy debates, my research has found that despite top-down 
governance being imposed on these small-scale fisherfolk (who lack representation and 
inclusion in the policy making process) that they are able to formulate their own informal 
means of governance and co-operation. It is important therefore to be cognisant of the 
context-specific nuances of governing communally-held resources, like fisheries. This 
leads to my claim that perspectives of bottom-up governance ought to be included in 
analysis, because up to this moment no form of top-down governance regime has been 
successful in fisheries management. The fisherfolks’ informal means of governance and 
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co-operation are unaccounted for in high-level fisheries governance or development 
policy. It is my position that fisherfolk ought to be included at the negotiating table 
particularly when policy decisions affect them. 
  
The second debate in which I have chosen to intervene, is a critical constructivist 
theoretical debate regarding how identity shapes practices of governance. Identities shape 
how we see the world and our capacities to act in it (Bechhofer and McCrone, 
2009).  Given that critical constructivists see identities as fluid and not fixed, this study 
was able to explore varied identities enacting governance, and by extension, rights to the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery on multiple scales of analysis (from international to the local). 
In the case of this study, my contributions to this theoretical debate are rooted in the 
study’s ability to illustrate that in constructing governance of a regional fishery, elite actors 
have not resolved the political tensions surrounding formally demarcating shared 
distributive rights to the shared regional Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. I suggest 
that the identities of elite actors, and specifically political actors, have propelled them to 
uphold a long-standing pre-occupation with national sovereignty and to perpetually 
reproduce political contentions that have hindered the achievement of a viable Anglo-
Caribbean regional community. I was also able to demonstrate that despite there being a 
lack of resolve in the policy-making process, through the ability of Barbadian fisherfolk, 
as they indicate, to enact a shared identity and mutual interests in the multi-species 
regional flyingfish fishery, they were more likely to practice upholding a regional 
community, and to co-operate in governance and informally demarcating shared 
distributive rights so that livelihoods would not be jeopardised. The fisherfolk who were 
interviewed in this study shared the strong sentiment that when politicians conduct 
negotiations all fails. This research contribution reveals the important distinction between 
the contentious practices of elites upholding nationalistic divisions through policy and 
enforcement frameworks versus fisherfolk’s practices creating successful regional 
cooperation through mutually beneficial relationships. I was also able to demonstrate that 
embedded stratifications of race/colour and class have shaped the governance of 
Barbados’ national development priorities around the sectors of fisheries and tourism, 
and thus, the identities of communities vying for rights to own and physically access 
valuable coastal space in Barbados’ north-west. Consider that the long-standing political 
agreement with whites controlling the economy and blacks controlling the state has 
influenced uneven distribution of the island’s productive land resources. In my research, 
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I have demonstrated that local communities and fisherfolk do not feel welcome on the 
island’s platinum coast, where the luxury tourism product is designated. Furthermore, I 
have highlighted the significance that local communities and fisherfolk have reproduced 
the label of being “black Barbadians” as a way to lay claim that they ought to be included 
in the governance of Barbadian national development—in this case, by way of 
maintaining the cultural traditions and heritage of northern fisheries. These insights into 
racial and class identity are important for any understanding of the fisheries sector in 
Barbados and the region generally. 
  
The empirical contributions of the study discussed here also highlight how this study 
contributes to a key political and policy debate for SIDS within the Caribbean. This is 
regarding to what extent can SIDS, like Barbados, legitimise fisheries development and 
policy. In the Caribbean region there have been continual struggles to place fisheries as a 
visible and viable part of regional and national development agendas and on policy and 
political platforms. This is quite worrying for the region’s development prospects seeing 
that the majority of SIDS in the Caribbean depend quite heavily on their marine 
environment to sustain food security and livelihoods of the masses. This study as such 
aids in bringing attention to the political concerns surrounding the inability of high-level 
actors to viably recognise Caribbean fisheries and fisherfolk as part of the region’s 
development. The overarching question is how a paradigmatic shift can be engaged to 
look at these human dimensions of governing Caribbean fisheries before it is too late? 
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2, Theories of Maritime Governance: presents a literature review of the 
dominant theories of maritime governance pertaining to fisheries as framed between 
Hardin’s and Ostrom’s focus on property rights to the emerging focus on human rights. 
The importance of integrating social and cultural concerns in the concept of sustainable 
development as it is applied to the contemporary fisheries governance discourse is also 
discussed. Also offered is an explanation of how top-down and bottom-up governance 
are understood in this study. This chapter’s key findings are that the dominant theories 
of fisheries governance are built on prescriptive rationalist assumptions. I argue that 
particularly in the context of international relations, these perspectives do not provide an 
adequate understanding of the social motivations of actors in enacting governance, and 
by extension, rights. This literature review therefore feeds the debate concerning the 
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International Relations (IR) critical constructivist theoretical approach adopted in this 
study to get to the root of these social motivations.  
Chapter 3, On the Legitimation and Contestation of Norms: introduces and justifies 
the use of critical constructivism and its positions on “norms mattering” as this study’s 
theoretical approach rooted specifically within the context of IR. I build on Wiener's 
(2014) A Theory of Contestation to situate this study’s conceptual schema. Wiener offers a 
typology of norms that is useful to locate legitimacy gaps in governance in international 
settings that encapsulates three levels of norms: fundamental norms (type 1 norms), 
organising principles (type 2 norms) and standardised procedures (type 3 norms). This 
conceptual framework offers a starting point to explain  how norms emerge and come to 
be accepted and/or contested. The conventional IR critical constructivist approach to 
investigating the function and effects of norms is top-down. Consequently, the 
conceptual space needed to explore how norms are validated at the level of the locale is 
lacking, and therefore the perceptions of actors are unaccounted for in those places where 
governance is implemented. Chapter 3 thus makes the case for adjusting the typology of 
norms that A Theory of Contestation offers by including local norms in this study’s 
conceptual framework. In doing so, this chapter makes a contribution to IR critical 
constructivist research agendas by arguing that it is necessary to include in empirical 
analysis the effects of local norms on actors. This study thus adopts a conceptual 
framework which distinguishes legitimacy gaps between top-down governance being 
shaped via fundamental principles and standardised procedures (type 1 and 2 norms) and 
bottom-up governance being shaped by local norms (type 3 norms). The theoretical 
adjustments I propose insist that in understanding norms within the context of IR, critical 
constructivists should remember that local norms also matter. 
Chapter 4, Methods: explores the methods used in this study and how they complement 
this study’s conceptual schema (see chapter 3). The central aim of chapter 4 is to explain 
how to locate both the texts and practices which constitute how norms of governance 
come to be shared or contested in the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. In departing from 
conventional IR critical constructivist methodology of discourse analysis, this chapter 
makes the case for utilising ethnographic methods, i.e., interviews and non-participant 
observation as the best complement to this study’s conceptual schema. This is because of 
their ability to elicit, particularly, localised perspectives constructing governance of the 
fishery. Also explained is the importance of archival document analyses for triangulating 
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shared and contested perspectives of constructing governance of the flyingfish fishery. 
The chapter also explains why Barbados and its flyingfish fishery were chosen as an 
interpretive case study, and, why the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex (the main landing 
site in the island and commercial fishery) and Six Men’s Bay (an artisanal rural fishing 
community) as comparative social settings. In doing so, the chapter also explains how the 
regional and development norms of  under investigation in this study have emerged 
inductively from the field research process. A detailed reflective account of how the 
ethnographic methods used in this study as described above were coded and interpreted 
in line with the study’s conceptual schema is also provided. In line with this, this chapter 
also provides critical reflection on my own positionality and reflexivity within the research 
and the limitations of the methodological approach taken. 
Chapter 5, A Socio-Political Chronology of Governing the Barbadian Flyingfish 
fishery: presents a socio-political chronology of governing the Barbadian flyingfish 
fishery. It ought to be read as a bridge between this study’s theoretical and empirical 
chapters, and methodologically, as a partially descriptive/partially empirical chapter. It 
contributes by expanding on the sparse literature that can account for the socio-political 
dimensions of governing the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. My observations foreground 
the political tensions underpinning how the regional and development norms under 
investigation in this study have been forged through the social relations of race/colour, 
class, nationality and gender. From this, an understanding is gained of how the distributive 
and access rights afforded to Barbadian fisherfolk to the fishery have been shaped by the 
historical institutional environment constructing the top-down governance of the fishery. 
Chapter 6, Constructing the Region: is the first of two which present this study’s 
empirical findings. It is set in the context of constructing governance of the regional 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. The central question is: whether there is acceptance 
of or contention regarding the idea of shared distributive rights to the Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish fishery, and why or why not. This chapter’s findings ultimately suggest that 
although the norms of regional community and national sovereignty have both been 
widely accepted as guiding fundamental principles—they have also been contested 
institutionally (type 1 norms), procedurally (type 2 norms), and at the level of the locale 
(type 3 norms). This has led to the failure of elite actors to resolve the establishment of a 
regional fishing agreement between the neighbouring Anglo-Caribbean states of 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago for over 20 years. I found that there were legitimacy 
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gaps in governance given that state and technocratic actors constructed governance from 
the top-down in contrast with fisherfolk who constructed governance from the bottom-
up. These legitimacy gaps pointed to two overarching ways in which the top-down 
governance of the regional fishery is being challenged: 1) the appropriateness of high-
level negotiations to conclude a fishing agreement between the states, and, 2) the 
inclusivity of fisherfolks’ interests in these high-level negotiations.  
Chapter 7, Constructing Development: is the second of the study’s empirical chapters. 
Its analysis is set within the frame of constructing governance of Barbadian national 
development priorities. The central question is: whether there is acceptance or contention 
over the idea of granting reciprocal rights to luxury tourism and fisheries to own and 
physically access valuable coastal space in Barbados and why or why not. My observations 
are based on the developments of two luxury marinas and the Six Men’s fishing 
community alongside each other in Six Men’s, St. Peter. This chapter’s empirical findings 
ultimately suggest that the norm of sustainable development has been accepted as a way 
of talking and thinking about development, and, has shaped the rhetoric around achieving 
sustainable fisheries and sustainable tourism. However, there has been obvious friction 
because sustainable development has different meanings and uneven acceptance 
institutionally (type 1 norms), procedurally (type 2 norms) and at the level of the locale 
(type 3 norms). This has led to the failure of elite actors to resolve if the two sectors ought 
to be granted reciprocal rights to own and physically access coastal space in Barbados’ 
north-west through several political pronouncements. I found that there were legitimacy 
gaps in governance given that the state and private sector actors constructed governance 
from the top-down in contrast with fisherfolk and the local community who constructed 
governance from the bottom-up. These legitimacy gaps pointed to two overarching ways 
in which the top-down governance of Barbadian national development priorities is being 
challenged: 1) the appropriateness of integrating sustainable fisheries and sustainable 
tourism as pillars of national development in Six Men’s, and, 2) the inclusivity of ordinary 
Barbadians interests (particularly in the Six Men’s locale) in constructing national 
development priorities.  
The Conclusion: provides a brief recap of the study’s chapters and offers a detailed 
reflection on the study’s key findings on a whole and the implications of the study’s main 
contributions to knowledge. It also provides insight into the limitations of this study and 
possible areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF MARITIME GOVERNANCE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a literature review of the dominant theories of maritime governance 
pertaining to fisheries. This chapter’s key findings are that the extant literature details 
conventional and emerging approaches to fisheries governance that are built on 
prescriptive rationalist assumptions. I argue that particularly within the context of 
international relations, these perspectives do not provide an adequate understanding of 
the social motivations of actors in enacting governance, and by extension, rights.  
 
Section 1 describes how the concept of fisheries governance has come to be understood 
through the prisms of top-down and bottom-up governance. It goes further to explain 
the evolution and importance of the concept of property rights in fisheries and how it 
has come to influence the major debates about the governance of fisheries under the 
doctrines of Mare Liberum (freedom of the high seas) and Mare Clasum (the enclosed seas). 
Section 2 provides an overview of the major theories of maritime governance as 
underpinned by theses of Garrett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ and Elinor Ostrom’s 
‘governing the commons’. I make the argument that the concept of property rights has 
remained central in these governance paradigms. Hardin’s thesis laid the foundation for 
the dominant institutional arrangements for governing fisheries under the classifications 
of state-controlled property and private property, and, influenced the more contemporary 
institutional arrangement of rights-based-fisheries reforms built on free market principles. 
Ostrom’s thesis provided the foundation for alternative institutional arrangements for 
governing fisheries through participatory collective action via community-based 
management and co-management. Section 3 then goes on to document the recent 
paradigmatic shift from a focus on property rights to human rights and the importance 
of integrating social and cultural concerns in the concept of sustainable development as 
it is applied to the contemporary fisheries governance discourse. The key takeaway from 
these dominant paradigms of fisheries governance is that none provide the conceptual 
space to locate how governance emerges. The conclusion sums up this chapter’s findings. 
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1. Understanding Governance and Rights in the Fisheries Literature 
 
1.1. Top-down vs. Bottom-Up Governance 
Governance has become a central concept in the social sciences and in the policy world 
(Kooiman et al., 2008, pp. 1). This is perhaps because “the need for governance exists 
any time a group of people come together to accomplish an end” (Institute of 
Governance, 2018). Broadly, governance is defined as “a system of formal and/or 
informal rules that apply to certain activities, like fishing” (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 
44). But the concept has different meanings for different people which “often revolve 
around the perceived role of the state” both normatively and analytically (Kooiman et al., 
2008, pp. 1). The concept has often been traditionally related to “governments and what 
they do” (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009, pp. 554). It is important nevertheless to 
distinguish  governance from the term government (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 17). 
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009, pp. 554) explain that “government is not the only 
governor”. Governance therefore is the “shared, collective effort of government, private 
business, civic organisations, communities, political parties, universities, the media and 
the general public” (Ibid, 2009, pp. 554). Futhermore, governance should be understood 
as the “interaction between institutions … creating an orderly framework for action—
not only at the global level, but also at the regional, national and local levels” (Carley and 
Christie, 2000, pp. 18). Governance essentially determines then “who has power, who 
makes decisions, how other players make their voice heard, and how account is rendered” 
(Institute of Governance, 2018). From this, it can be suggested that good governance 
“therefore requires co-operation (or even, in the best circumstances, partnership)” 
between the actors “which represent the broad diversity of interests in any given society” 
(Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 18). The concept of governance ought to also be 
differentiated from management. This is because according to Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 
(2009, pp. 555) “governance is broader than management”. Management is a technical 
issue that involves a set of tools that are applied to solving a concrete task with clear goals 
and measurable outcomes. On the other hand, governance encapsulates the deliberation 
and determination of these goals “including the values, norms, and principles 
underpinning them” (Ibid, 2009, pp. 555).  
 
It is important to understand that crafting governance for fisheries/coastal resources has 
historically been based on their communally shared status. The importance of this 
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“commons” characteristic is expanded on later in this chapter. Given that various actors 
must interact in the governance process to organise, co-ordinate, and implement policy 
at varied levels— international, regional, national, local—there needs to be collective 
action between the different levels so that “bottom-up” and “top-down” efforts are 
aligned on governance outcomes (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 12). Despite this, the 
significant literature on resource governance does not align top-down and bottom-up 
governance perspectives. Moreover, these literatures are largely built on prescriptions of 
rational choice theory which sees “humans as self-interested, short-term maximisers” (cf. 
Ostrom, 1998, pp. 2). This thesis makes the argument that these governance approaches, 
omit actors’ social motivations in enacting governance, and in doing this demonstrates 
how top-down and bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve or frustrate governance 
goals. It is necessary then to provide an explanation about what is meant by top-down 
and bottom-up governance within this study’s context.  
 
Another important characteristic of fisheries governance is that “the rules that dictate 
social and economic policy considerations are often developed at the international level” 
(ICAR, 2018). However, policies usually meet resistance because they appear reasonable 
but often prove difficult or impossible to implement in practice because of political 
fissures between the policy making elite and the reality of life at the level of the locale 
(Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 22; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009, pp. 556). With this in 
mind, Donovan (2007b, pp. 972) explains that a top-down approach to governance: 
  
is characterised by a powerful, hierarchical state where a 
political elite devises policy that is then implemented 
through a strict, sequential and stable chain of command 
via bureaucrats and service providers. It emphasises 
national planning, rationality, command, control, 
obedience, and constraints, and evokes notions of red 
tape and bureaucracy. 
 
Here, the state uses regimented clear lines of authority “to enforce its norms and 
objectives and to minimize any conflict or deviation from its aims” (Donovan, 2007b, pp. 
972). Top-down governance has often been characterised as the ideal type of governance 
due to its emphasis on prescriptive rational analysis and models. Despite this, top-down 
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approaches have drawn heavy criticism because their rational assumptions are flawed in 
theory and practice when compared with every-day political life (Ibid, 2007, pp. 972). To 
explain, top-down decisions tend to lose sight of highly contextualised local knowledge 
(Linden et al., 2017). These accounts tend to overlook whether a policy is successfully 
implemented and also the dynamism in the policy process. Essentially then the top-down 
approach to governance has come to be characterised as devoid of human interaction and 
grossly oversimplifying the complexity of implementation. Therein, the relationship 
between policy and action is depoliticised and notions of power and dependence between 
agencies and actors are underplayed. Consequently, there is no way to account for the 
complex patterns of human motivations, behaviour and interests (Donovan, 2007b, pp. 
972). As it relates to fisheries resources, Rova (2006, pp. 3-4) explains that top-down 
governing — what he calls ‘hierarchical governing’ — often relies upon centralised 
command and control decision-making, and is based on legal and administrative tools. 
The reasons that many top-down systems fail are numerous and complex, including 
mostly “high information costs, lack of adequate monitoring devices, lack of trained 
personnel and/or financial resources, and subordination of environmental concerns to 
shorter-term economic or political interests”. Top-down governance thus emphasises 
regulatory incentives, while omitting normative incentives that particularly influence 
fisherfolk to participate in enacting governance (Ibid, 2006, pp. 3-4). 
 
Bottom-up approaches to governance are an alternative way of thinking about and 
understanding governance. Donovan (2007a, pp. 50) explains that a bottom-up approach 
to governance: 
  
takes the view that policy and action simply cannot 
be separated; hence, policy implementation is an 
essentially political process. It is concerned with the 
dynamism that bureaucrats and street-level service 
providers bring to the policy process. 
 
Bottom-up approaches therefore “demonstrate that policy making does not stop when a 
policy is approved because it is continually being remade as it is administered” (Donovan 
2007a, pp. 50). Essentially then, bottom-up approaches to governance have been 
characterised as “an antidote to rationalist, prescriptive, top-down models where policy is 
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devised by elites and mechanically implemented…” (Ibid 2007a, pp. 50). Herein, conflict 
and bargaining viewed as dysfunctional under top-down approaches are embraced as 
features in the governance process. Implementation is therefore understood “as another 
form of politics within the sphere of unelected power” (Ibid 2007a, pp. 50). It should be 
noted that bottom-up approaches to governance have drawn their own criticisms because 
of the removal of traditional barriers between elected representatives, public servants, and 
the general populace (Ibid 2007a, pp. 50). Indeed, as it relates to fisheries resources, Rova 
(2006, pp. 4) posits for example that “bottom-up approaches lead to insufficient 
conservation, since there are wider public interests in conservation that are unlikely to be 
fully internalised into the calculations of fishermen themselves”. Despite this, with 
bottom-up governance, human interactions are seen as central to successful policy 
implementation. Political scientists thus focus on investigating these interactions that link 
actors’ social motivations to behaviour (Donovan 2007a, pp. 50).  
 
The purpose of providing this explanation about how bottom up and top-down 
approaches to governance are understood as a political phenomenon in this study is not 
to assert whether either governance approach is better. As Rova (2006, pp. 4) argues 
neither bottom-up nor top-down governance approaches can be expected to work on 
their own. Moreover, “there are no basic and fixed governance structures that apply to all 
types of fisheries” (Ibid 2006, pp. 4). Rather, the purpose of these explanations is to 
suggest that there is the need for co-ordination and inclusivity of all actors in the 
governance process, thereby “pushing decisions down to the lowest level of governance 
possible”8 (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 23). If this is accomplished, what is mitigated is 
the fragmentation and incoherent action that top-down global governance prescriptions 
often evoke at the regional, national and local levels (Ibid, 2000, pp. 23). This thesis makes 
the case that when governing resources like fisheries, a more holistic recognition of 
local/bottom-up governance is needed to understand the contextual nuances of policy 
implementation not gained elsewhere (cf. Linden et al., 2017).   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Aligning top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance can be characterised as vertical integration of governance (Carley and 
Christie, 2000). Here, it is noted that governance frameworks can also be understood horizontally. Take for example, Kooiman’s 
framework on interactive governance (cf. Kooiman, et al. (eds), 2005). 
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1.2. The Evolution of Property Rights for Fisheries 
The concept of enforceable property rights has been an enduring problematic for 
establishing effective maritime governance. Yet, how rights to particularly fisheries have 
been understood has taken on varied forms within the literature (Carley and Christie, 
2000, pp. 43). It is therefore relevant to explain the dominant paradigms that have 
provided the basis upon which the current debates about fisheries governance have been 
built. Fisheries resources have been viewed as inexhaustible. This notion was reinforced 
over a 100 years ago by Thomas Huxley, an influential British philosopher, who famously 
stated “…probably all the great sea fisheries are inexhaustible; that is to say that nothing 
that we do seriously affects the number of fish…” (qtd in Baden and Noonan (eds), 1998, 
pp. 19). Huxley’s remarks were made at the at the opening of the 1883 International 
Fisheries Exhibition in London, United Kingdom. At the time free, open and unrestricted 
access to and harvesting of fisheries resources had become an accepted practice among 
states both within territorial waters and on the high-seas. It has been widely documented 
that this practice became entrenched through legal argument via the doctrine of the 
“freedom of the high seas” in the early seventeenth century. Dating back to the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, the great maritime powers had claimed large areas of the ocean, 
for example, the division of the Atlantic Ocean between Portugal and Spain (Carley and 
Christie, 2000, pp. 53; Gagern and van den Bergh, 2013, pp. 376). As these claims became 
increasingly opposed by emerging maritime powers, in 1609, the Dutch Jurist, Hugo 
Grotius9, argued in his famous treatise, Mare Liberum “that property rights could exist only 
if the holder was able to defend them against others” (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 53). 
Furthermore, “Grotius also argued that fishery resources were so abundant that no 
benefit would accrue from exclusive jurisdiction” (Ibid, 2000, pp. 53). Grotius’ position 
became accepted as customary international law in that “the high seas are open to all 
states: the high seas and the fish within it belong to no one: they are res nullius” (Ibid, 
2000, pp. 54). In early applications of the mare-liberum paradigm, a state’s territorial sea or 
marine sovereign territory was situated as the narrow strip along the coast, no more than 
3 nautical miles wide. This practice became globally recognised as open-access rights 
within which peoples of all states could harvest fish found on the high-seas (Ibid, 2000, 
pp. 54). The freedom of the high-seas doctrine did not go unchallenged. In 1635, the 
British jurist, John Selden, famously presented his doctrine on Mare Clasum10 or the closed 
                                                          
9 Hugo Grotius is known as the father of international law (cf. Feenstra, 2009). 
10 The concept of Mare Clasum actually dates back to the medieval era or the age of discovery when it served the political aims of the 
now erstwhile great maritime powers, Spain, Portugal, the Nordic countries, and England. For more information on the mare-clasum 
doctrine (cf. Theutenberg, 1984).  
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seas. Selden’s doctrine claimed that at least parts of the sea should belong to specific 
countries (Ziskind, 1973). 
 
The opposing paradigms of mare-liberum and mare-clasum continue to fuel the debates 
around effective fisheries governance today. The principle of free and open-access was 
widely accepted among states through to the middle of the twentieth century. Things 
began to change by the end of World War II when scientists had generally rejected the 
paradigm that fisheries were inexhaustible. The historical precedent of free and 
unregulated open-access led to the exploitation of the global marine commons, and, 
brought about the collapse and depletion of many of the world’s major fisheries stocks, 
for example, the collapse of the Atlantic Halibut fishery in the nineteenth century (Grasso, 
2008). This prompted a response from the international community to redefine the 
governance of fisheries/coastal resources with the first United Nations conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 195811. Coastal states were set on expanding their 
national fishing zones and their territorial sea limits. By 1960, the territorial sea or national 
fishing zone was generally regarded at 12 nautical miles.  By the 1970s, most countries 
had established 200 nautical mile national fishing zones under UNCLOS III (1972-1982). 
In 1994, the 200 nautical mile national fishing zones became officially codified into 
international law as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).  The advent of UNCLOS III 
was fuelled by the desire of newly independent developing states joining the international 
community to secure a fair share of ocean’s wealth, the concern of overfishing and stock 
collapse, as well as the climate of a ‘new international economic order’ and the concept 
of the ‘common heritage of mankind’12 (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 44, 54). Despite 
this global governance framework advocating for the establishment of property rights in 
fisheries, it is important to also mention that local governance frameworks have played a 
role in the designation of property rights to fisheries resources. It has been historically 
common for coastal fishing communities to establish rights to exclusive use of coastal 
fishing grounds that were normally known good fishing areas relatively close to the 
community (Carley and Christie, 2000, pp. 54). Focus is now turned to explaining the 
dominant theories of maritime governance, and by extension, how rights to fisheries 
resources have been understood in the literature. 
                                                          
11 There were 3 United Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea. The first in 1958 established four conventions: on the High Seas, 
the Continental Shelf, the Territorial Sea, and the Contiguous Zone. The second in 1960 was to discuss the breadth of the territorial 
sea and proposed fishing zone. Both UNCLOS 1 and II ended in failure. UNCLOS III beginning in 1982 was hailed as the only 
successful Law of the Sea conference (cf. United Nations, 1982; Nemeth et al., 2014). 
12 For more information on the new international economic order and the concept of the common heritage of mankind (cf. Vogler, 
2012). 
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2. Hardin’s Law and Ostrom’s Law 
 
2.1. Hardin’s Law 
Governing fisheries/coastal resources has long been classified as a problem of collective 
action in the commons. According to Carley and Christie (2000, pp. 15, authors' emphasis): 
  
the term ‘commons’ is derived from the shared 
grazing system on the village greens of feudal 
England. It refers to an important form of resource 
management involving land and natural resources 
held communally. These pose a special economic 
problem, in that natural resources are a form of public 
good subject to degradation or even destruction from 
overuse.   
 
It has been the case that most commons debates related to fisheries surround property, 
around which there are varied interpretations of property rights (Feeny et al., 1990). The 
first debate to highlight is the conventional "theory of common property resources" (CPR 
theory). According to Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) the "theory of common 
property resources" is summarized by the maxim "everybody's property is nobody's 
property". This is also known as the open-access problematic. Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop suggest that at one time or another, this concept of open access or free-for-all has 
been applied to an array of resources including fisheries, grazing lands, forestry, 
groundwater, oil, air, campgrounds, etc. CPR theory sees the individual as the unit of 
analysis and his or her rational choices under a set of constraints that must be explained 
or controlled (Saunders, 2014, pp. 641-644).  Here, it is important to make note of the 
definitional disagreements regarding the concept of common property resources. 
Bromley (1990, pp. 1-2) challenges that: 
 
there is no such thing as a common property 
resource— there are only resources controlled and 
managed as common property, or as state 
property, or as private property. Or, and this is 
where confusion persists in the literature, there are 
22 
 
resources over which no property rights have been 
recognised. We call these latter resources open 
access resources (res nullius).  
 
In other words, to avoid confusion, common property resources ought to be classified as 
common-pool resources that may be owned by national, regional or local governments, 
by communal groups, by private individuals or corporations, or used as open-access 
resources for whomever can gain access (Feeny et al., 1996; Ostrom and Hess, 2008). 
Distinctions of open-access are the source of major tensions in commons discourses 
(Bromley, 1990). This is because, as Feeny et al. (1996) describe, under open access 
regimes (res nullius), there is an absence of well-defined property rights, i.e., access to 
resources are unregulated, free and open to everyone. As noted earlier, many offshore 
ocean fisheries before the twentieth century, and until recently, most marine resources 
outside of the 3-12-200 nautical mile coastal zones clearly fell into this category. It has 
been argued in this regard that the governance problem lies with the perception of open 
access resources having no restrictions on aspiring users to refrain from exploiting the 
resource (Bromley, 1990). 
 
It is widely accepted in the resource governance literature that these prophecies of open-
access doom are built on ecologist, Garrett Hardin’s, classic and seminal article, The 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). The extant literature suggests that Hardin’s foretold 
tragedy is relatable to open-access fisheries through the economic theory of fisheries 
launched by Scott Gordon in 1954 (Feeny et al., 1996; Campling and Havice, 2014). 
Mansfield (2004, pp. 315) explains that Gordon’s 1954, The Economic Theory of Common 
Property Research: The Fishery is regarded as one of the first efforts to apply systematic 
economic analyses to fisheries. Gordon outlined that if fisheries were treated as a 
common rather than private resource, economic inefficiencies and overexploitation were 
inevitable. Gordon’s thesis was based on the argument that “fish in the sea are valueless 
to the fisherman, because there is no assurance that they will be there for him tomorrow 
if they are left behind today” (Gordon, 1954, pp. 135). Because “in the sea, fisheries, the 
natural resource, are not private property the rational fisher will catch as many fish today 
as possible” (Ibid, 1954, pp. 130-131). From Gordon’s perspective, the solution then was 
to focus on ways to reform property rights to harness individual decision making to both 
market and ecological realities (Mansfield, 2004, pp. 316). In the succeeding years, Hardin 
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is cited to have popularised the most widely accepted explanation of the over-exploitation 
of open-access resources via his ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis:  
 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom 
in the commons brings ruin to all (Hardin, 1968, pp. 
1244).  
 
Almost parallel to Scott’s 1954 predictions, Hardin’s seminal article advocated a 
pessimistic view of actors’ interests in the commons by drawing on the divergence 
between individual and collective rationality. Therein, Hardin is recognised to have 
championed the notion that resource degradation was inevitable unless the “commons” 
was converted to private property13 or government regulation of uses and users was 
instated. Thus, in Hardin’s thesis, without this formal allocation of property rights, there 
is an ungoverned space. Hardin generally recognised two general solutions and no 
others—private enterprise and centralized government control (Sharma, 2001, pp. 1).   
 
Hardin’s recommendations to govern fish as private property or state-controlled 
resources prompted a shift in the contemporary fisheries governance discourse to a focus 
on rights-based-fisheries market reforms. According to Mansfield (2004, pp. 316) for the 
first few decades following the inception of modern fisheries economics, while not 
unaffected by economic analysis, governing fisheries was primarily based on direct 
restrictions on fishing activity. In so doing, limiting entry to individual fisheries was 
viewed as a way of moving towards secure property rights. Thus, at the centre of the 
emerging and influential field of fisheries economics was the commons—increasingly cast 
as a market failure. The belief was that in the absence of clearly specified property rights, 
rational individual economic behaviour leads to economic and environmental problems. 
Regarding this, Mansfield suggests that the neo-classical economic paradigms of the 
1950s and 1960s which advocated for state involvement in fisheries prefigured, by several 
decades, the free market themes requiring state intervention to ensure a market society, 
for example, through enforceable property rights. By the 1980s, fisheries economists had 
largely adopted the perspective that enforceable property rights were best served to 
                                                          
13 In much of the economics literature, private property is defined as equivalent to alienation (cf. Ostrom and Hess, 2008, pp. 9).  
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govern communally held resources, like fisheries. Strikingly like Hardin’s tragedy of the 
commons thesis, the paradigm of rights-based-fisheries market reforms14 proposed that the 
only way to avoid environmental as well as economic havoc in the management of oceanic 
fisheries was by introducing private property rights and a market to govern them. The 
theme of market privatisation has evolved as being central to the birth of most social 
sciences approaches to fisheries today; and, in the current political economy discourse on 
fisheries refer to, for example, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and territorial user 
rights in fisheries (TURFS). Here, the World Bank has been chief among the institutional 
players steeped in the orthodox approach and analysis in offering an economic 
justification for fisheries reform (Campling and Havice, 2014). It is important to mention 
that this paradigmatic shift in the fisheries governance discourse was influenced by the 
realities of fisheries development in the era of extended jurisdiction. One could argue 
then, that the tenets of UNCLOS III were premised on the several decades of economic 
theory on the commons, and particularly the promotion of ‘secure’ property rights 
through enclosure and privatisation (Campling and Havice, 2014; Pedersen et al., 2014).  
 
It is fundamental to my thesis to explain how rights to fisheries resources are understood 
under the institutional arrangements influenced by Hardin’s thesis. Under a state-
controlled system, rights to the resource are vested exclusively in the government i.e. 
crown or state, which in turn makes decisions concerning access to the resource and the 
level or nature of exploitation afforded to users. Herein, the crown/state has coercive 
powers of enforcement. It is important to mention that the state governs most fisheries 
resources in Small Island Developing states. On the other hand, when a resource is 
classified as private property, the rights to exclude others from using the resource and to 
regulate the use of the resource are vested in an individual or group of individuals, for 
example, households, partnerships or corporations. Private property rights are generally 
recognised and enforced by the state and are usually exclusive, tradeable and transferable 
(Feeny et al., 1990; Steins and Edwards, 1999).  
 
Hardin’s thesis has received significant criticism in the extant literature (cf. Berkes, 1987; 
Bromley, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Feeny et al. (1996, pp. 187) explain that overexploitation 
has indeed occurred, but its incidence is not exclusive to situations of open access as 
                                                          
14 For more information on rights-based fisheries market reforms (cf. Carley and Christie, 2000; Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012; 
Campling and Havice, 2014; Pedersen et al., 2014). 
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implied by Hardin. In fact, overexploitation has also occurred under private and state 
property regimes. Hardin’s thesis is therefore perceived as oversimplified and as overly 
restrictive in describing the motivations of fisherfolk (Pomeroy, 1994, pp. 25; Sharma, 
2001). Additional criticisms have been levelled against Hardin’s state-control model in 
that it has inadequate understanding of social organisation while concentrating power in 
the hands of elites (Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012, pp. 310). The notion of private 
property rights as encapsulated by rights-based-fisheries market reforms has also received 
a significant amount of disapproval from scholars and practitioners alike. Campling and 
Havice (2014, pp. 707-727) observe that social goals beyond economic efficiency are not 
explicit. Economic efficiency is assumed to generate socially desirable conditions by 
stimulating productivity and limiting waste, but this is likely to spur power inequalities 
and varied priorities of governance. In so doing, Pedersen et al. (2014) argue that rights-
based-fisheries reforms, including those that claim to be based on human rights 
principles, fail to recognise the political and social roots of unsustainable use of marine 
resources, and, also omit from the heart of the debate the communities whose livelihoods 
and food sovereignty depend on the resources. Chuenpagdee and Song (2012, pp. 311) 
equally raise the concern that these reforms ignore rising issues with respect to equity and 
erosion of community identities. Issues of scale are also important. It has been suggested 
that Hardin’s thesis focused on addressing issues of a global commons, whereas, there 
have been several realistic successful empirical cases of governing local commons (Berkes, 
1989; Ostrom, 1990; Araral, 2014). This now leads to a discussion on Ostrom’s Law as 
her thesis has provided the foundation for alternative paradigms for governing maritime 
resources in the commons, like fisheries. 
 
2.2. Ostrom’s Law 
During the 1980s, scholars in anthropology, institutional economics, and geography were 
challenging the idea that the “commons” is the ultimate cause of environmental and 
economic problems associated with resource access and use (Mansfield 2004, pp. 317). 
In fact, Feeny et al. (1990) charge that until the 1980s, many scholars had presumed that 
the users of such resources could not self-organize to manage them, and so,  
recommended the imposition of government or private ownership. However, scholarly 
reports began to raise serious questions about the wisdom of imposing these particular 
institutional arrangements. Mansfield (2004, pp. 317) notes that researchers found 
numerous case studies from around the world, of fisheries and otherwise, in which local 
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people successfully managed common resources. Within this empirical work, scholars 
offered the commons not as the underlying cause of resource problems, but rather as a 
potential solution (cf. McCay and Acheson, 1987; Berkes, 1989; Bromley, 1992). These 
approaches have come to be known in the extant literature as participatory collective 
action solutions to governing the commons. 
 
Ostrom's (1990)15 influential work Governing the Commons is heralded as leading the charge 
in emphasising participatory collective action solutions in the commons in academic and 
policy fora. It is important to mention that throughout her career Ostrom was keen to 
avoid crude ideological labelling of left vs. right confrontations (Pennington, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it has been argued by Ostrom and her colleagues that her thesis on 
governing commons sits firmly within the tradition of classic liberal political economy, 
and broadly, within the rational choice tradition in economic and political theory16. 
Ostrom’s framework recognises that individuals are purposeful actors that respond to 
incentives. Institutions shape these incentives17 (Ostrom et al., 2012, pp. 15, 22). 
According to Ostrom et al. (2012, pp. 22): 
 
Institutions refer both to formal and ‘hard’ institutions, 
such as the relative extent of the individual, communal 
and state-owned property rights and a legal system which 
enforces these rights; and to informal or ‘soft’ institutions 
such as cultural attitudes towards promise-keeping, and 
preferences for long or short-term gain.  
 
Ostrom’s thesis was built on the argument of “moving beyond the dichotomy between 
privatisation and government regulation” as advocated by Hardin (Ostrom et al., 2012, 
pp. 21). As such, Ostrom’s work on the commons has been crucial to identify what 
alternative property institutions might look like (Ibid, 2012, pp. 21-22). Ostrom’s work is 
often misrepresented as refuting the paradigm of private property rights to govern the 
commons (Pennington, 2012). Although highly critical of free market principles and the 
notion of centralised planning, Ostrom’s thesis was not in conflict with these concepts 
                                                          
15 Ostrom has at least three major legacies to environmental governance: 1) a critique of Hardin 2) for establishing an international 
research agenda to identify determinants of collective action in the commons; and 3) for establishing the Bloomington school of 
institutional analysis otherwise known as the Ostrom workshop (cf. Araral, 2014). 
16 For more on how Ostrom engages with rational choice theory (cf. Ostrom, 1998). 
17 Ostrom is also the professed founder of the paradigm of new institutionalism or new institutional economics. This paradigm was 
built off her empirical work on governing local commons (cf. Nee, 2005; Vijge, 2013).  
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entirely. In fact, she appreciated that in context-specific circumstances controlled 
property institutions like the state or market may be better placed to incentivise resource 
conservation (Ostrom et al., 2012). What Ostrom’s work did was provide an alternative 
to a top-down reading of governing the commons to incorporate the expertise of local 
actors that central planning cannot. As Ostrom et al. (2012, pp. 25) explain, the aim of 
Ostrom’s thesis “is to discover what factors are most likely to result in bottom-up 
solutions to potential common-pool problems and what factors are likely to thwart the 
development of these solutions”.  
 
Essentially, Ostrom’s approach to theorising about the commons was to debunk the 
conventional textbook analysis of the ‘tragedy in the commons’ by traditional ecologists 
like Hardin by using rigorous empirical case study analysis via a pre-defined set of 
institutional principles18 (Ostrom et al., 2012). Contrary to conventional thinking, 
Ostrom’s work suggested that communities were able to self-organise and that communal 
ownership worked (The Library of Economics and Liberty, 2018). Based largely on field 
work, multi-method and multi-disciplinary approaches, Ostrom’s research agenda 
explored more broadly what forms of property rights are deemed most relevant to govern 
commonly held resources in context-specific cases (Ostrom et al., 2012; Pennington, 
2012). In fact, Ostrom has been lauded for overturning the conventional wisdom of 
Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ through emphasizing that tragedy is not inexorable 
and cannot be generalised. This Ostrom inspired research agenda covered, for example, 
governance of fisheries in Maine and Mexico, ancient irrigation in Nepal, Arizona, Spain 
and the Philippines; forestry in India, Nepal, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia; pasture in 
Kenya, etc. (Ostrom et al., 2012; Araral, 2014). Ostrom’s thesis has been useful to draw 
attention to the largely informal institutions which underpin governance. This has laid the 
institutional foundation for fisheries governance in two major forms: community-based 
management and co-management.  
 
Community based management emphasises a self-governing institution where customary 
traditions are intricately linked to and inseparable from community functioning 
(Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012, pp. 310). In this regard, scholars have argued that 
Ostrom’s thesis raised the possibility of self-governance as a viable solution to collective 
action problems in the commons. Indeed, in the context of market and state panaceas, if 
                                                          
18 For more information on Ostrom’s institutional  design principles for governing the commons  (cf. Cox, et al., 2010). 
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rational self-interested individuals and countries can learn to trust each other, the 
possibility of self-governance has a powerful intuitive appeal (Araral, 2014, pp. 14). In the 
contemporary era, this notion of self-governance in the commons has largely been driven 
by donor/policy support of government and non-governmental organizations 
(Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012, pp. 310). Pomeroy (1994, pp. 1) argues that the growing 
realisation of the need for a stronger community role in resource management can be 
seen in a wide range of programs and policies worldwide. Both increased local 
participation and institutional restructuring have given the community and resource users 
greater control of resource management. Pomeroy goes on to suggest that community-
based ‘management starts from the premise “that people have the innate capacity to 
improve their quality of life. Often, support is needed to organise and educate people to 
mobilise available resources to meet their needs” (Pomeroy, 1994, pp. 2). The potential 
advantages of community-based management therefore include effectiveness and equity. 
This self-management approach can also be more economical as it relates to 
administration, monitoring and the enforcement of rules because responsibility for 
governing falls on the community (Pomeroy, 1994, pp. 2).  
 
The other type of institutional arrangement that has been influenced by Ostrom’s thesis 
is that of co-management. This approach to governing fisheries is considered a hybrid 
and “typically manifests as a sharing of responsibility between government and local level 
fishery organisations” (Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012, pp. 311). Berkes et al. (1991) 
similarly describe co-management as partnerships, where the national government and 
community share authority. The amount of authority that the national government and 
the community shares differs and depends on the country and site-specific conditions. 
Co-management focuses on shared authority, whereas, community-based management 
focuses on self-governing solutions. Property rights are still at the core of community-
based management and co-management institutional approaches to fisheries governance 
(Pomeroy, 1994). How rights are granted and legitimated are situation specific. For the 
former, rights of access and use are defined and designated by community leaders and 
members (Warner, 2000). For the latter, the state is seen as facilitating oversight of rights 
of access and use (Jentoft, 1989).  
 
Like Hardin, Ostrom’s thesis has been heavily criticised by scholars and practitioners 
alike. There is little dispute that participatory collective action via community-based 
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management and co-management can be used to solve issues of governing the commons. 
However, according to Rova (2006, pp. 3) “the challenge is much of this research has 
focused on locally situated small user groups and communities” (cf. Pinkerton, 1989; 
Tang, 1991; Baland and Platteau, 1996). It is important to highlight here that within the 
context of the resource governance literature in international relations, this thesis departs 
from the underlying principles of Ostrom’s thesis. With regards to this focus on local 
level empirics, Cox et al. (2010, pp. 12) argue that Ostrom’s empirical design principles19 
are overly precise with respect to the range of conditions to which they might be 
applied—for example, the characteristics of the community or institution, such as scale, 
village size, homogeneity, or the ability to exclude outsiders. From Cox et al’s perspective, 
in empirical analysis, these prescriptive characteristics do not capture or explain how the 
social mechanisms that keep an institution or community alive over time emerge or 
evolve.  
 
It’s also worth critiquing how the concept of community is applied in Ostrom’s work 
because it affects how rights holders are conceived in empirical analysis. Carley and 
Christie (2000, pp. 66) contend that “the distinctive demographic, social and cultural 
characteristics of the community harvesting the resource will necessarily influence the 
form rights should take”. Drawing on Kearney et al. (2007, pp. 81), within the context of 
this thesis, the term community also carries with it, implicitly or explicitly, a reference to 
the norms and social institutions that characterise these social settings. Moreover, various 
fields of social science point to the interdependence of people living in a community in 
developing their identity, sense of meaning, values, as well as economic well-being. In 
other words, it would be incorrect to understand communities as homogenous entities 
with fixed values, identities and interests as implied in Ostrom’s thesis. Rather, it is more 
substantive to view communities as highly complex and differentiated “fluid associations 
formed through processes of cultural struggles in the contexts of unequal power” (Singh, 
2006, pp. 313).  
 
It is also important to be cognisant then that coastal communities who rely on natural 
resources are subject to a mix of jurisdictions, and, more often than not, governance is 
guided by international norms – municipal, provincial and federal governments as well as 
                                                          
19 See supranote 19. 
 
30 
 
First Nations20 (Kearney et al., 2007, pp. 80). Additional criticisms have been levelled 
against Ostrom’s underlying rationalist assumptions. According to Blomley (2008, pp. 
320) Ostrom’s assumptions of self-interested rationality, rule-guiding behaviour and 
maximising strategies are inadequate for capturing the ethical and political issues involved 
in resolving conflicting understandings of public interest and public ownership among 
local actors. Moss (2014, pp. 460) suggests that Blomley’s point is not just about the 
absence of certain dimensions, such as, political contestation from much commons 
research. It is also about how commons are the product of social interaction. As Blomley 
articulates, “commons [are] not so much found as produced” (Blomley, 2008, pp. 320). 
So, while Ostrom emphasises the importance of local level empirics, as the empirical cases 
of this study also do, Ostrom’s thesis provides no way to understand how these 
governance forms emerge, are legitimated and contested. This thesis will continue to 
expand on the importance of this, particularly in context-specific cases as is this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 First Nations is another name used for indigenous communities (cf. Kearney et al., 2007, pp. 80). 
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3. Human Rights and Sustainable Development 
 
3.1. From Fishing Rights to Human Rights 
Over the past twenty years, policy prescriptions for strengthening fisheries governance 
have been dominated by the theses of Hardin and Ostrom (Allison et al., 2012, pp. 14). 
These governance approaches have been uniquely concerned with establishing property 
rights for fisheries via greater economic efficiency and participatory collective action 
(Ibid, 2012, pp. 16).  Allison et al. (2012)  argue that these approaches do not capture the 
less obvious long-term shortfalls in the social, economic, and cultural dimensions of 
fishing communities, particularly in developing countries, manifest as poverty and social 
exclusion (Allison et al., 2012, pp. 16, 19). 
 
These policy and political considerations have prompted a recent paradigm shift in the 
fisheries governance literature from a focus on fishing rights as debated through the 
discourse on property rights to human rights (Allison et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2014). In 
recent years, the notion of human rights has gained prominence in international 
development policy as a response to capturing essential components of the human side 
of development that economic indicators fail to capture (Ratner et al., 2014, pp. 120). 
Ratner et al. (2014, pp. 120) explain that:  
 
in its application to natural resource management, a 
human rights-based framework draws attention to 
the institutions and power structures that determine 
resource allocation and access, as essential 
contributions to livelihoods and wellbeing, 
sometimes framed as environmental entitlements. 
 
Proponents of this approach have validated their claims by making use of the existing 
legal framework that supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Allison et al., 
2012, pp. 15). This notion of human rights-based development thus “aims to use the 
framework of international human rights law and its codification in national legal systems 
as a basis for securing the rights of groups of citizens who the state — or its partners in 
the development industry—are currently neglecting or harming” (Allison et al., 2012, pp. 
19). Ratner et al. (2014, pp. 120) explain that recent years have seen an explicit adoption 
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of human rights principles in international norms in the fisheries sector. Since 2007, this 
has been increasingly notable with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) along with its range of civil society partners increasingly framing policy support 
and governance advice in the small-scale fisheries sector in terms of human rights (cf. 
FAO, 2007, 2009, 2012). In 2015, the FAO Guidelines on Securing the Rights of  Small-Scale 
Fisheries were ratified by its’ 192 Member states, thereby setting the basis for the 
institutionalisation of human rights approaches to the sector (FAO, 2015).  
 
Ratner et al. (2014) highlight three major reasons for this shift to human rights in the 
fisheries governance discourse. The first, “is the institutionalisation of human rights 
approaches to development in the UN system, with particular emphasis on implementing 
the Right to Food”21 (Ibid, 2014, pp. 120-121). Second, “is the recognition that small-
scale fisherfolk tend to be marginalised in social, economic, and political terms, and, often 
include indigenous groups, disadvantaged castes and other groups who face particular 
obstacles to participation in broader development decision-making” (Ibid, 2014, pp. 121). 
Third, is the rise of civil society movements to secure “traditional and communal tenure 
systems in the face of state and private-sector led moves to strengthen private property 
rights or state ownership and private leasing arrangements” (Ibid, 2014,  pp. 121).  
 
Indeed, this human rights-based approach has been particularly useful for indigenous 
fishing communities in their wider quest for self-determination and equal rights. 
Nevertheless, in small-scale fishing communities, particularly in developing countries, 
fisherfolk are often excluded from the processes of development planning. This is often 
because they are mobile (sometimes unregistered migrants), living in remote marginal 
areas, or because the roles and contributions of fisherfolk to society and economy is 
poorly known and undervalued. It is no secret that many inhabitants of small-scale fishing 
communities lack the power, education and cohesive social institutions to be aware of 
their rights, self organise, articulate their demands, and to negotiate with government 
officials to fulfill their responsibilities of resource stewardship. It has been propsed that 
these issues of social exclusion can be addressed by adopting a human rights approach to 
fisheries governance. Here it is up to fisheries departments and communities to work 
together to form partnerships with emerging grassroot democractic processes, new 
                                                          
21 For more information on the debate surrounding the Right to Food (cf. United Nations, 2012). 
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alliances of power, for example, between environmental NGOs and local communities 
to establish fair fishing agreements (Allison et al., 2012, pp. 20-21). 
 
Applying the human rights approach to fisheries governance is still rather new in the 
fisheries governance discourse22. It has been characterised as useful to capture the 
complex social relationships that exist between poverty, resource access and the wider 
economic and political context, especially when applied to small-scale fisheries in 
developing countries (Ratner et al., 2014, pp. 121). It is important to mention that the 
human rights approach does not reject or promote any specific institutional property 
rights arrangements for fisheries. What is does is address the fundamental issues of 
poverty and social exclusion that often cause these arrangements to fail (Allison et al., 
2012, pp. 25). Despite its utility for improving understandings of the social conditions 
faced by fisherfolk, and, the potential impacts of tenure reform processes, the human 
rights approach to fisheries governance has received criticism. According to Ratner et al. 
(2014, pp. 121, authors’ emphasis), “human rights approaches are being promoted with 
limited empirical and conceptual understanding of the relevance and desirability of this 
turn to rights-talk”. Moreover, “this is compounded by the fear that, in the international 
organisations at least, the human rights agenda may be lofty and idealistic rhetoric, 
unmatched by political commitment and action” (Ibid, 2014, pp. 121). Therefore, it is 
important to consider, as Sen (2005, pp. 151) argues, that the notion of human rights is 
seen by many to be frail, lacking in foundation and “perhaps even in coherence and 
cogency”. It’s also important to add that within the context of the extant literature on 
fisheries governance, human rights is presented as a top-down internationalised concept, 
which, may be deemed politically naïve because of the lack of rigorous empirical analysis 
of the meaning and application of the concept in the fisheries sector (cf. Charles, 2011; 
Lewis et al., 2017; Zheng, 2018). 
 
3.2. Socio-Cultural Sustainability and Fisheries 
The concept of sustainable development has also long been an underlying tenet of 
achieving effective fisheries governance. The concept officially rose to prominence in 
1987 with the World Commission on Environment and Development’s publication of 
the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987, pp. 43). From its inception, the norm of sustainable 
                                                          
22 There are also shifts in the fisheries discourse to an interactive governance approach,  whereby the interactive study of poverty and 
governance in fishing communities is brought together in empirical analysis (cf. Kooiman et al., 2008). These paradigms which see 
fisheries as linked social-ecological systems are out of the scope of this chapter. For more information (cf. Garcia et al., 2003; Ratner 
and Allison, 2012). 
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development has encompassed three principles: economic sustainability, meaning 
generating prosperity at different levels of society and addressing the cost effectiveness 
of all economic activity; social sustainability, meaning respecting human rights and equal 
opportunities for all in society; and, environmental sustainability, meaning conserving and 
managing resources (cf. UNCED, 1992b). 
 
Within the contemporary fisheries governance discourse, the debate has often been 
framed around achieving environmental and economical sustainability. However, there 
has been a paradigm shift accelerated by the United Nations Development Program’s 
publication of Human Development Reports beginning in 1991. “Earlier ideas about the 
centrality of economic growth in development policy (increases in real GDP per head) 
were being replaced by broader notions of development as a human-centred rather than 
a commodity-centred process” (Throsby, 2008, pp. 2). This paradigm shift was further 
accelerated by the writings of economist Amartya Sen, “who characterised development 
as ‘human capability expansion’, i.e. enhancement of the capacities of people to lead the 
sorts of lives they desire, including their access to cultural resources and cultural 
participation”23 (Ibid, 2008, pp. 2). The principle of social sustainability and the inclusion 
of culture as an essential part of a human-centred sustainable development paradigm was 
therefore brought into focus by the international community. This human-centred 
approach to sustainable development was further validated with the adoption of the 1992 
Agenda 2124 as well as the introduction of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) (UNDESA, no date; UNCED, 1992a). The Agenda 21 declaration was important 
because it encompassed a compact set of 27 principles, within which, promoted, inter-alia, 
were notions of the centrality of human beings to the concerns of sustainable 
development (Principle 1) (UNDESA, 2011). The 2015 SDGs further advanced this 
human-centred approach by bringing together the three aspects of sustainable 
development – the economic, environmental and social - and includes 17 global goals, 
169 targets and 230 indicators that apply to all countries, with the aim of achieving them 
by the year 203025 (Institute of Development Studies, 2017). However, there have been 
                                                          
23 See for example, Development as Capacity Expansion (Sen, 1990). 
24 The 1992 Agenda 21 is titled the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  Agenda 21 is a non-binding comprehensive plan of 
action to achieve sustainable development to be undertaken globally, nationally and locally. It was adopted by more than 178 
Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 
June 1992. The principles of Agenda 21 were strongly reaffirmed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa from 26 August to 4 September 2002.  (cf. UNCED, 1992a). 
25 The successor to Agenda 21 was the 2000 Millennium Development Goals that were later replaced with the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) known in the international development community as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
is titled the Future We Want. For more information (cf. UNDESA, no date). 
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criticisms levelled against implementing sustainable development by way of the SDG 
principles declared in 2015, whereby, while economic and environmental sustainability 
are well understood, more attention needs to be paid to understanding social sustainability 
(Verbeek and Dill, 2017). Integrating social and cultural concerns has thus become an 
important facet of achieving sustainable fisheries governance in the global sustainable 
development agenda.  This undoubtedly is linked to the goal of this thesis of gaining a 
better recognition and understanding of bottom-up perspectives in the contemporary 
fisheries governance discourse. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter provided a review of the literatures of the dominant theories of maritime 
governance. Given that governance and rights are two overarching concepts that are 
addressed throughout this study, Section 1 first explained how they evolved in the extant 
literature and how they are applied within the literature on fisheries. Within the context 
of international relations, a main contribution of this thesis is that the significant literature 
on resource governance does not adequately capture the extent to which bottom-up 
analysis goes beyond rationalist insights to genuinely capture the social motivations of 
actors. Notwithstanding, rights to fisheries have come to be defined in the extant 
literature on resource governance through the dominant prism of property rights, which 
has been built on the long-standing debates concerning the paradigms of mare-liberum 
(freedom of the high seas) and mare-clasum (the enclosed seas). Section 2 described how 
the dominant theories of maritime governance have been influenced by rational choice 
theoretic assumptions, and, how they have evolved via the theses of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ and Ostrom’s ‘governing the commons’. Hardin’s thesis influenced 
notions of how property rights to fisheries establish effective governance through state-
controlled, private property and later rights-based fisheries market reforms. Conversely, 
Ostrom’s thesis influenced notions of how property rights to fisheries establishes 
effective governance through participatory collective action in the form of community-
based management and co-management. Section 3 then goes on to document the recent 
paradigmatic shift from a focus on property rights to human rights and the importance 
of integrating social and cultural concerns in the concept of sustainable development as 
it is applied to the contemporary fisheries governance discourse. Despite these divergent 
positions of enacting fisheries governance, within these documented approaches the 
conceptual space for capturing the social motivations of actors who would enact 
governance and uphold rights is not adequately recognised or understood. Indeed, a 
major limitation of the rational theories of fisheries governance documented in this 
chapter is that they do not capture adequately the influence of ideas, values, and norms 
on the identities and interests of actors. This study seeks to support these claims and is 
directly concerned with identities, discourses, and discursive practices constructing 
governance of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery, also contributing to the sparse literature 
on the socio-political dynamics of the fishery. Focus is now turned to explaining the 
critical constructivist theoretical framework adopted in this study as a way to get to the 
root of these social motivations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ON THE LEGITIMATION AND CONTESTATION OF NORMS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter makes the case for a critical constructivist research agenda rooted in 
uncovering and understanding legitimacy gaps in governance. It offers a theoretical 
framework grounded in International Relations (IR) constructivist approach to explain 
how the regional and development norms constructing governance of the fishery have 
shaped actors’ perceptions about their rights to the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. To 
accomplish this, Section 1 introduces IR constructivism and particularly critical 
constructivism as the best theoretical approach to underpin this study’s research agenda. 
I argue that it is particularly cogent as an alternative theoretical approach to rationalist 
theories, in that it adequately captures the influence of ideas, values, and norms on the 
identities and interests of actors. Section 2 posits the use of IR critical constructivism and 
its positions on “norms mattering” as the basis for this study.  In Section 3, I build on 
Wiener's (2014) A Theory of Contestation to situate this study’s conceptual schema. Wiener 
offers a typology of norms that is useful to locate legitimacy gaps in governance in 
international settings and a starting point to explain  how norms emerge and come to be 
accepted and/or contested.  At the same time, Weiner’s approach, and arguably other 
dominant IR critical constructivist approaches to investigating the function and effects 
of norms is top-down. Omitted from these research agendas is the theoretical space to 
explore how norms are validated at the level of the locale. By failing to account for the 
perceptions of actors who are affected by governance in implementation, Wiener and 
other IR constructivists are unable to fully account for why governance is resisted or 
reworked from the bottom-up. Section 4 thus makes the case for adjusting the typology 
of norms that A Theory of Contestation offers by including local norms in this study’s 
conceptual framework. In doing so, I contribute in this chapter to the wider IR critical 
constructivist research agenda.   
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1. Constructivism in International Relations 
 
1.1. A Middle Ground Theory 
Chapter 2 explained that the major theories of maritime governance as applied to fisheries 
have been couched in rationalist thinking. This rationalist thinking assumes the regularity 
and consistency of behaviour, whereby, norms are regarded as standards of behaviour, 
defined in terms of fixed rights and obligations (Bjorkdahl, 2002, pp. 13). A major 
limitation of these rational theories is that they do not “capture adequately the influence 
of ideas, values, and norms on the identities and interests of actors” (Ibid, 2002, pp. 9). 
Given critical constructivism’s theoretical strength in providing such understandings of 
actors’ social motivations specifically within the context of International Relations (IR), 
this theory is introduced here as the conceptual approach that underpins this study’s 
empirical findings. 
 
Constructivism is an IR theory that gained prominence during the 1980s as a “middle-
ground” between rationalism and reflectivism26 (Adler, 1997; Guzzini, 2000; Wiener, 
2006). From the 1990s, the principal axis of the academic debate lay between rationalists 
and constructivists27 (Wendt, 1992; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Katzenstein et al., 1998; 
Finnemore and Sikkink. 2001; Reus-Smit, 2013). Rationalist theories, i.e. neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism institutionalism encapsulated by the ‘neo-neo’ debate, are constructed 
“upon choice theoretic assumptions”28 (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 220). The former has a 
focus on conflict and anarchy, and the latter, on interdependence and cooperation in IR 
(Choi 2015). After the end of the Cold-War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it 
became clear to IR theorists that the material explanatory methodology of neo-realists 
and neo-liberal institutionalists could not predict or adequately comprehend the systemic 
transformations reshaping  the global order (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 223). Indeed, before 
constructivism, ‘neo-neo’ solutions to world politics were the dominant framework to 
address collective action dilemmas (Olson, 1965). Neo-liberal institutionalism introduced 
by Keohane and Nye (1972) emphasises that institutions and regimes regulate interests 
among states and shapes their behaviour. By emphasising intentions and preferences, 
neo-liberal institutionalists are most concerned with issues related to economic welfare 
                                                          
26 Rationalism and reflectivism as constructivism’s main analytical competitors is also defined as the debate between materialist and 
individualist theories. Materialist theories see political behaviour as determined by the physical world alone, and individualist theories 
treat collective understandings as simply epiphenomena of individual action and deny that they have causal power or ontological status 
(cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, pp. 392-393).  
27 It is acknowledged that this is a very Western-centric reading of constructivism in International Relations. 
28 For more information on the foundations of the ‘neo-neo’ debate (cf. Nye, 1988; Baldwin, 1993). 
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and international political economy and other issues unrelated to international security 
and anarchy, for example, international environmental concerns (Baldwin, 1993, pp. 4-8). 
It is worth mentioning here that given Ostrom’s focus on institutions shaping incentives 
and also being the professed founder of new institutionalism or new institutional 
economics that her thesis does hold affinity with Keohane (cf. Nee, 2005; Vijge, 2013). 
In fact, in Local Commons and Global Interdependence, Keohane and Ostrom eds. (1995) 
sought to bridge the common pool resource and international relations literatures by 
exploring which design principles or processes lead to effective institutional development. 
Keohane (2010) has also advanced the Ostrom research agenda by exploring the 
evolution of institutions of collective action. Power-based neo-realism on the other hand, 
advanced by Waltz (1979), is premised on two fundamental assumptions: one, that the 
international system is anarchical; and, two, states are primarily interested in their own 
survival. Waltz argued that in order for states to ensure their survival, states must 
maximise their power (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 218-219). In other words, neo-realists see 
neo-liberal institutionalists as exaggerating the impact of institutions and regimes on state 
behaviour. As such, neo-realists emphasise that anarchy causes states to be preoccupied 
with relative power, security and survival. Consequently, neo-realists are more inclined to 
investigate issues related to international security and the causes of war (Baldwin, 1993, 
pp. 4-8; Jervis, 1999, pp. 45). 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, the theses of Hardin (1968), Ostrom (1990), and the more recent 
paradigmatic shift from property rights for fisheries to human rights are couched in such 
rationalist assumptions. This is because rationalists believe that actors’ interests are 
exogenously determined, i.e., preferences are treated as determined a priori to social 
interaction. They consciously exclude interest formation because they are not interested 
in where these preferences come from, but only in how actors pursue them strategically 
(Reus-Smit, 2013; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Although there are stark differences in 
their approaches to world politics, Reus-Smit (2013, pp. 220) presents three shared 
theoretical assumptions about neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism: “First, 
political actors – be they individuals or states – are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested 
and rational”. Second, actors’ “interests are assumed to be exogenous to social 
interaction”. This means “social interaction is not considered an important determinant 
of interests”. Third, “society is understood as a strategic realm in which individuals or 
states come together to pursue their predefined interests”. Thus, despite the diverse 
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theoretical frames in which they approach world politics, rationalist theorists do not treat 
actors as inherently social and thus products of their social environment. The shared view 
among constructivists was that neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism were “under-
socialised” because of their insufficient attention to “the ways in which actors in world 
politics are socially constructed” (Wiener, 2006, pp. 9). 
 
As a response to rationalist assumptions then, constructivists “focus on the role of ideas, 
norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in particular interest in the 
role of collectively held or ‘inter-subjective’ ideas and understandings on social life” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 392). It is an approach to social analysis that holds 
three primary assumptions to be true: 1) “human interaction is shaped primarily by 
ideational factors, not simply material ones; 2) the most important ideational factors are 
widely shared or “inter subjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and, 3) 
these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors” (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 393).  
 
1.2. Living in a World of Our Making – A Constructivist Ontology  
Constructivists see states much the same as individuals living in a “world of our making” 
(Onuf, 1989). Constructivism, as such, is not a substantive theory of politics. Rather “it 
is a social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 393). Essentially, “constructivism is about human 
consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie, 1998, 8pp. 56) and focuses on 
what Searle (1995) has called “social facts” i.e. things like money, sovereignty, and rights, 
which have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist 
and act accordingly29. Understanding how social facts change and the ways these influence 
politics is the major concern of constructivist analysis in IR (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 
pp. 391). Consequently, IR constructivists have adopted research agendas focused on 
Foucauldian analyses of the power of discourse (Keeley, 1990; Price, 1995); theories of 
agency and culture (Bukovansky, 2001); self-presentation in public life (Barnett, 1998); 
security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998); theories about organizational behaviour 
(Finnemore, 1996a, 1996b; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999); social movement theory (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998); and Habermasian theory about communicative action (Risse, 2000). 
 
                                                          
29 The concept of “social facts” was first introduced by sociologist, Emile Durkheim in 1895 (cf. Durkheim, 1895). 
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IR constructivists are split between conventional and critical variants (Hopf, 1998; 
Checkel, 2006; Wiener, 2014; Choi, 2015). While they share an ontological basis, they 
differ epistemologically (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Here, I explain the ontological 
commonalities of the theory. All constructivists hold in common three core ontological 
positions: First, Normative or ideational structures are as important as material structures in shaping 
the behaviour of social and political actors.  For constructivists, “material resources only acquire 
meaning of human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are 
embedded” (Wendt, 1995, pp. 73). In other words, normative and ideational structures 
are thought to shape the social identities of political actors, for example, the 
institutionalised norms of the academy s 
haping the identity of a professor (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 224). Second, Identities constitute 
interests and actions. Constructivists argue that “understanding how interests are constituted 
or how actors develop their interests is the key to explaining a wide range of international 
political phenomena that rationalists ignore or misunderstand” (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 
224). Third, Agents and structures are mutually constituted. “Constructivists stress the way in 
which normative or ideational structures define the meaning and identity of the individual 
actor and the patterns of appropriate economic political and cultural activity engaged in 
by those individuals” (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 267).) In other words, institutional 
norms and ideas would not exist without the knowledgeable social practices of actors, 
and “it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively 
enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests” (Reus-
Smit 2013, pp. 225). If this study is used as an example then, the norms that govern the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery give actors attached to the fishery an identity as a Barbadian 
fisher, which shapes appropriate conduct, for example, a particular way of harvesting or 
marketing fish. However, “it is only through the routinised practices of” Barbadian 
fisherfolk “that such norms exist and are sustained” (Ibid, 2013, pp. 225). Indeed, the 
mutual constitution of agents and structures means that actors “consciously and 
unintentionally replicate and challenge institutionalised routines and prevailing 
assumptions” thereby leaving room to address empirical questions of contestation and 
change (cf. Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 12, authors' emphasis).  
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1.3. A Critical Constructivist Epistemology in International Relations 
The main dividing line between conventional and critical constructivism is the distinction 
between their causal and constitutive claims, i.e., their epistemology30 (Hopf, 1998; Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007). The articles and essays presented in The Culture of National Security (ed. 
Katzenstein, 2006) and Cultures of Insecurity (eds.Weldes et al., 1999) best illustrate this 
epistemological divide. The former has a focus on generalisation and hypothesis, and the 
latter, on anthropological insights (Klotz and Lynch 2007, pp. 17). In the Culture of National 
Security, the authors claim to not depart from “normal science” or a positivist epistemology 
(Hopf, 1998, pp. 182). Many of them focus on particular norms either prohibiting or 
encouraging strategic behaviour, for example, patterns of conventional weapons 
proliferation (cf. Eyre and Suchman, 1996) and taboos on the use of chemical and nuclear 
weapons (cf. Price and Tannenwald, 1996). In other words, they make causal claims about 
the impact of norms on the identities of actors to explain actor preferences (Chul, 2009, 
pp. 82). For conventional constructivists, the meanings of culture and identity can be 
stable and knowledge independent of interpretive biases31 (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 17-
18). Thus, while expecting to uncover differences in identities and multiple 
understandings, conventional constructivists assume they can “specify a set of conditions 
under which one can expect to see one identity or another” (Hopf, 1998, pp. 183). 
Consequently, they are apt to adopt positivist conventions “sample characteristics, 
methods of difference, process tracing, and spurious checks in their empirical designs” 
(Ibid, 1998, pp. 183).  
 
On the other hand, critical constructivism which has roots in critical theory draws on a 
constitutive epistemology, and so, rejects the positivist conventions of conventional 
constructivism (cf. Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Hopf, 1998; Chul, 2009; Wiener, 2014). 
For example, in Cultures of Insecurity, Klotz and Lynch (2007, pp. 18), point out that instead 
of identifying a stable military culture that predictably influences policies, the contributors 
in the volume start by assuming that identity and culture is never fixed and/or constant. 
In seeking a deeper understanding of state identity, where “conventional constructivism 
is unable to interrogate the practices that constitute the states themselves” critical 
                                                          
30 Conventional constructivism concentrates on the sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects in world politics, and critical 
constructivism focuses on the relationship between power and knowledge (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 268). 
31 Klotz and Lynch (2007, pp. 17) suggest that the authors in The Cultures of National Security isolate the variables of culture from 
other characteristics of social life, to be treated as variables that explain the choices states make in military policy, offering a comparison 
across cases. 
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constructivists “see the state as open and malleable, and, have a non-essentialist view of 
its subjectivity” 32  (Cho, 2009, pp. 88-89). To illustrate this, many of the contributors focus 
on how discourses produce dominant representations of threat in areas as diverse as the 
Middle East (cf. Niva, 1999) and cyberspace (cf. Ballinger, 1999). In other words, critical 
constructivists adopt post-positivist or constitutive methods that can “capture the creation 
of meanings and accompanying processes of communication” through discourses and 
their associated social practices (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 19). Essentially, from an IR 
purview, where conventional constructivists treat identities as possible causes of action, 
critical constructivists expose the underlying social processes associated with identity 
formation. These constructivists, with whom I align in this thesis, “self-consciously 
recognise their own participation in the reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social 
entities they observe” and “realise that the actor and observer can never be separated” 
(Hopf, 1998, pp. 184). Critical constructivists thus claim, “an interest in change, and a 
capacity to foster change” that according to Hopf (1998, pp. 184) “no conventional 
constructivist could make”. 
 
This study has an explicit focus on exploring how governance of the Barbadian flyingfish 
fishery is understood, legitimated, and contested. In introducing why critical 
constructivism was chosen as the most appropriate theoretical approach for this study 
then, my key argument is that to understand how this resource is governed there is a need 
to be attentive to socio-political norms that have shaped what is deemed appropriate. 
This study’s subsequent chapters go on to demonstrate that regional norms framed between 
national sovereignty and regional community, and, development norms framed within 
sustainable development are the two areas in which this is most pertinent. Essentially, 
from time in the field and archival research, this study has established that these norms 
have emerged out of the process of changing social relations that are understood with the 
remit of race/colour, class, nationality and gender (the latter being not an explicit 
empirical focus of this study). From an IR perspective, these social constructs are 
undoubtedly all associated with exposing the underlying social processes of identity 
formation that critical constructivism can address.  
 
                                                          
32 Drawing on Cultures of Insecurity, for critical constructivists, the state cannot exist of its own accord, for it has no ontological 
foundation apart from the many discursive practices of self/other and inclusion/exclusion bring that into being (Cho, 2009). 
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It is also important to draw attention to the fact that Barbados has a particular material 
and cultural history as one of Britain’s most valued former colonies. Arguably, a 
significant amount of this particularity is premised on the cultural significance of and the 
traditions attached to Barbados’ flyingfish fishery. However, research that explores the 
socio-political dimensions of the flyingfish fishery from pre-colonial times through to the 
present day is relatively scant (cf. McConney, 1995, 1997; Cecil, 1999; McConney et al., 
2003a; Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013).  This is a bit surprising given that flyingfish has 
been formative to Barbadian life and identity and can be characterised as the belly of 
ordinary Barbadian society. This study thus contributes to the sparse literature that 
addresses these socio-political dynamics of the fishery through the prism of governance 
and rights. Chapter 5 expands on this.   
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2. Critical Constructivism and Norms 
 
2.1. Constructivism and Critical Theory 
As mentioned in Section 1 of this chapter, this thesis draws specifically on IR 
constructivist theory, and as such, is very much critical within those parameters. It is 
therefore useful to explain what is meant by critical constructivism within the context of 
IR constructivist theory. Critical constructivism in IR has its intellectual roots in critical 
social theory and was inspired by Frankfurt school scholars, Anthony Giddens, Antonio 
Gramsci, Jurgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault, among others (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001, pp. 398; Price and Reus-Smit, 1995). The foundational element of critical research 
is to confront injustices in society and explain social change as it occurs in relation to 
social struggle. Consequently,  
 
critical researchers aim to understand the 
relationship between societal structures 
(especially those economic and political) 
ideological patterns of thought that constrain 
the human imagination and thus limit 
opportunities for confronting and changing 
unjust social systems (Schofield, n.d., pp. 1). 
 
Given critical constructivism’s grounding in critical theory, the theoretical approaches 
have shared assumptions: a) Interpretation: Both disciplines are more interested in offering 
interpretations than conclusions based on causality; b) Rejection of Positivism: Both argue 
that dynamic social structures open up the possibility of social change, rather than 
distinguishable variables which constrain human action; and c) Meaning and language: Both 
stress that meaning and language are socially constructed and are interested in how 
meanings may remain the same or change over time (Schofield, n.d., pp. 2). 
 
Despite their commonalities, critical theory has been criticised by IR critical constructivists 
because of its perceived lack of conceptual elaboration and sustained empirical analysis 
(cf. Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 264). IR critical constructivists have therefore extended 
their critical project by employing theoretical propositions, conceptual frameworks and 
methods of critical social theory to inquire about and explain diverse aspects of world 
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politics (Schofield, n.d., pp. 2). The following is elaborated from Kincheloe et al. (2011) 
to provide a brief description of the basic tenets of critical constructivism: 
a) The world is socially constructed. This means what we know about the world 
always involves a knower and that which is to be known. How the knower 
constructs the known constitutes what we think to be social reality. 
b) All knowers are historical and social subjects. As such, spatial and temporal 
settings always shape our constructions of the world. 
c) As the world is socially and historically constructed, people and the knowledges 
they possess are also socially and historically constructed. 
d) Isolated facts and truths are not enough to explain the construction process. 
Critical constructivists instead are concerned with the processes through which 
certain information becomes validated knowledge and the processes through 
which other information is rendered invalid.  
 
Ontologically, IR critical constructivists seek to understand how socio-historic dynamics 
influence and shape an object of inquiry. Epistemologically, they explore how the content-
specific foundations of knowledge surround and impact their object(s) of inquiry. 
Although it shares the core features of conventional constructivism identified in Section 
1 of this chapter, critical constructivism adds the belief that social constructions of reality 
reflect, enact, and reify relations of power, and that, certain powerful groups and 
institutions play a privileged role in the process of knowledge production. These 
proprietors of knowledge maintain the legitimacy of their claims by continuously 
undermining alternative knowledges. The task of the IR critical constructivist scholar then, 
is to unmask these ideational structures of domination and facilitate the imagining of 
alternative worlds which are marked by inclusivity, contingency, and open-endedness 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 398). As such, critical constructivism is characterised 
as an emancipatory theory and used as an approach to dismantle status-quo teaching and 
research practices that, perhaps unknowingly, are complicit in the reproductions of 
systems of class, race, cultural and gender oppression33 (cf. McDonald, 2012; Weber, 
2014). It aims, as such, to encourage reflexivity, the questioning of dominant systems of 
knowledge production, and the opening-up of critically aware dialogue. Critical 
constructivism, therefore, is the practice of searching out alternative discourses and new 
                                                          
33 Many critical approaches, for example, postcolonial, de-colonial and feminist theories are similar to critical constructivism in their 
practices of exposing elitist assumptions embedded in existing knowledge, questioning dominant forms of knowledge production, 
and the rejection of western epistemologies so as to include previously excluded and marginalised knowledge in mainstream discourse 
(cf. Manning n.d.). 
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ways of thinking, while, at the same time, exposing subjugated knowledge claims (cf. 
McDonald, 2012).  
 
2.2. Norms Matter in Critical Constructivist Research  
This study has an explicit focus on norms and their contested meanings. Norms have 
always been a central focus of both conventional and critical constructivist research in 
International Relations (IR) (Chul, 2009; Weber, 2014; Wiener, 2014). Florini (1996, pp. 
364) explains that in departing from the dominant IR rationalist theories which assume 
that norms “are unexplained sources of exogenously given preferences of actors,” IR 
constructivists focus on norms to investigate the role of social construction in shaping 
behaviour. In other words, rationalists view norms as mere reflections of fixed 
preferences having no explanatory power, whereas, for constructivists, norms have 
explanatory power independent of structural and situational constraints that help to 
determine actor preferences (Florini, 1996, pp. 363). In their theoretical approaches to 
norms then, constructivist scholars speculate that norms and their associated social 
understandings often have different influences on different agents (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 2001, pp. 398). Essentially, “norms matter” in IR constructivist research. 
Identifying these differences in how norms influence actors’ behaviour is therefore the 
bedrock IR constructivist task (Katzenstein, 1996a).  
 
Constructivists working in IR define norms34 as “shared expectations about appropriate 
behaviour held by a collectivity of actors” that are social inter-subjective facts within 
international society35 (Checkel, 1999, pp. 83). Constructivists thus view norms as a “set 
of inter-subjective understandings, readily apparent to actors that make behavioural 
claims on those actors” (Finnemore, 1994, pp. 2). Norms should thus be viewed as 
constituting actors’ interests and identities, and, creating expectations as well as 
prescribing “what appropriate behaviour ought to be” (Bjorkdahl, 2002, pp. 21). Because 
they are inter-subjective or shared, norms leave broad patterns that once embedded in 
social institutions, act like structures shaping behaviour (Thompson, 1993, pp. 72). The 
distinctiveness of a norm for an IR constructivist is the sense of an ought of how an actor 
should behave (this can apply to the individual or the assessor) (Florini 1996, pp. 364, 
                                                          
34 The best known definition of norms is found in the regimes literature (Krasner, 1983; Florini, 1996, pp. 364 ). Here norms are 
considered to be one component of regimes that determine ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations (Krasner 
1983, pp. 3). Constructivist critics of regime theory (cf. Florini 1996; Wiener 2006) argue however, that there is no reason to restrict 
a norm to the confines of a given issue area. 
35 This study looks not just at function of norms in international society but also national and local society. 
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emphasis mine). Indeed, as Florini (1996) contends, the most important characteristic that 
IR constructivists ascribe to a norm is that it is considered to be a legitimate behavioural 
claim. In other words, “no matter how a norm arises, it must take on an aura of legitimacy 
before it can become a norm. Norms are thus obeyed not because they are enforced, but 
because they are seen as legitimate” (Ibid, 1996, pp. 365).  
 
Not surprisingly, conventional and critical constructivists differ in their epistemological 
approach to the study of norms. Conventional constructivists focus on the structuring 
power of norms and their influence on the behaviour of states in world politics (Checkel, 
2001). However, conventional constructivism falls short on explaining the processes or 
constitution of norm construction and diffusion, i.e., where norms come from in the first 
instance, and how they become accepted and validated (Chul, 2009, pp. 83, emphasis mine). 
Glaringly absent is a discursive consideration of power. Conventional constructivism’s 
lack of focus on such research matters helps to explain why a critical constructivist 
approach was deemed more relevant, particularly as this study’s observations are based in 
a region where development, policy and practice are always informed by unequal power 
relations.  
 
Wiener (2014, pp. 19) explains that critical constructivism is interested in the historical 
emergence and normative meaning of norms. Consequently, in Wiener’s view, normative 
meaning is established via the practice of re-/enacting norms. Critical constructivists 
apply the critical theoretic assumptions of reflexivity and ought-ness or ‘normativity’ of 
societal change (cf. Hopf, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002; Fierke, 2006, emphasis mine). According to 
Wiener (2009, pp. 179), critical constructivists’ interest in norms “enhances the 
understanding of how inter-subjectivity plays out in international relations”. 
Consequently, it is a theoretical approach that “is therefore receptive of the interrelation 
between agent-centred and structural change” (Ibid 2009, pp. 179). Being post-positivist 
in epistemology, critical constructivists do not attribute essential properties to social facts. 
In contrast to conventional approaches, for critical constructivists, actors can agree on, 
for example, what constitutes human rights at a particular point in time, while these 
meanings are also contested, particularly by marginalised actors (cf. Schwellnus, 2009; 
Park, 2009; Klotz and Lynch 2007, pp. 14). Essentially, critical constructivists treat 
knowledge as truth claims rather than objective fact, knowledge thus becomes intertwined 
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with power, resulting in what Klotz and Lynch (2007, pp. 14) call “regimes of truth” that 
perpetuate particular (un-equal) relationships.  
 
This focus on the historicisation and contingent nature of the normative meaning of 
norms invokes two distinct analytical perspectives in critical constructivist research: 1) are 
norms considered appropriate and how are they implemented; and, 2) how are norms re-
/constructed based on their normative meaning? Here, how a norm is understood and/or 
contested may either “generate changing normativity through critical approval or identify 
disapproval. All depends on how normative substance is perceived by the respective 
agents” (Wiener, 2014, pp. 19). Critical constructivists thus emphasise the fluidity of social 
practices. In other words, they view the norms (institutions and power relations) that 
underlay the production of identities and interests as neither fixed or constant entities 
(Hopf, 1998, pp. 183). For critical constructivists, meanings therefore are inherently 
unstable. They do however accept enough stability in meanings, while acceding to the 
possibility that those very meanings could shift, depending upon the context, to make use 
of language, describe discourses and theorise about power (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 
13-14). 
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3. A Conceptual Schema of Norms 
 
3.1. On Shared vs. Contested Meanings of Norms 
Park (2009, pp. 97) points out that what has been specifically overlooked in International 
Relations (IR) constructivist research on norms is the “contingent, historically situated 
and contextually specific nature of norms”. IR Constructivists therefore should not only 
focus on the structural power of international norms in shaping actors’ behaviour and 
identity, “but also how norms are made meaningful within specific contexts” (Ibid, 2009, 
pp. 97). Following from this, Wiener (2007a, pp. 5) contends that any IR constructivist 
work on norms will proceed from the premise that “norms — and their meanings — 
evolve through interaction in context. Norms, therefore, are contested by default”. 
Consequently, to analyse how norms acquire meaning in divergent contexts requires 
going beyond an examination of how a norm emerged to influence actors’ behaviour, to 
include how it became recognised as appropriate within specific social contexts (Park, 
2009, pp. 97). The question then is how to identify these multiple meanings-in-use?  
 
3.2.     Unpacking the features of A Theory of Contestation  
This subsection explains the relevant features in Wiener’s (2014) A Theory of Contestation 
that are adopted in this study to identify when norms become shared and/or contested 
as re-/enacted through their meaning in-use. Wiener’s (2014) A Theory of Contestation is an 
IR critical constructivist approach that is useful to identify a norm’s multiple meanings-
in-use by locating legitimacy gaps in governance in international settings.  It works with 
three underlying assumptions. First, is that norms have a dual quality. That is “... while 
stable over particular periods, they always remain flexible by definition” and can evolve 
over time (Wiener, 2014, pp. 27). Second, is that social life is recursive and constituted 
through social practice. This means “norms are constituted and reconstituted through a 
continual process of social interaction between agents and structures. Consequently, 
social structures are cast as routinized discursive and physical practices that define the 
meaning of actions in a given context” (Wiener, 2007, pp. 4). It follows that the normative 
quality or the ought-ness of a norm is generated through the social practice of re-/enacting 
structures of normative meaning in use (Wiener, 2009, emphasis mine).  Third, is that the 
shared-ness vs. contested-ness of norms is revealed through how norms are practiced in 
specific social contexts. This means that in the process of constructing normative 
meaning, acceptance and/or contestation arises from individually-held background 
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experience that is dependent on distinct cultural validations and social contexts of 
normative meaning (Wiener, 2014, pp. 27). 
 
The first and most important feature of A Theory of Contestation is three types of norms. A 
Theory of Contestation suggests distinguishing between three levels of norms: fundamental 
norms (type 1), organising principles (type 2) and standardised procedures (type 3). 
According to Wiener (2014, pp. 36), these levels “capture both the diversity of meanings-
in-use and the diversity of the involved” and “based on this information, multiple actor-
ships and distinct meanings can be related”.  
 
According to Wiener’s (2014) typology, type 1, fundamental norms, are meta-level 
universal moral claims or global norms that are widely shared in principle, for example, 
the principle of non-intervention or human rights (Wiener, 2014, pp. 36). Fundamental 
norms keep the community together. They include both core constitutional norms that 
are most commonly used with reference to nation-state constitutions, such as, rule of law, 
fundamental freedoms, human rights, democracy, and equal citizenship; and, with 
reference to world politics, norms most commonly applied in IR theory, for example, 
sovereign equality, respect for human rights, and non-intervention in other countries 
sovereign affairs (Wiener, 2007a, pp. 9). Wiener contends that “given the formal validity 
as well as the moral weight attached to fundamental norms and which is sustained through 
the formal treaties, conventions, or universal declarations within the framework of 
international organisations or covenants, these norms are highly likely to be agreed to in 
principle” thus least likely to be contested morally. However, when implementing “these 
norms ‘on the ground’ they are most likely to be contested in practice” (Wiener, 2014, 
pp. 36).  
 
Type 2 norms, organising principles, “structure the behaviour of individuals or groups” 
and “evolve through the very practices of policymaking, jurisprudence or political 
processes” (Wiener, 2007a, pp. 9; 2014, pp. 37). These therefore “inform political 
procedures and guide policy practices” (Wiener, 2007a, pp. 9). As organising principles36, 
they include, for example, principles of legality, accountability, transparency, legitimacy, 
and gender mainstreaming (Ibid, 2007a, pp. 9). These norms enjoy a more balanced 
                                                          
36 As organising principles are subject to contestation, they can also be upgraded to the status of a fundamental norm. For example, 
the norm of accountability may be understood both as an organising principle with reference to one particular policy process in one 
policy, yet it may well be a fundamental norm in another (Wiener, 2009, pp. 185). 
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degree of legitimacy in theory and practice as their moral claims evolve in direct relation 
in practice (Wiener, 2014, pp. 37).  
 
Type 3 norms, standardised procedures, include specifically defined standards, rules and 
regulations for specific policy measures. As such, they provide detailed and clearly 
articulated advice for policy specific activities and prescriptions for action. Consider for 
example, a state manual that details specific fishing procedures for their country based on 
declarations made in specific treaties or conventions. It holds that these norms are rarely 
expected to generate moral issues, but they are likely to conflict with individual interests, 
thereby leading to a high degree of contestation at the implementing stage (Wiener, 2007a, 
pp. 9; 2014, pp. 37). 
 
The second relevant feature to explain is how these norms come to be legitimated and/or 
contested.  A Theory of Contestation upholds the notion that contestation is a social activity. 
Regarding this, Wiener (2014, pp. 1) posits that the ways norms can be legitimated or 
contested depends on the respective environment in which contestation takes place i.e. 
courts, regimes, societal, academic contexts (Wiener 2014, 1). Because A Theory of 
Contestation sees contestation as a social activity that involves discursive and critical 
engagement with norms of governance, “whether voiced or voiceless, contestation is 
constitutive of social change” (Wiener, 2014, pp. 2). The study of actors’ social practices 
is therefore, in and by itself, meaningful (Ibid 2014, pp. 28).  
 
To explain, in A Theory of Contestation type 1, fundamental norms have a constitutive 
function and are thought of as being formally validated via a political community, for 
example, international society or national community (Wiener, 2014, pp. 19). Herein, the 
formal validity of a norm is contestable in the process of drafting a constitution, treaty, 
or convention. At this stage, a norm is most likely to be contested by “constitutive powers 
or their representatives who bestow formal validity to selected norms by signing 
international treaties” (Wiener, 2014, pp. 29-30). Second, type 2, organising principles, 
have a referring function and are appropriate indicators of behaviour or sources of social 
obligation held by a group, for example, regime, organization, or another type of social 
environment (Wiener, 2014, pp. 19). Here, the social recognition of a norm is contestable 
when different social groups do not agree about the appropriate behaviour in a given 
situation. At this stage, any type of actor that acts in a societally structured context of a 
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community that makes “habitual reference to common socially recognised norms or rules 
will refer to norms without contestation. In turn, social groups that are not part of the 
community are expected to contest the norm” (Weiner, 2014, pp. 29-30). Third, type 3, 
standardised procedures otherwise known as implementing norms, or norms ‘on the 
ground’ are culturally validated through individual experience, i.e., by individual norm 
users, including policy-makers, public servants, firms, corporations, political parties or 
organisations (Wiener, 2014, pp. 19). Here, the cultural validity of a norm is contestable 
when individuals bring their respective background experiences to bear. It is the choice 
of the individual to engage with the norm through giving it normative meaning-in-use. 
As such, contestation is likely when actors who meet lack an inter-subjective 
understanding of the others background experience. Here, individual actors or groups 
“are expected to contest norms, rules, and procedures according to their individual 
interests” (Wiener, 2014, pp. 30).   
 
The key takeaway here is Wiener’s assertion that a high degree of contestation is expected 
at the implementing stage (i.e. where standardised procedures come to be culturally 
validated) is not surprising. Consider, the fundamental norm of sustainable fishing. 
Fisherfolk generally share the idea of sustainable conservationist approaches to fishing, 
but yet when asked to implement specific changes that might affect their harvesting of 
the resource, for example, implementing specific net sizes or fishing catch quotas, there 
is a high likelihood that the fisherfolk will contest the state dictated and mandated quotas. 
This leads to two critical assumptions when locating legitimacy gaps in governance. On 
the one hand, while there is a high acceptance of fundamental norms, both by signatories 
of international treaties as well as with the wider public; on the other, the standardised 
implementation of “specific procedures and regulations stands to be highly contested on 
the ground by designated norm-followers” (Wiener, 2014, pp. 34). Essentially then, 
Wiener’s overarching theoretical contribution is that there is a need to examine individual 
interpretations that actors ascribe to a meaning of a norm. This provides an additional 
dimension of analysis that allows for identifying the cultural validation of a norm based 
on everyday experience, i.e., enacting a norm’s meaning-in-use. Structures of meaning-in-
use are thus defined as: 
 
 inter-subjective structures [...] that provide the 
categories through which we represent and 
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understand the world. They therefore offer a 
reference frame for empirical studies that seek to 
reconstruct the respective meanings of norms 
which have been enacted at a particular point in 
time by particular actors (Wiener, 2009, pp. 180).  
 
The features of A Theory of Contestation thus offers a conceptual toolkit for critical 
constructivist empirical research on norms to be equipped to identify legitimacy gaps via 
the ‘shared-ness’ or contestability of a norm in any sector of global governance (Wiener, 
2014, pp. 7). Consequently, A Theory of Contestation “aims to move beyond empirical 
observations about how norms work (i.e., how given norms influence behaviour), to 
thereby address the more substantive normative questions about whose norms count” 
(Ibid, 2014, pp. 4).  
 
It is nevertheless critical to recognise that while the features of A Theory of Contestation are 
useful to locate legitimacy gaps in governance in international settings37, its typology of 
norms does not capture perspectives of actors’ social motivations for enacting 
governance. In other words, although A Theory of Contestation attributes a significant 
amount of weight to implementing norms or ‘norms on the ground’ encapsulated by 
standardised procedures (i.e. policy/political prescriptions) being culturally validated 
through individually-held background experiences, there is no room to explore how 
norms come to be shared or contested at the level of the locale. Of course, this has 
conceptual implications. Constructivists largely agree that issues of identity are central to 
the social construction of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Wendt, 1994). Actors in 
world politics construct a social reality that is based on a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 74). People make sense of the world by noticing differences 
in routine discursive practices, for example, nationality, language, political affiliation, 
gender, race, and religion (Ibid, 2007, pp. 75). It follows then, that the recognition of 
norms in this study is sustained by the meaning ascribed to it by actors through discursive 
practice (Wiener, 2007a, pp. 6). It is the case then that omitting local norms in A Theory 
of Contestation’s conceptual design excludes the locally derived alternative knowledge 
claims of actors that might be subjugated in the governance process. This important 
                                                          
37 In Wiener’s conceptual schema, understanding is never unmediated but subsequent to interpretation against the background of 
individual experience. Therefore, individually experienced and enacted expectations about norms hold the key for comparing 
interpretations in international settings (2009, pp. 179). 
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conceptual problem with the features of A Theory of Contestation brings us to Section 3. In 
order to get a more encompassing understanding of the domestic processes that allow 
for an understanding of how norms come to be validated at the level of the locale, thereby 
opening up the possibility to adequately discuss propositions for social change, two 
adjustments to the features of a Theory of Contestation are proposed. 
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4. The Politics of Change 
 
4.1. Norms are What Actors Make of Them: Contestation and Legitimacy in 
Practice 
For a critical constructivist, the interest in change and the capacity to foster change is 
important. This emphasis on change is also normatively linked to predispositions of how 
knowledge produces power38(Hopf, 1998, pp. 184). Critical constructivism’s ontological 
and epistemological positions are in harmony with exploring these questions of change, 
particularly questions of moral inclusion and exclusion. In this study, this is explicitly 
linked to understanding whether the governance mechanisms of the fishery are being 
challenged.  
 
It is certainly noteworthy that Wiener and Puetter (2009, pp. 7) claim that we know little 
about how norms come to be culturally validated39. Given that this study adopts the 
critical position that there are divergent interpretations of meanings of norms, this means 
that once norm interpretation and implementation occur in various contexts, the meaning 
attached to a norm is likely to differ according to actors’ respective experiences with a 
norm (Wiener and Puetter, 2009, pp. 9). A good example of contested  norms research 
being applied in practice is Schwellnus' (2009) study on The Domestic Contestation of 
International Norms. Schwellnus provides an analysis of the “fundamental norm of minority 
protection within the domestic context of Polish politics” (Wiener and Puetter, 2009, pp. 
15). According to Wiener and Puetter (2009, pp. 15), Schwellnus demonstrated that 
despite the fundamental norm of minority protection “being more and more codified 
within the international and European context after the Cold War”, and thus gaining 
“increased importance for the reform of domestic legislation, the very process of norm 
application” revealed the potential for contestation. In other words, despite institutional 
attempts to codify minority rights, they remained contested when actors re-/enacted their 
own perceptions of minority rights’ normative meaning-in-use (Schwellnus, 2009, pp. 
124). Hence, as Wiener and Puetter (2009, pp. 4) put it, “norms are what actors make of 
them”40 and are as “just, fair, and legitimate as what actors make them out to be”. In other 
                                                          
38 Based in the framework of critical theory, it is not surprising that critical constructivists are concerned with the role power plays in 
research construction and validation processes, particularly the ways in which these processes privilege some people and marginalise 
others. Understanding the ways in which power works within and around the research context is the basis of understanding how 
meanings are produced, reproduced, represented and changed (Steinberg 2014, pp. 205).   
39 Students of both international law and international relations have been inclined to concentrate on the norms become formally 
validated and socially recognised and accepted (Wiener and Puetter, 2009, pp. 16). 
40 Cf. Wendt (1992) “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power”. 
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words, norms may entail formal validity via a legal framework (constitution, treaty), and 
have achieved social recognition (appearing as appropriate to the group); “yet, successful 
norm diffusion ultimately depends on cultural validation” (Ibid, 2009, pp. 5). It is 
interesting that Wiener and Puetter (2009, pp.  5) suggest that normative approaches see 
the impact of norms as crucially dependent on the acceptance of norms and where these 
encounters develop. They go on to argue that who is involved in international encounters, 
where, and how often are the key questions which allow for a more specific assessment 
of the role of norms. As the previous section argued however, Wiener’s typology of 
norms does not align with capturing localised perspectives that the term cultural 
validation seems to imply. In the case of this study then, I rephrase Wiener and Puetter’s 
statement to say that who is involved in encounters at all political levels of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery, and especially, at the domestic community level, is the important 
consideration.  
 
Two adjustments to A Theory of Contestation’s conceptual schema are therefore proposed. 
First, it has been noted that in A Theory of Contestation the highest degree of contestation 
takes place at the implementing stage, i.e., where standardised procedures come to be 
culturally validated. This brings into scope how Wiener (2014) characterises norms. 
Consider here, Wiener’s definition of type 1 and 2 norms. The former, fundamental 
norms are meta-level universal moral claims purportedly widely shared in principle, and 
the latter, organising principles evolving through consensual policy, legal or political 
processes. There seems to be a forced separation of the normative processes establishing 
organisational principles that would inform fundamental norms. In other words, if under 
Wiener’s conceptual outline, type 1 norms evolve from policy and political processes, 
there should be some accompanying normative principle(s) to shore up such political 
processes. In Wiener’s conceptual map, this is captured through organising principles 
(type 2 norms). Consider for example, the fundamental norm of non-intervention being 
shored up by the organising principle of a culture of equal sovereignty. Consequently, 
fundamental norms and organising principles really should be pooled together as type 1 
norms. Continuing, Wiener classifies type 3 norms, i.e. standardised procedures, as clearly 
articulated specifically defined standards, rules and regulations that are culturally validated 
at the implementing stage where individual dispositions come to bear. Essentially, Wiener 
casts standardised procedures as regulatory normative re-enactments by individuals. This 
view is not compelling enough to refer to the routine habituated practices of actors 
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legitimating governance at the level of the locale that this study seeks to explore. This 
leads to the second adjustment.   
 
In order to understand the background experiences of actors that would lay claim to not 
only situating the cultural validity of a norm, but a more wholly encompassing view of 
how a norm is validated in the locale, it is necessary to include another level of norm in 
the study’s conceptual design, in the form of local norms. This would allow this study to 
capture the differences in the domestic processes and perceptions of actors charged with 
actually implementing governance. These norms are thus needed to explore the effects of 
the locale which are highly contested through practice. A framework is now provided to 
gauge how norms come to be shared and/or contested ‘on the ground’ in 
implementation, and to explore possibilities for social change. Table 1 below is a roadmap 
of the typology of norms used to inform this study’s empirical chapters and their 
accompanying definitions. Thus, when thinking about how the flyingfish fishery is 
governed, one can situate what norms are, how they function or operate, and where those 
norms come from the global to local.  
 
Table 1: The Empirical Road Map  
 
 
This study adopts the following typology of norms as its conceptual framework to guide 
empirical analysis: Type 1, fundamental principles merge A Theory of Contestation’s 
definitions of fundamental norms and organising principles. These are widely shared 
universal moral claims and the accompanying normative principles that shore up such 
political processes. Type 2, standardised procedures being prescriptive to policy 
development aligns with the definition offered by A Theory of Contestation. The new type 
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3, local norms, that this study identified as a layer of analysis needed to capture the social 
motivations of actors at the level of the locale are defined and operationalised in this study 
as the habituated discursive practices of state and non-state actors, be it the individual or 
local community, that result from grassroots social interaction and background 
experiences. These norms are located through actors’ practices of implementing type 1 
and type 2 norms. In other words, as implementing norms, or norms ‘on the ground’, 
local norms validate the shared-ness or contested-ness of type 1 and 2 norms through the 
individual and collective experiences and practices of actors engaging with a norm 
through giving it normative meaning in use. Contestation is thus likely when actors lack 
an inter-subjective understanding of the other’s individual or collective background 
experience (Wiener, 2014, pp. 30). 
 
This conceptual roadmap rooted in International Relations (IR) constructivist theory 
highlights a typology of norms that is useful in locating legitimacy gaps in governance, 
particularly, in historically contingent and content-specific cases as is this study.  It 
broadens the empirical focus from solely exploring the effects of fundamental principles 
at an institutional level, and the political plans and management manuals which dictate 
prescriptive action at the procedural level, to understanding how norms governing the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery are understood, legitimated, and contested by actors 
implementing governance at the local level. These conceptual adjustments to A Theory of 
Contestation’s typology of norms illuminates several broader theoretical hypotheses which 
orient this study. 
 
First, there is a working assumption that the regional and development norms that have 
emerged to determine ‘who gets the fish’ in the Barbadian flyingfish fishery have been 
constituted through complex and contested processes involving multiple interest groups 
on multiple scales (international, regional, national and local). Therefore, actors’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of their rights to the fishery would be subject to their own 
experience with the norms being explored. These actor perceptions may converge or 
conflict on multiple political scales that can now be captured in empirical analysis.  
Second, there is a working assumption that actors are more likely to legitimate and/or 
contest the regional and development norms constructing governance of the fishery by 
way of their habituated practices of interacting with the fishery at the level of the locale. 
This means that the conventionally accepted IR constructivist foci on explaining instances 
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of normative change from the top-down (global to local) is shifted to a bottom-up (local 
to global) reading. In other words, if emphasis is to be placed on exploring if the 
governance mechanisms of the fishery are being challenged, the conceptual space is now 
provided to understand how the norms come to be validated in the locale, and so, 
accepted and/or contested by actors who are directly attached to the fishery. Third, 
bringing the conceptual focus to include local norms, addresses the analytical concern 
that much of the literature of norms in IR constructivism lacks an engagement with, and 
analysis of, power relations between dominant and marginalised actors. This is particularly 
pertinent as chapter 5 goes on to historically unpack how the guiding fundamental 
principles of region and development have been forged through the social relations of 
race/colour, class, nationality and gender in Barbadian society. Moreover, larger 
normative concerns can be addressed about dominant actor theorising in empirical 
analyses from an IR critical constructivist purview. For example, chapter 4 explains that 
it is important to locate who has access to or control over public discourse as it is a 
powerful resource (cf. van Dijk, 1997; Mackenzie and Sesay, 2012, pp. 161). 
 
To rephrase the famous characterisation of norms from Checkel's (1997; 1998) essays41 
then,  including locals norms in empirical analysis conceptually captures the view that not 
only do state and non-state actors react differently to the same norms (global to local), 
but the mechanisms by which norms are internalised/legitimised by state and non-state 
actors also differ. Therefore, by providing the conceptual space to understand how 
domestic processes function via local norms, an understanding can be gained about the 
political effects of how actors and social structures interact from the local to global in world 
politics (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 298).  
 
4.2. Local Norms, Contestation and Change 
The question at this point of the chapter is perhaps how local norms have been 
operationalised by others? Weiss and Wilkinson (2018, pp. 194-195, authors' emphasis) 
argue that the field of global governance “remains firmly focused on understanding who 
governs and how they do it rather than who is governed and how that governance is 
experienced”, essentially exploring the experiences of the governors rather than the 
governed. With regards to understanding the effects of global governance on the 
                                                          
41 Checkel's essays (cf. 1997; 1998) illuminate, not only do different states react differently to the same international norms, but the 
mechanisms by which norms are internalised/legitimised within states also differ. So, without an understanding of how domestic 
processes function, we cannot understand the political effects of global social structures (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, pp. 298).  
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governed then, it is important to consider that local norms are often foundational to a 
group (Acharya, 2004). As Acharya (2004, pp. 248) contends: 
 
They may derive from deeply ingrained cultural 
beliefs and practices or from international legal 
norms that had, at an earlier stage, been borrowed 
and enshrined in the constitutional documents of a 
group. In either case local norms have already 
become integral to the local group’s identity, in the 
sense that they constitute actors’ identities and 
interests and not simply regulate behaviour. 
 
With this in mind, the adjustments proposed to A Theory of Contestation are largely 
premised on Mackenzie and Sesay's (2012) account of No Amnesty from/for the International: 
The Production and Promotion of TRCs as an International Norm in Sierra Leone. This piece was 
particularly pertinent because in literature searches for explanations of norm formation it 
provided a cogent explanation for the inclusion of local/community norms in 
constructivist research. I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that constructivist 
norm research, both conventional and critical, largely focus on the effects of international 
norms on domestic actors42. I draw on one particular critique Mackenzie and Sesay (2012) 
raise about how these dominant constructivist accounts examine the tensions between 
international norms and local/community norms. Mackenzie and Sesay suggest that these 
“dominant accounts of norms” are primarily “white” Western accounts which assume 
that “norms emerge from equal relationships between states” (Mackenzie and Sesay, 
2012, pp. 147). This assumption denies the marked economic and socio-political 
inequalities between all global actors. Arguably then, the dominant IR constructivist 
formula for investigating the effects of norms, largely disregards the fact that intense 
political contestations emerge, and thus, occur between state and non-state actors, 
particularly at the level of the locale43 (Ibid, 2012, pp. 147).   
 
                                                          
42 IR constructivists accounts of the importance of international norms are commonplace (Park, 2009, pp. 97). 
43 I acknowledge that scholarly work beyond IR constructivism, for example, thinkers in the field of post-structuralism and post-
development like Arturo Escobar and James Scott (anthropologists) could be helpful in setting a theoretical frame to give recognition 
to and understand local political contestations between state and non-state actors (cf. Scott, 1985; Escobar, 1995).. This is expanded 
upon in the study’s conclusion.  
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It is important to highlight that Mackenzie and Sesay (2012) derive their understanding 
of local norms from Kothari (2001). In Power, Knowledge and Social Control and Participatory 
Development, Kothari (2001) argues that notions of “local,” “indigenous,” or “people’s” 
knowledges are socially constructed. However, in development policies, these 
knowledges are cast as fixed entities which can be found and represented (cf. Mackenzie 
and Sesay, 2012, pp.148). Critics have argued (cf. Mohan and Stokke, 2000), that rather 
than trying to understand and represent the “local”, development actors have defined and 
constructed these representations based on their own biases and project objectives 
(Mackenzie and Sesay, 2012, pp. 148). The potential consequences of this, as Kapoor 
(2005, pp. 1213) summarises, is “before long, what were once select do’s and don’ts—
reflective of elite/institutional complicities—are taken for granted”, i.e., they become, 
naturalised, passing off as “consensus,” “community will,” or “traditional knowledge” 
when in fact this is not the case (cf. Mackenzie and Sesay, 2012, pp. 148).  I expand on 
these critiques to say that IR constructivists have also been guilty of imposing elite claims 
in their research on norms which tends to homogenise local communities. As such, 
dominant IR constructivist approaches disregard local (and indigenous) political claims 
to contestation, whereas, this study seeks to surface and foreground these claims. This 
leads me to pose the question of how IR constructivists choose the norms that matter in 
their research, and, as Weber (2014, pp. 525) puts it, go beyond “an interest in the fact 
that norms matter, toward investigating which norms should command respect, and 
why?” This study seeks to be critical in its approach to answering this question. Therefore, 
as empirical analysis unfolds at multiple political scales (local to global), and through the 
multiple contested meanings of regional and development norms in use, to truly analyse 
how these norms are understood, legitimated, and contested it is important to give them 
attention at the level of the locale.   
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Conclusion 
Rooted in the discipline of International Relations (IR), this chapter introduced and 
justified the use of critical constructivism and its positions on “norms mattering” as the 
theoretical basis for this study.  It then demonstrated how this study’s conceptual schema 
is built on Wiener's (2014) A Theory of Contestation as a starting point to explain how norms 
emerge and come to be accepted and/or contested. Within the context of IR 
constructivism, Wiener offers a typology of norms that is useful to locate legitimacy gaps 
in governance in international settings. This typology encapsulates three levels of norms: 
fundamental norms (type 1 norms), organising principles (type 2 norms) and standardised 
procedures (type 3 norms). Despite the utility of the relevant features of A Theory of 
Contestation, I argued that Weiner’s approach to investigating the function and effects of 
norms entails a top-down research agenda. Consequently, the perceptions of actors are 
left unaccounted for in the social settings where governance is actually implemented. This 
chapter built on the challenge articulated best by Wiener and Puetter (2009, pp. 16), for 
IR critical constructivist research to develop more encompassing definitions of norms, so 
as to situate the importance of understanding the role of norms from multiple cultural 
contexts and perspectives. In this chapter, I argued for adjusting the typology of norms 
that A Theory of Contestation offers by including local norms in this study’s conceptual 
framework. This study’s conceptual framework which distinguishes legitimacy gaps 
between top-down governance being shaped via fundamental principles and standardised 
procedures (type 1 and 2 norms) and bottom-up governance being shaped by local norms 
(type 3 norms) was explained and justified.  
 
This study offers broader theoretical contributions to IR critical constructivist research 
on norms as expressed and contested on multiple political scales (global to local). This is 
particularly because it includes in analysis, a more holistic view of how norms emerge and 
come to be understood, legitimated and contested at the level of the locale. The result is 
that more specific analysis can take place around the divergence and convergence of 
normative meanings which play a role in governance encounters of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery. By taking this perspective, this study offers an alternative understanding 
to the dominant IR constructivist state-centric view that tends to mask complex global-
local connections that highlight the mutability of identities, interests, and norms (cf. Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, pp. 72).  The theoretical adjustments that are proposed herein therefore 
stress that particularly in historically contingent context-specific cases, IR critical 
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constructivists should remember that local norms also matter. Consequently, the 
theoretical approach this study adopts answers the concern that critical constructivists 
rooted in the discipline of IR need to build cogent arguments about domestic politics into 
their approaches and integrate factors across different levels of analysis (cf. Checkel, 2006, 
pp. 13). The following chapter will now explain the methods that I used to uncover the 
discursive practices that will lay claim to unearthing the multiple contested meanings of 
regional and development norms which have shaped governance of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery and the rights afforded to Barbadian fisherfolk. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the methods used to research the governance of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery. To recap, this study poses three overarching research questions:1) who 
gets the fish and on what basis; 2) how is this system of allocation governed and why in 
this way; and, 3) is this governance being challenged? This study’s empirical chapters 
answer these questions by interpreting how regional norms framed between national 
sovereignty and regional community, and, development norms framed within sustainable 
development have shaped the governance of, and by extension, the rights afforded to 
Barbadian fisherfolk to their flyingfish fishery. Section 1 explains the methodological 
implications of the theoretical approach adopted in the last chapter. It highlights the use 
of ethnographic methods to capture localised perspectives constructing governance 
rather than discourse analysis, which is arguably more conventional in International 
Relations critical constructivist literature. Section 2 provides justification for choosing 
Barbados and its flyingfish fishery as the case study, and the two primary research sites 
of Bridgetown Fisheries Complex and the Six Men’s Fishing Village within this. Section 
3 discusses the ethnographic methods used in the research, namely interviews and non-
participant observation as the primary means of data collection, and how these are 
triangulated with archival document analyses.  Section 3 also offers critical reflection on 
my positionality and reflexivity in the research and the limitations of the methodological 
approach taken. The conclusion provides an overview of the way in which these methods 
fit with the theoretical approach outlined in the previous chapter, and how this will inform 
this study’s empirical findings. 
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1. Methodological Implications 
 
1.1. A Critical Constructivist Interpretive Ethnographic Methodology 
The previous chapter argued that in dominant International Relations (IR) constructivist 
accounts of norms (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1994; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 2001; Guzzini, 2003; Stahl, 2013), none provide conceptual schematics to analyse 
and reflect on the degree to which norms emerge and come to be shared and/or contested 
through their meaning in use (cf. Wiener, 2008; 2009; 2014). Given the clarion call for all 
constructivists, especially critical constructivists in IR, to take more care in explaining and 
operationalising their argument at the level of  methods (cf. Guzzini, 2000; Adler, 2002; 
Zehfuss, 2002; Neumann, 2003; Waever, 2004; Checkel, 2006), the methodological 
implications of the conceptual schema proposed for this study in the previous chapter 
are explained below.  
 
At the core of their approach, all constructivists need methods that can capture inter-
subjective meanings and recognise that all research involves interpretation (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 2001, pp. 395). Critical constructivists in the discipline of IR in particular seek 
to understand the ways in which the world is socially constructed by exploring, 
particularly, the constructive power of language via the written word (cf. Hopf, 1998; 
Zehfuss, 2002; Fierke, 2006). Critical scholars in IR, have indeed had a tendency to 
uphold the ‘linguistic turn’ “which has generated a wealth of text-based analyses of global 
politics” (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 292). As such, it is common for critical constructivists in IR to 
base their findings on textual evidence and socio-historical context to capture a broad 
notion of power and the dynamics of constitutive processes (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 
105).  
 
Consequently, most critical constructivists in IR have employed discourse analysis as their 
preferred methodological and interpretive tool (cf. Hopf, 1998; Weldes et al., 1999; 
Zehfuss, 2002; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Schwellnus, 2009; Park, 2009; Wiener, 
2014).The prominence placed on discourse analysis via textual narratives as constitutive 
of the substantive meaning of norms is not shared between all critical constructivists, 
however (Wiener 2007b, pp. 10). For critical constructivists in IR, Checkel (2006, pp. 7) 
argues that what is needed is the proper balance between textual approaches and those 
emphasising practice. For critical constructivists in IR then, the empirical move has been 
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to look beyond linguistic evidence to incorporate the practices of the every-day by 
triangulating methods that also bring a wealth of contextual data from the field (Vrasti, 
2008, pp. 294).   
 
Here, Foucault’s definition of discourse is helpful to explain this study’s interpretive tools.  
Foucault’s definition of discourse “refers not only to language (text), but also to language 
and practices that operate to produce objects of knowledge”44 (Barrett, 2006, pp. 2). 
According to Barrett (2006, pp. 2, emphasis mine), Foucault was concerned with 
understanding the particular historical context that allowed certain regimes of truth to 
prevail, and, the apparatuses or discursive formations, i.e., “webbed connections that link 
knowledge, power, institutions, regulations, philosophical and scientific statements, 
administrative and other practices – that regulate conduct and support or determine what 
counts as knowledge”45 (Foucault, 1972 in Barrett, 2006, pp. 2). Within this context, this 
study departs from conventional critical approaches in IR. Instead, it seeks to probe for 
discursive practices by triangulating varied forms of discourse, not only represented 
through language in text, but also as represented by the spoken word (interviews), and 
through (non-participant) observation46 (Foucault, 1972; Bacchi and Bonham, 2014). 
 
This interpretation of discourse that accounts for the interpretation of norms not only 
through language via text, but also the spoken word and observations allows this study’s 
conceptual schema to compensate for the way in which “differently positioned social 
actors see and represent life in different ways” (Fairclough 2001, pp. 231). To explain, 
“discourses are diverse representations of social life” (Ibid 2001, pp. 231). Meaning, in 
the case of this study, how actors understand the meaning of norms will vary. Consider, 
for example, that the discursive practices of fisherfolk and government officials are 
represented through different discourses which correspond to their positions as social 
actors. This study also locates discourses and discursive practices in varied social settings. 
It holds true the assumption that how actors understand their place in constructing 
governance will also vary dependent on the social context where these discourses and 
discursive practices are gathered, i.e., a rural artisanal fishing community or an urban 
commercial fishery (see Section 2.2 of this chapter). Therefore, this research seeks not to 
                                                          
44 Foucault’s central analytic point is that discourses are practices or, more specifically, sets of practices. For Foucault the term 
“discourse” refers to knowledge, what is “within the true”, rather than to language (cf. Bacchi and Bonham 2014, pp. 174).  
45 For a more detailed discussion of Foucault’s treatment of discourse as language and practice (cf. Foucault, 1972; Barrett, 2006) 
46 It is acknowledged that there are many variations or definitions of the terms discourse and discursive practices in the social sciences. 
It is the aim of the study not to engage in a broad debate around these matters. cf. Bacchi and Bonham (2014) for more detailed 
analysis of this debate. 
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impose an order on things, but rather is keen on exposing the disorder, conflict and 
disjuncture/s which constitute norms of governance of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery.  
 
The next element of the research design is to locate how the norms of governance being 
explored in this study come to be shared or contested in the actual locale of Barbados. 
Here, it is important to operationalise, as situated in the previous chapter, the 
methodological implications of what is meant by norms being contested. In revisiting this 
study’s conceptual schema (see chapter 3), the concept of contestation is operationalised 
by the contexts in which it is practiced (cf. Wiener 2017, pp. 113). However, as argued in 
the previous chapter, in Wiener’s account of norms, there is a methodological gap in 
locating how norms come to be validated in the locale, i.e., how norms come to be shared 
or contested at the level of the community. To explain, it will be relatively easy to establish 
both the formal validity as well as social recognition of norms based on textual evidence. 
However, the additional interest this study has in understanding the social realities and 
drivers of the actors who play a role in the day-to-day activities and governance of the 
fishery requires tools that can elicit localised perspectives. If this study were to follow 
conventional IR critical constructivist methodology of linguistic discourse analysis, it 
would be difficult to probe these discursive interventions of practice, particularly in the 
realm of the locale. Methods were therefore needed to also observe the discursive 
practices which express approval or disapproval of norms, which dependent on the type 
of norm, is expressed differently by actors in the actual locale of Barbados (cf. Wiener, 
2014, pp. 1). 
 
Consequently, I found it appropriate to utilise ethnographic methods to complement the 
study's conceptual schema. Ethnography as a methodological tool has a long and rich 
history, and “is most heavily associated with the field of cultural anthropology, especially 
the famed anthropologists, Bronislaw Malinowski, Franz Boas, and, later, Clifford 
Geertz” (Kanazawa, 2017, pp. 206-207). These anthropologists were interested in 
understanding culture through lived experiences by immersing “themselves in the culture, 
both by observing and participating in day-to-day life for a significant period of time” 
(Ibid, 2017, pp. 206-207). Theirs was a focus on studying and observing native peoples in 
their authentic settings (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 295). From its origins in cultural anthropology, 
the practice of ethnography has spread to contexts outside what were traditional 
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community settings in non-western cultures, and into the disciplines of sociology and 
more recently International Relations47 (Vrasti, 2008; Kanazawa, 2017; Montsion, 2018).  
 
As discussed in chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, this study’s critical constructivist 
theoretical approach is rooted in an IR perspective.  Mainstream approaches to IR have 
often utilised quantitative methodologies based on rationalist and positivist precepts. In 
contrast, critical scholarship in IR has been inspired by post-positivist and reflexive 
approaches by focusing on non-state voices as key actors. It is within these constructs 
that ethnography has become associated with IR scholarship, i.e. “as a methodological 
counter-weight to mainstream quantitative approaches in the field” (Montsion, 2018, pp. 
1-2). It is true that IR scholars generally opt for a top-down or deductive approach to 
their study of global politics, whereas ethnographic methods as invoked by social 
anthropologists, allow for a bottom up viewpoint of investigating the world (Ibid, 2018, 
pp. 3). In IR, ethnography is sometimes used in empirical analysis as “built on a mix of 
interviews, documentary analyses and some ethnographic observations” (Kuus, 2013, pp. 
117). For critical IR scholars, these methods have been used to move beyond the 
mainstream state-centric analysis offered by conventional IR scholars so as to incorporate  
a focus on the “every day and bottom-up ways of conducting research” thereby making 
linkages between local and global realities (Montsion, 2018, pp. 1-2). IR’s version of 
ethnography has been adapted from “some anthropological scholarship focused on 
connections and associations among different territorial sites” (Montsion, 2018, pp. 5). 
For critical IR scholars then, the use of ethnography has become less focused on 
traditional embeddedness in a community or culture to more broadly “understand a 
locally experienced, multi-location, inter-cultural, and globalised world” (Ibid, 2018, pp. 
5). Indeed, for critical IR scholars, these research tools are “deemed useful in their ability 
to generate first-hand knowledge of authentic forms of living, relations of power, 
embodied states and social actions” (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 284).  
 
For critical IR scholars in the discipline of constructivism, ethnographic methods have 
been particularly useful for moving beyond “a purely discursive understanding of social 
reality” (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 292). Indeed, in moving beyond this empirical focus on 
linguistic discourses, ethnographic methods have been used to explore and observe 
                                                          
47 In International Relations, feminist scholars, for example, (Cohn, 1987), have been at the forefront of the trend in utilizing 
ethnographic methods. Social constructivists, for example, (Nuemann, 2002)and postcolonialists, for example,  (Ling, 2002) have also 
followed suit. These IR scholars have at times been criticized for their limited reading of ethnography. For more information (cf. 
Vrasti, 2008).  
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everyday life “as a prime site of international inquiry by providing an empirically nuanced 
account derived from ‘being there’ on a daily basis” (Montsion, 2018, pp. 2).  
Ethnographic contributions to IR are therefore seen as forwarding an emancipatory 
empiricist research agenda that can lay claim to a much-desired policy voice as well as 
highlighting the importance of inter and multi-disciplinary efforts (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 295). 
For critical IR scholars who I align with the appeal of utilising ethnographic methods is 
that “it complements discursive analyses, moves beyond the mainstream perspectives of 
conventional actors such as states and international organisations, and sheds light on 
underexplored  knowledge, linkages, and understandings of world politics” (Montsion, 
2018, pp. 2). Furthermore, these ethnographic methods have helped to “secure a stable 
middle ground between rationalist (realist or liberal) and reflexivist (critical and post 
structuralist) approaches (Vrasti, 2008, pp. 291). 
 
With this in mind, this study characterises ethnography as a genre of research “that 
enables the study of behaviours, norms, beliefs, customs, values, applied human patterns 
and human phenomena as these are expressed in practice…both cultural and political as 
reflected in daily conversations and local events” (Shagrir 2017, pp. 19-20).The use of 
ethnographic methodologies therefore ties in well with the study's conceptual schema 
because they allow for a focus on revealing localised individual and collective insights 
constructing governance of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. This enables a bottom-up 
analytical approach that establishes a link between the everyday discursive practices of 
norm validation which this study views as being shaped through local norms (type 3 
norms); and, fundamental principles and standardised procedures (type 1 and 2 norms) 
through textual forms of discourse. The use of ethnographic methods therefore allows 
for an exposing of “subjugated knowledges based on how different collectives and 
individuals experience the international” as well as local “on their own terms” thereby 
“bringing representations of everyday life into the study of world politics (Montsion, 
2018, pp. 8). Indeed, for a critical constructivist, ethnographic methods are deployed as a 
way to “unpack sites of struggle, compliance and production of IR…” thereby putting 
“representations and perceptions of various actors front and centre” (Montsion, 2018, 
pp. 10).  The specific ethnographic methods utilised in this study are interviews and non-
participant observation and are triangulated with archival document analyses. These 
methods are described in detail in Section 3 of this chapter.  
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2. Locating the Field: The Case Study of Barbados and its Flyingfish fishery 
and the primary research sites 
 
2.1.    The Case Study: Barbados and its Flyingfish Fishery 
As a political scientist based at a British institution with no prior engagement with 
Barbados and its flyingfish fishery—and no prior background in marine science or natural 
resource management— it was critical for me to first get familiar with the case study and 
primary research sites. This was accomplished through a formal Visiting Researcher 
Agreement with the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies 
(CERMES) at the University of the West Indies (UWI), Cave Hill, Barbados, from 
February 2016 – October 2016. CERMES is the leading academic research and policy 
centre for flyingfish fisheries management and governance in the Eastern Caribbean. 
Through this affiliation, I gained a level of authority to credibly position myself within 
the community to proceed with the data gathering process.  
 
Barbados and its flyingfish fishery present a well-suited case to explore how governance 
of fisheries in Small-Island-Developing-States have been socially constructed. This is 
because the Barbadian flyingfish fishery is extremely complicated and politically charged 
within local, national and regional spheres of influence. In this section, I discuss how the 
contested regional and development norms have inductively emerged from the field 
research process to inform this study’s subsequent empirical chapters. Barbados is a small 
island nation in the North Atlantic, lying as the most easterly of the Lesser Antilles entirely 
surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean48.  Fisheries are of high importance to the country 
(Mohammed et al., 2015, pp. 1). However, the majority of Barbados’ culturally and 
economically important fisheries are shared resources among the countries of the South 
Eastern Caribbean (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003). It is the case that Barbados’ flyingfish 
fishery is part of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery and is a shared resource 
exploited by seven countries49 (Oxenford et al., 1995; Oxenford et al., 2007) (see Figure 
1).  
 
                                                          
48 Barbados is the only Caribbean/CARICOM country entirely surrounded by the Atlantic. The other islands are in or touch the 
Caribbean Sea basin. 
49 These countries include: Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica and France 
(Martinique) (UNDP-GEF, 2016). All the islands are independent islands most belonging to the Commonwealth, with the exception 
of Martinique which remains a department of France (CRFM Secretariat 2014, 10). All the English-speaking islands are member to 
the Anglo-Caribbean regional organization CARICOM as well as its fisheries subsidiary body, the CRFM. 
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Figure 1. Map showing the Distribution of the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish 
(Source: Fanning and Oxenford 2008, pp. 3) 
 
Research suggests that in comparison to other Eastern Caribbean states, Barbados has 
long had the best developed flyingfish fishery (cf. Bannerot and Harding 1986, pp. 79-
80). Fanning and Oxenford (2008, pp. 5) document that “almost the entire catch, 
excluding the small amount used at sea for bait, is sold for human consumption”. 
Furthermore, although there are also important fisheries in Tobago, Martinique and St 
Lucia for human consumption—when compared to Barbados—these islands do not 
realise the same degree of value-added benefit. Barbados also has the largest flyingfish 
fishery in the Eastern Caribbean, and, when compared with other commercially viable 
fisheries in the region, the largest domestic, cultural, and commercial stake in the fishery 
(Oxenford et al., 2007; Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013; CRFM Secretariat, 2014). The 
traditional and continuing economic importance of flyingfish in Barbados is due, in part, 
to limited demersal resources, i.e. shallow water or coastal reef resources. This has led to 
the present day traditional Barbadian focus on pelagic fishing wherein ice-boats undertake 
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long-range fishing away from the shore50(Bannerot and Harding, 1986; Parker 2002, 
emphasis mine ). Flyingfish typically accounts for around 65% of total Barbadian fish catch 
on an annual basis (Parker 2002, pp. 18). Barbados also lands the majority (~65%) of the 
reported regional catch on an annual basis (Fanning and Oxenford 2008, pp. 5; 
Cumberbatch and Hinds 2013, pp. 120).  
 
As part of the Eastern Caribbean sub-region, Barbados and its flyingfish fishery operate 
in one of the most compact multi-national archipelagos of the world (CRFM Secretariat 
2014, pp. 10). Therein, all of the Eastern Caribbean countries have declared 200 nautical 
miles Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) giving them exclusive sovereign rights to 
marine territory and resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) III (CRFM Secretariat 2014, pp. 10). However, Barbados is less than 200 
nautical miles from neighbouring islands in the north, west and south (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, all of Barbados’ maritime boundaries overlap with its neighbouring states51. 
The same, of course, is true of Barbados’ neighbouring states, many of which are much 
closer to each other. These geo-political facts have been significant for establishing the 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. Between 1991-2016, numerous proposals were put 
forth for a regional vision of a shared flyingfish fishery52 (FAO, 2002, 2010; CRFM 
Secretariat, 2014; Mohammed, 2016). Despite this, there have been on-going historical 
tensions, particularly between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, to define and 
demarcate their exclusive sovereign distributive rights to the shared flyingfish resources 
of the Eastern Caribbean. This problematic provides an interesting case to reveal 
important political dynamics of the regional governance of the fishery.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 The primary range of the fishery expanded from the vicinity of Barbados to approximately 140 miles to the South-South West to 
the primarily productive waters of the Lesser Antilles, between Tobago and Grenada. Total catches of both flyingfish and other larger 
pelagics have increased significantly with this advancement (Bannerot and Harding, 1986; Oxenford, 2007). 
51 In 2003, it was reported that Barbados had yet to settle any of its maritime boundaries with its neighbours (GOB Fisheries Division, 
2003).  Recent developments however illustrate that positive strides have been made with Barbados settling maritime boundaries with 
both St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015, 2016). 
52 This vision for a shared regional fishery is known as the Sub-Regional Management Plan for flyingfish of the Eastern Caribbean. 
This was noted to be a collaborative project to be implemented jointly between the University of the West Indies and McGill University 
as well as the Fisheries Divisions of Dominica, Martinique, St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, and Trinidad 
and Tobago (Oxenford et al., 1987). 
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Figure 2. Map of the Wider Caribbean showing potential EEZs 
 
(Source: CRFM Secretariat, 2014; VLIZ, 2017). Note that not all countries have accepted 
the proposed boundaries.  
 
Known as the land of flyingfish, the flyingfish fishery is also a quintessential aspect of 
Barbadian heritage—a symbol of pride and industry—the country’s national motto. It is a part 
of the island’s national dish/cuisine ‘flyingfish and cou-cou’, adorns the silver dollar coin, 
and is on the logo of the Barbados Tourism Authority (see Figure 3). While flyingfish is 
not unique to Barbadian waters nor to the people of Barbados, it has generated a sense 
of possessive national ownership, and, to the tourists that visit, cultural value which 
benefits the Barbadian economy (Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013, pp. 118; Mahon et al., 
2007). Locally, the flyingfish fishery plays an important role not only in contributing to 
Barbadian food security, but also the livelihoods of many coastal dwellers and the actual 
fisherfolk who make the fishery possible (Sobers, 2010; Cumberbatch and Hinds 2013, 
pp. 120). It is also an extremely high value-added fishery, especially through sales in the 
tourism sector (Mahon et al., 2007). However, in recent years, traditional flyingfish fishing 
practices and fishing communities seemingly are in conflict with the encroaching interests 
of tourism, particularly on the island’s platinum coast. This has led to conflict between 
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how the sectors share reciprocal rights to own and physically access valuable coastal 
space. This problematic validates that there are important political dynamics to be 
revealed surrounding the governance of Barbadian national development priorities 
around the sectors of fisheries and tourism. Taken together, these case studies 
substantiate the choice of Barbados and its flyingfish fishery to answer this study’s 
overarching research questions.  
 
Figure 3. Flyingfish Logo engraved on Barbados Silver Dollar Coin 
 
(Source: Vacation in Barbados, 2011) 
 
2.2. The Primary Research Sites 
It was important to choose primary research sites that would allow for a comparison of 
social settings. As referenced earlier in this chapter and also chapter 2, contextualising 
social settings was an important factor to situate how the norms constructing governance 
of the fishery are understood. Consequently, the primary sites of analysis chosen for this 
study were the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex (BFC) (an urban commercial fishery) and 
Six Men’s Bay (a rural artisanal fishing community) (see Figure 4). Although the national 
context of Barbados is held constant, this emphasis on grounding empirical analysis on 
varied social settings can be used to test the assumption that how actors validate their 
rights to the fishery will vary with respect to the setting where discursive practices 
(particularly interviews and non-participant observation) are located. 
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Figure 4. Map of the Primary Research Sites in Barbados 
 
(Source: Ministry of Agriculture Barbados, 2015). Note, this map shows the primary 
research sites and other fisheries landing sites around the island.   
BFC is located on the south-west coast of the island in Bridgetown, the capital of 
Barbados. It is a primary landing site and the major landing site for the Barbadian flyingfish 
fishery (Willoughby, 1989; Oxenford et al., 2007, emphasis mine). Opened in 1989, BFC is 
the most modern, largest and best-equipped public fishing market in Barbados (Parker, 
2010). Parker (2002, pp. 12), estimates that 68% of the Barbadian flyingfish catch is 
landed and processed at BFC. Its facilities include a fishing harbour for 150 boats, a 
processing hall, vendor stalls for display and sale of fish, a boat-yard for service and repair 
of boats, refrigeration facilities, locker facilities and fuel outlets (see Figure 5). Findings 
based on actors’ social interactions operating at BFC provide the potential for gaining an 
understanding of social meanings related to governance that are distinctly nationalised 
and internationalised53 components of the flyingfish fishery.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Vendors, fisherfolk, boat owners, consumers come from all over the island to utilize BFC as their place of business in fisheries. 
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Figure 5. Processing and Marketing Facilities at the Bridgetown Fisheries 
Complex 
 
(Source: Soares, 2016, taken by author on site). Note, this picture shows some male 
vendors conducting business transactions at the modern facilities at the BFC. 
 
BFC also offered a broad empirical base to identify the norms being explored in this 
study. I considered the fact that the majority of the Barbadian ice-boat fleet is housed and 
land flyingfish at BFC54—yet day-boats also land flyingfish there (see Figure 6). As such, 
the majority of the flyingfish from Tobago landed by ice-boats, as well as the domestic 
catch landed by day-boats (i.e. fish harvested from Barbadian territorial waters) converge 
at the BFC (cf. Parker, 2002). It was assumed then, that there would be conflicting 
accounts in actors’ perceptions of the benefits to be gained from fishing solely in 
Barbadian sovereign marine borders versus that of a shared regional fishery with Trinidad 
and Tobago. In addition, because BFC is located in the capital, and so, characterised as 
urban — it was assumed that influences of traditional fishing practices and rural fishing 
communities would not be necessarily visible. As a case site, BFC does provide for further 
research on Barbadian development perspectives, particularly, with regards to the 
interactions of ice-boats and day-boats in the fishery, as well as the interactions of the 
fishery with urban tourism interests.   
                                                          
54 See Chapter 6 of this thesis for a more detailed explanation on why ice-boats are an important factor for increasing the fishing 
efficiency of the Barbadian fleet, particularly with fish landed from Tobago. 
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Figure 6. The BFC Fishing Boat Harbour 
 
(Source: Soares, 2016: taken by author on site). Note, the BFC is the central landing site 
for the Barbados ice-boat long-range flyingfish fishery fleet. 
 
Next, Six Men’s Bay. This is a small rural artisanal fishing community located on the 
north-west coast of the island (see Figure 4 above). It sits just past Speightstown55 in the 
parish of St. Peter, one of two parishes that span both the West and East coasts of the 
island56. As a small rural fishing community, it is useful as a site to explore social meanings 
that relate to the distinctly localised components of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. 
Consequently, it was assumed that the social setting of Six Men’s would bring quite the 
opposite perspective of actors’ interactions in the fishery than BFC. Largely because of 
its proximity to Speightstown, it is considered an important tertiary landing site for the 
flyingfish fishery. Tertiary landing sites comprise open beaches with no fisheries related 
infrastructure. These include the most basic amenities for fish processing, namely, a 
concrete slab for cutting and boning the fish and a sink supplied with running water (see 
Figure 7) (Alleyne-Greene, 2015). Highlighting these characteristics of the Six Men’s 
locale matters because Six Men’s is classified in this study as one of Barbados’ remaining 
fishing communities that still utilises traditional fishing practices. In this study, fishing 
communities are defined as coastal communities situated directly on or adjacent to a 
fishing beach, wherein the majority of the community’s inhabitants’ livelihoods depend 
                                                          
55 Speightstown is the first settlement in Barbados and is known as the only major primary landing site for flyingfish in the North of 
the island. In recent years, however, Speightstown has become known as the ‘sleepy town’ and is said to have lost its standing as a 
central fishing landing site in Barbados, for more see, Chapter 6, Constructing Development. 
56 The other parish the spans both the East and West coasts of Barbados is St. Lucy. 
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on the fishery. Because long-range flyingfish fishing via ice-boats has been characterised 
as the ‘modern’ fishing technique, this study defines the erstwhile technique of using day-
boats as the traditional practice to exploit the fishery (cf. Parker, 2002; Willoughby, 2007).  
  
Figure 7.  The Six Men’s Fishing Beach and Concrete Slab 
 
(Source: Alleyne-Greene 2015, pp. 38). Note, this photograph illustrates the narrow 
stretch of highway and the small beach from where the Six Men’s fishing transactions are 
conducted. Traditional day boats facing the highway line the beach. 
 
In contrast to BFC, Six Men’s offered an intrinsically localised empirical base to identify 
the norms being explored in this study. I anticipated that as a small rural artisanal fishery 
there would be a significantly large number of day-boats engaged in the fishery57. 
Although ice-boat owners do reside in the community, the majority of their catches are 
landed at BFC (Alleyne-Greene, 2015). Moreover, customers seem to have an aversion 
to purchasing iced-fish in the island’s rural areas58 (Parker, 2002). Meaning that day-boat 
fish is preferred by local consumers of flyingfish in the island’s north-west. In fact, in an 
interview with one of the fish vendors in the Six Men’s Community, she postured that 
“people come from all over the island just to buy the freshest fish from us here” (SXMF2 
                                                          
57 See Chapter 6 and earlier in this chapter for a more detailed explanation on why ice-boats are an important factor in increasing the 
fishing efficiency of the Barbadian fleet, particularly with fish landed from Tobago. 
58 All of the ice-boats land and sell approximately 80% to 90% of their catch at the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex, and the 
remainder is sold at Six Men’s Bay. On the other hand, the day-boat launches and moses owners land and sell 90% to 95% of their 
fish catch at the Bay (Alleyne-Greene, 2015, pp. 20). 
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interview, 2016). In recent years however, the Six Men’s near-shore fishery has been 
losing an abundance of its resources59 (Alleyne-Greene 2015, 34). It was assumed then, 
that there would certainly be conflicting accounts regarding the benefits to be gained 
from, on the one hand, a day-boat fishery that can only be serviced from sovereign marine 
borders, and, on the other, an ice-boat long-range shared regional fishery with Trinidad 
and Tobago. Moreover, Six Men’s was a primary site of interest because there are a 
number of national development reports and political declarations which document the 
community being promised an infrastructural upgrade to their fishing facilities by the 
Barbadian government to potentially serve as the new commercial centre of fishing in the 
island’s north-west (cf. Mahon and Jones, 1998; Design Collaborative, 1999; BLP, 2003). 
Nevertheless, none of these plans have materialised. Given that the west-coast of the 
island has been dubbed the “platinum coast” by Barbadian tourism interests (Platinum 
Coast Barbados 2017), there are competing claims whether interests in luxury tourism 
have upended the interests of locals to retain the cultural traditions of Six Men’s as a 
fishing community and important facet of the island’s northern fisheries. 
 
Focus is now turned to explaining and justifying the ethnographic methods used to gather 
data, i.e., interviews and non-participant observation and how they triangulate with 
archival document analyses. Also discussed is how the data gathered are to be interpreted 
using the study’s conceptual schema (see Table 4, chapter 3). I also offer critical reflection 
on my own positionality and reflexivity in the research and the limitations of the 
methodological approach taken. The ethical principles adhered to in this study are bound 
by the institutional ethical codes and guidelines of the University of Warwick’s Politics 
and International Studies Department, as well as through my Visiting Researcher 
Agreement with the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies 
(CERMES), University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 The fishing activities of the local fisherfolk at Six Men’s Bay have changed since the reduction in fish abundance. For instance, 
once before fisherfolk of moses’ or dayboat vessels could cast seine nets 3 metres away from the near-shore to fish for pelagic, 
however nowadays fishing a few metres away from shore is unlikely. Presently fisherfolk of moses’/dayboat vessels fish 1.6 
kilometres or more away from the near-shore (Alleyne-Greene, 2015, pp. 34). 
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3. The Methods 
 
3.1. Interviews 
The type of interview method employed in this study was a semi-structured approach. 
These interviews were formed from a series of predetermined open-ended questions and 
were useful for eliciting narrative data that would help to reconstruct and describe events, 
as well as actors’ social experiences, opinions, beliefs and feelings (Shagrir 2017, pp. 11). 
In the conceptual schema, these interviews provided an understanding of how norms 
function that could not be gained from textual data, offering insight into the discursive 
practices of actors validating norms in the locale in their own words and terms. 
Preliminary web research and conversations with lead academics at CERMES largely 
helped me to identify actors in the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. Within the study’s 
empirical chapters, interviews are referenced with acronyms identifying the station of the 
interviewee or the location of the interview. For example, SXMM2 references a male 
interviewee from Six Men’s. In total sixty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted.  
Appendix B lists the biographical information, date of interview, and length of interview 
for each research participant. Fifty-nine were face to face interviews conducted on site in 
Barbados. Two interviews were conducted remotely with the regional representatives of 
the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM). The CRFM is the regional body 
with regulatory authority for fisheries governance in the Anglo-Caribbean. It has co-
ordinated and facilitated regional negotiations surrounding the adoption of the Caribbean 
Community & Common Market (CARICOM) Common Fisheries Policy, the Sub-
Regional Fisheries Management Plan for Flyingfish in the Eastern Caribbean, and the 
Caribbean Large Marine Eco-System Project, among others. Table 1 below lists the 
breakdown of the station of this study’s Key Informants (KIs), each chosen because of 
their unique social interactions with the Barbadian flyingfish fishery.   
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Table 1. Interviewees and their stations 
 
83 
 
Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify this study’s research 
participants. With purposive sampling, strategic individuals and institutions were selected 
for the important information they provided (cf. Maxwell 1997, pp. 87). These included 
national and regional government representatives and institutions, private sector 
representatives, as well as academics and members of civil society, for example, 
BARNUFO, easily recognised from media and development reports, as well as policy 
documents. Analytically, these individuals and institutions were selected because they 
represent expertise in researching, writing, and enforcing governance mandates in the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery. In the conceptual schema, their narratives are 
operationalized as ‘elite’ perspectives that provide some insight into how, particularly, 
standardised procedures and local norms (type 2 and 3 norms) are formed and validated. 
In fact, the narratives gained from these actors in regulatory authority yielded insights as 
to how certain governance positions and instruments might serve to marginalise certain 
actors.  
Second, the snowball sampling method typically involves research participants from the 
purposive sample identifying other potential participants in the study (cf. Morgan, 2008). 
Given the credibility afforded to me as a Visiting Researcher with CERMES, I was able 
to quickly make secondary connections by tagging along to market visits and professional 
industry meetings. Contact with fisherfolk (including artisanal and commercial fisherfolk) 
was made using this technique. This study classifies fisherfolk in the broad categories of 
processors (industrial commercial), fisherfolk in the harvest sector including boat-owners 
(mostly men), and vendors/hawkers including boners of flyingfish (mostly women)60. 
This study assumes that these fisherfolk are, more often than not, the recipients and not 
the makers of high-level governance mandates. Consequently, their narratives were 
expected to produce contrasting views to those in regulatory authority. Given their 
individual and collective roles and interests in the day-to-day success of the fishery, in the 
conceptual schema these actors illuminated, particularly, how local norms (type 3 norms) 
come to be validated in the locale. In doing so, I was able to identify and explore the 
legitimacy gaps between type 1 and 2 norms constructing top-down governance and type 
3 norms constructing bottom-up governance. This is significant because although 
fisherfolk are not in regulatory authority per se, they do command authority in the locale 
                                                          
60 In a 2007 report titled, The Value of Barbados’ fisheries: A preliminary assessment  (Mahon et al., 2007) the distribution channels of the 
flyingfish through the harvest and post-harvest sector are identified. This study identifies fisherfolk active in the fishery based on the 
categorisations presented herein.   
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as they have the largest stake and say in how norms governing the fishery are understood 
and implemented in practice.  
 
All interviews were conducted in Barbadian English and/or Barbadian creole61. A review 
of this study’s informed consent form and ethical procedures were conducted before any 
interview commenced62. Most research participants declined to sign the informed consent 
form. Those that did (mainly government representatives and academics) opted to keep 
the form as a personal overview of the study for their records. Once the researcher 
received consent (verbally or signed), the interviews were recorded and stored as iPhone 
voice memos (synonymous to a tape recorder) and then uploaded to an internet cloud63. 
In situations where consent for recording the interview was declined, hand notes were 
used to transcribe the interview on-site. These situations were few and occurred mainly 
with representatives of the government and private sector. Research participants were 
also briefed that their participation was entirely voluntary, and, assured that the data 
collected from them will be processed and reported anonymously where possible64. In 
cases where interviews were permitted to be recorded, participants were also guaranteed 
of their rights to stop the recording at any time and/or to provide “off the record” 
perspectives.  
 
Next, I offer some critical reflections on the use of interviews in this study and my 
positionality and reflexivity in the research process. Apart from being able to locate the 
legitimacy gaps between top-down (type 1 and 2 norms) and bottom-up (type 3 norms) 
governance, these personal narratives were also useful for locating how contestation 
emerged. Cohen et al. (2007, 29) suggest that interviewing is also “a valuable method for 
exploring the construction and negotiation of meanings in a natural setting”. Indeed, 
efforts were made to conduct the interviews at a place and time comfortable and 
convenient for the research participant. These natural settings included: vendors’ stalls at 
                                                          
61 English is the lingua-franca of Barbados. Despite this, it’s important to take note that Barbadian English is a variety of English that 
differs from standard received English in phonetic and phonological features (accent, intonation, delivery etc) and vocabulary and 
discourse practices. Barbadian Creole is not English, but a distinct language related to other Caribbean creoles such as Jamaican patois.  
62 All research participants were presented with a one-page summary of the study’s objectives and goals. This one-page summary also 
served as an informed consent instrument documenting the ethical guidelines of the study, as well as the contact information of my 
supervisors at the University of Warwick if participants wished to report any complaints or abuse. 
63 They were some situations where the research participant was not comfortable with reading written statements. In these cases, the 
researcher read the consent/ethics clauses to the participants and ensured they understood what was being asked of them before 
proceeding with the interview. 
64 They are certain situations that even if anonymity is upheld in reported findings that certain identifiers or characteristics can be 
traced back to the individual. Given the size of Barbados and the proximity of the communities, the likelihood of this is taken into 
account, particularly with individuals who hold positions of authority and or are seen to wield power over governance mechanisms of 
the fishery. The reverse is true for those who are community leaders or directly active in the harvest and post-harvest aspects of the 
fishery. 
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the Bridgetown Fishing Complex and the Six Men’s Fishing Village, fisherfolks’ boats, 
fisherfolks’ beaches, and, on a few occasions, the personal homes of fisherfolk and 
community members. As might be expected, all of the elite interviews were conducted in 
office settings. These natural settings allowed for additional opportunities to observe 
localised insights about how these actors’ lives had been socially constructed around such 
parameters.  
 
Given this study’s normative emphasis on critical scholarship, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that I had to engage with research participants who held opinions that oppose this study’s 
research scope (cf. McGinn 2008, pp. 712). Despite this, in departing from conventional 
critical constructivist studies in International Relations (IR) (cf. Weldes et al., 1999; 
Zehfuss, 2002; Park, 2009; Schwellnus, 2009; McDonald, 2012), I did not impose upon 
the research participants, a priori or ex post facto assumptions or presumptions of societal 
injustices and inequalities, nor their desires to challenge the status-quo of how the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery is governed. Rather, to make credible this study’s critically 
emergent approach, it was important for me to apply in empirical analyses Palmer's (1987, 
pp. 2) claim that “every way of knowing contains its own moral trajectory”. Regarding 
this, studies have equally shown that research participants prefer to establish relationships 
with researchers who they identify as having a similar social identity or cultural 
background (cf. Shagrir 2017, pp. 10-11). This led to an interesting balancing of my 
insider/outsider status65. In the field, I did encounter less than a handful of interview 
situations, namely with persons in positions of political or management authority in 
Barbadian fisheries, who were either cynical about or averse to speaking to a researcher, 
especially, a non-Barbadian woman of Jamaican heritage, studying the politics of their flyingfish 
fishery. Although regionalism and the interspersing of nationals is a strong social construct 
throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, there has historically been suspicion about 
what may be perceived as nationalist or protectionist political agendas of host countries66 
(Girvan, 2001; Bravo, 2006). For Jamaicans navigating in the Anglo-Caribbean, arguably, 
the social construction of societal relations has often been an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality. 
Nevertheless, these constructs of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ are social constructs, i.e. malleable and 
content specific. In most cases, my social identity as a higher-educated Jamaican woman 
made way for this study’s critical normative agenda to harness integrity—particularly with 
                                                          
65 Scholars have written about insider/outsider status frequently to discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of various 
configurations of researcher-participant relationships (McGinn, 2008). 
66 This has mostly been illustrated in the tensions surrounding the free movement of working nationals throughout the English 
speaking Caribbean through the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2005). 
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civil society, academia, and Barbadian fisherfolk. I was accepted as an insider ‘Caribbean 
sister in arms’, so to speak. Furthermore, my affiliation with CERMES was particularly 
useful in gaining access to these sceptical research participants. Yet, access was only part 
of the equation. It was also a necessity for me to cement my credibility as an informed 
researcher, i.e., knowledgeable about Barbadian life, culture and fishing. The main 
limitation with gathering and interpreting data from these settings was these research 
participants declining authorisation for their interview to be recorded67. While these 
interviews were being conducted, hand-notes were taken on-site. Admittedly, the 
transcription process was short-hand and rushed in these circumstances.  
 
Additional lessons learned were that conversations with fisherfolk, in contrast to elites 
(i.e., academics, civil society or government officials) were, more often than not, shorter 
and blunter. On a few occasions, there were also no-shows to confirmed interviews with 
fisherfolk, and, on a handful of occasions, it proved easier to buy a few snappers and 
flyingfish from a vendor and/or hawker68 before a revealing conversation could take 
place. Nonetheless, while establishing relationships with fisherfolk were timely processes, 
it meant that I amassed numerous opportunities to interact with a large cross section of 
fisherfolk participating at varied levels of the fishery. In revisiting the earlier account that 
interviews were conducted in Barbadian English and/or Barbadian creole, I admit that 
during the interview conversations (especially with the local fisherfolk), there were some 
challenges in understanding the Barbadian creole. This is a significant point to highlight 
because it relates to the use of language and power relations. Typically, the more formally 
“educated” actors in positions of power, whether public or private, were more likely to 
use Barbadian English. On the other hand, actors from the working class, typically less 
formally educated and more likely to be fisherfolk or vendors, were more likely to use 
Barbadian Creole. However, given that most English-speaking Caribbean islanders have 
similar/identifiable creole or linguistic patterns, it was useful being born and raised in 
Kingston, Jamaica, the largest English-speaking island in the Caribbean known for the 
Jamaican patois creole, and, to have travelled extensively in the Caribbean. Further 
mitigating challenges with the linguistic barriers, all the interviews were transcribed as 
narrative scripts with the help of a local Barbadian student. More importantly, as 
mentioned earlier, critical constructivists in IR prefer to use discourse analysis as their 
                                                          
67 Appendix B, Item 1 details the modality of each research interview i.e. whether recorded or research participant declined recording. 
68 These conservations were especially with vendors/hawkers (mostly women but some men) and provided significant insights about 
the political perils being faced by everyday fisherfolk. 
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primary methodology and tool for interpretation. Arguably, this is largely based on the 
concern that “interview research in social science has been fraught with a taken-for-
granted assumptions… in relation to participants’ experiences, attitudes, beliefs, identities 
and orientations toward a wide range of social and cultural phenomena” (Cho 2014, pp. 
43).  
 
Here it is crucial to highlight that issues of positionality and reflexivity are undoubtedly 
important in critical scholarship. This is because the researcher’s choice of methods 
influences interpretation and knowledge production and is impacted by the context of 
institutional, social and political realities of the research undertaken (Sultana, 2015). In 
further reflecting critically on my own positionality and reflexivity in this study, although 
I provide empirical observations on the regional governance of the fishery as bound by 
relations between actors from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (see chapter 6), it is 
essential to state that I did not have an opportunity to interview fisherfolk nor elite or 
technocratic actors from Trinidad and Tobago. I acknowledge the potential biases of this 
omission, for example, the likelihood of Barbadian interviewees downplaying overfishing 
of the flyingfish fishery. However, the study’s methodological approach does mitigate this 
through its framework of checking claims against other sources of data and avoiding 
basing firm conclusions on anecdotal evidence. The study also explored issues of 
race/class and colour relations as it pertained to Barbadian development priorities on the 
island’s platinum coast (see chapter 7). Here, it is important to indicate that the 
perspectives of the elites on the ground who played a role in crafting Barbadian national 
development priorities on the island’s platinum coast were not captured in the study’s 
empirical findings. This was not for my lack of trying, but these actors chose not to 
participate. However, this means that a balanced perspective of the actors in development 
on the island’s platinum coast was omitted. Having not captured these alternative 
perspectives in the interview process, it is important for me in reflecting on my 
positionality to indicate that the findings presented in chapter 7 are not devoid of my own 
personal biases about the political tensions underpinning race/colour and class relations 
in Anglo-Caribbean society. In once again drawing attention to this study’s emphasis on 
critical scholarship, this of course includes an acknowledgement of my own formal and 
informal assumptions about the inferiority of Barbadian fisherfolk and every-day locals 
in policy and political processes of crafting national development.  
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Therefore, in acknowledging my positionality and reflexivity in the interviews conducted, 
it was important for me to keep in mind that research participants might just be relaying 
experiences they believe the researcher wants to hear from what has been insinuated from 
the context of the interview. So, despite the insights gained from these personal 
narratives, to have credible data on which to build the findings of this study, it was 
important to triangulate the evidence gained from interviews with data gathered from 
other methods, i.e., non-participant observation and archival document analyses. 
 
3.2. Non-participant Observation 
Non-participant observation served as an important ethnographic complement to the 
interviews. Williams (2008, pp. 562) describes non-participant observation as a relatively 
unobtrusive qualitative research strategy for gathering primary data about an aspect of the 
social world69. In the conceptual schema, these observations provided the ability to 
particularly locate and explore local norms (type 3 norms), and how these came to be 
validated by actors in the locale. As a non-participant observer, I did not take part in or 
facilitate fishing activities or the governance thereof, for example, boning, selling, leading 
community meetings, etc. Moreover, the research participants had no say about the 
mandate or outcomes of the study. No covert means were used to engage research 
participants or to observe research participants at the case study sites (see section 2.2 of 
this chapter). My field observations involved weekly observation visits to the Fisheries 
Division, Bridgetown Fisheries Complex and the Six Men’s Fishing Village, other popular 
fishing sites such as Silver Sands, Oistins and Conset Bay (see Figure 4 above), as well as 
attending a BARNUFO Board election meeting, and a Speightstown (North-East 
Barbados) community meeting on fishing. The time spent on these observations ranged 
from 1 to 5 hours dependent on the social setting, and provided perspectives on how 
actors and structures in the fishery interfaced on a day-to-day basis, such as:  the physical 
layout of the market and the village and how each were perceived in their respective 
surrounding communities; why certain leaders were recognised as leaders or seemed to 
have more authority in the day-to-day governance of the fishery, i.e., setting the daily price 
for flyingfish; fisherfolk interactions with the Food and Agriculture Organisation pushing 
education or advocacy initiatives; fisherfolk interactions with civil society representatives 
                                                          
69 This approach is differentiated from participant observation where the researcher takes part in everyday activities related to an area 
of social life through the observation of events in their natural contexts (McKechnie, 2008). They are thin lines between the two 
methods of observation as they both serve the purpose of providing the researcher with a deep understanding of a particular topic or 
situation through the meanings ascribed to it by the individuals who live and experience it (Ostrower, 1998).   
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from the Fisheries Division, for example, inspectors; a boat trip with some fishermen 
revealing interactions between boat-owners and crew as well as insight about the harvest 
process; observing the post-harvest process via a floor tour of the factory of one of the 
large-scale processors and distributors of flyingfish; and, observing the post-harvest 
process via the offloading of flyingfish ice-boats at BFC (see Figure 8 below) and day-
boats in Six Men’s. This also included observing transactions between customers, 
vendors, processors, boat-owners, fisherfolk, etc. in the fishery. 
 
Figure 8. The Bridgetown Fishing Complex Loading Dock 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken by author on-site). Note, the picture shows the offloading 
of a couple thousand flyingfish from an ice-boat at the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex. 
 
I was also invited on several occasions to socialise with fisherfolk70. It was mostly through 
these informal interactions that I was able to gain non-narrative insights about the actual 
practices of actors’ re-/enacting the politics of the fishery. Revisiting the significance of 
varied social settings, it is certainly worth noting that at the BFC, the business of fish is 
fast paced, and customer oriented towards commercial processors and bulk demand. In 
                                                          
70 These opportunities occurred both at the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex and the Six Men’s Fishing Village. 
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Six Men’s, as a small tight knit artisanal rural fishing community, the business of fish is 
more community oriented toward the drive or walk up customer. I highlight these site 
nuances here because observations provided insight to both the alignment and 
divergences of discursive practices with the verbal accounts provided by interviewees as 
well as the written accounts imprinted in texts. Of course, navigating critically and 
maintaining credible ethical procedures with non-participant observation is somewhat of 
a blurred line between research and non-research interaction. An example of this is that 
I was able to mitigate these concerns by ensuring that non-research interactions were few 
and limited, for example, to attending the birthday party of the daughter of a local 
fisherman upon invitation. Given that these non-research interactions were personal (and 
more often than not took place after interviews with fisherfolk) they helped in lending 
me additional credibility with actors in the fishery in the community settings where actual 
non-participant observation took place, i.e., bars or fisherfolks’ vending stalls (see Figure 
9). Even though the data gleaned from these observations were informal, non-participant 
observation was an important supplement needed to triangulate the reconstruction of the 
competing knowledge claims revealed in the empirical chapters. 
 
It is important to also further reflect critically on my positionality and reflexivity in the 
non-participant observation process. Kanazawa (2017, pp. 207) poses the question of “is 
it the job of the ethnographic researcher merely to faithfully describe what she observes?”. 
In answer, Kanazawa argues that the ethnographic researcher should not merely observe, 
but also interpret. However, in doing so, “that any particular interpretation should be 
regarded as only one among many possible interpretations” and to also  “be aware that 
others may interpret things differently”(Kanazawa, 2017, pp. 207).  As discussed in 
Section 1 of this chapter, the goal of mainstream ethnography is for the researcher to 
become a part of the group and culture they are studying to so understand the lived day-
to-day experiences of their research participants. It was also discussed in Section 1, that 
this study had adopted ethnographic methodologies situated within an International 
Relations (IR) critical constructivist purview. Given that this study’s theoretical 
parameters are rooted in critical constructivist IR, in utilising non-participant observation 
as an ethnographic research method, though while not dwelling with my research 
participants, I did indeed make efforts to establish relationships with my research 
participants to understand their day-to-day lived experiences of governing the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery. As I’ve alluded to, this certainly presented a blurred line in my 
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insider/outsider status with the study’s research participants, particularly fisherfolk. It was 
important for me therefore to be cognisant of my positionality by remaining objective of 
the observations gleaned yet the subjectivity of the research process and the study’s 
research participants. In doing so, it would be remiss for me as a researcher to assert that 
the informality of the non—participant observation process was neutrally value free. Of 
course, I had to make decisions about my positionality, especially from the 
insider/outsider perspectives discussed prior. Certainly, as a light-skinned educated 
Jamaican woman, it was probably the case that I was given more access than a ‘regular 
Caribbeaner’ or foreign researcher to amass these non-participant observations. 
However, it is important for me to highlight that it was certainly my contextual knowledge 
of living and working within the Anglo-Caribbean that situated the importance of me 
taking an informal approach to the non-participant observation process. Thus, in relaying 
empirical findings from non-participant observations, it was critical for me to be 
cognisant of my negotiating my various positionalities in the research process. Moreover, 
like Bachmann (2011, pp. 364) contends, even more significant was for me to maintain 
reflexivity that the research process “always has to be contextualised with the social 
relations of both the researcher and the researched, as well as with those between them, 
including aspects such as gender, nationality, race, social status etc.”  
 
Figure 9. Braddy’s Bar, Six Men’s Village 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken by author on-site). Note, Braddy’s Bar is the local Bar in 
the Six Men’s Fishing Village. You would find fisherfolk here when they are not at sea. 
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3.3. Archival Document Analyses 
It was also important to locate the discursive practices of how actors understand the 
norms governing the fishery via textual accounts. To locate these discourses, I spent time 
in the field sifting through Barbadian archives for primary and secondary data sources 
which could assist in the reconstruction of these social realities, interactions and political 
tensions. Institutional sources for these secondary data and historical documents were: 
The Barbados Museum and Historical Society; The Barbados National Library; The 
Barbados National Archives; and, the official Agriculture Library housed at the Ministry 
of Agriculture (the latter under which the Fisheries Division is designated). 
 
Archival documents were purposively selected as both primary71  and secondary sources72.  
Primary document sources included: The Nation, the Barbados Advocate and Barbados 
Government Information Service (BGIS) media clips (newspaper on-line, print and 
video);  Legal and regulatory instruments of  Barbadian fisheries and the flyingfish fishery: 
including Laws, Acts, Fisheries Development, Policy and Management Plans; Political 
manifestos published by the two major political parties in Barbados: the Barbados Labour 
Party and the Democratic Labour Party (1940-present); Official agreements with 
fisherfolk organisations specifically via the Barbados National Union of  Fisherfolk 
Organisations (BARNUFO); and, Political speeches. Secondary document sources 
included: Historical books and accounts of  Barbados and its’ flyingfish fishery; Published 
and unpublished theses; Journal articles; Research papers and reports connected to the 
Barbadian or Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery and/or research sites; National 
Development reports and plans (1940-present); and, Physical Development Plans (1940 
–present). 
 
Here, I offer distinctions for the use and meanings of institutional and official 
government documents as well as state-owned and privately-owned media sources. First, 
institutional and official government documents: According to Flick (2006, pp. 250) 
institutional documents are meant to record institutional routines and also simultaneously 
record the information necessary for legitimising how things are done. Institutional 
documents therefore carry a lot of weight as regulatory directives, especially if one 
considers Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s (2001) assertion that institutions can act as “norm 
                                                          
71 Primary data is data collected solely by the researcher for purposes of his/her study (Flick, 2006, pp. 248).  
72 Secondary archival documentary sources are data that were originally collected for other research purposes (Flick, 2006, pp. 248). 
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entrepreneurs”. Similarly, official government documents are supposed to illustrate the 
official position of the state on social, cultural, political and economic matters. In the 
conceptual schema, these data provide rich material for pinpointing, the bridge between 
how fundamental principles and standardised procedures (type 1 and 2 norms) come to 
be formally validated and gain social recognition. Political speeches equally represent 
discourses that lay claim to type 1 and 2 norms by acknowledging politicians’ personal 
narratives and vision for how state and non-state actors ought to engage in governance 
of the fishery.  
 
Second, media sources: This study considers state-owned media as well as privately 
owned media to both represent and reproduce discourses, but in different ways. The main 
newspapers (on-line and print) in Barbados are The Nation and The Barbados Advocate which 
are privately owned. Government owned media is disseminated through the Barbados 
Government Information Service (BGIS) website or office. Similar to government or 
institutionally sourced documents, the data from state-owned media provided insight into 
how type 1 and 2 norms gain formal validity and social recognition. There is the 
assumption that state-owned media portrays the official position of the government. On 
the other hand, media that is supposedly privately-owned reaches and is representative of a 
wider segment of the Barbadian society73. Thus, private media is operationalised as a 
different form of discourse wherein power and knowledge are more widely dispersed. 
For example, media/news reports from BGIS compared to the Nation newspaper74 will 
more than likely highlight different and perhaps competing perspectives that construct 
the social realities of Barbadian society and the flyingfish fishery.  
 
In critical constructivist research it is important to consider that archival documents are 
not just simple representations of facts and reality: “Someone (or an institution) produces 
them for some (practical) purpose” (Flick, 2006, pp. 248). Important questions when 
reporting empirical findings then, are: “who has produced this document, for which 
purpose and for whom? What were the personal and institutional intentions that 
produced the document and where is it stored?”75 (cf. Flick, 2006, pp. 248). Flick (2006, 
pp. 50) also suggests that when analysing these documents, the researcher should 
                                                          
73 The term ‘supposedly privately-owned media’ is meant to acknowledge that privately-owned media is sometimes in coercion with 
or controlled by government. My research in Barbados leads me to believe that this is not the case (at least not on the surface level). 
74 For example, letters to the editor or editorials that conjure an alternate dominant perspective to that of the state. 
75 Considering the features of the document and the particular conditions of their production is therefore crucial element of this 
study’s empirical findings. 
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especially consider, what has been left out in producing the record, by whom and why? 
In constructivist studies, criticisms are largely levelled about the selection of texts used to 
reconstruct norms only confirming a particular historical reading (cf. Zehfuss, 2002; 
Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 230). However, it was the case in this research that sometimes 
the necessary documents were not available, accessible or simply lost. In other cases, there 
were gatekeepers who blocked access to the needed or requested documents. These 
roadblocks mainly existed because of political reasons, and included, the lack of 
accessibility to development bids and plans, as well as environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) reports for the Six Men’s Fishing Village (see chapter 7). Generally, it was also very 
difficult to access documents from the Fisheries Division library. The Custodian 
explained that it needed to be organised. Although challenging, these roadblocks did not 
disrupt data gathering or empirical analyses. Conversely, they provided a perspective on 
the political nuances of governing fisheries in contemporary Barbadian society. To sum 
up the methods section, Table 2 below acts as a reference point for the reader to identify 
with ease how the conceptual schema was used to code the data gathered from what has 
been documented above. 
 
Table 2. Linking Methods with the Conceptual Schema  
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Conclusion 
This chapter explored the methods used in this study and how they complement its 
conceptual schema (see chapter 3). Section 1 made the case for utilising ethnographic 
methods, i.e. interviews and non-participant observation, as the best complement to this 
study’s conceptual schema because of their ability to elicit localised perspectives 
constructing governance. Also explained was the importance of archival document 
analyses for triangulating shared and contested discourses. Section 2 explained why 
Barbados and its flyingfish fishery were chosen as an interpretive case study, and, why the 
Bridgetown Fisheries Complex (BFC) (a commercial urban fishery and the main landing 
site in Barbados) and Six Men’s Bay (a small rural artisanal fishing community) as 
comparative social settings. Section 3 provided a detailed reflective account of the 
methods used in this study as described above. How the data gathered from each of the 
methods were coded and interpreted in line with the study’s conceptual schema was also 
explained. I also offered critical reflections of my positionality and reflexivity in the 
research process and the limitations of the methods undertaken. The implications of these 
methodological criteria allow this study to situate how a norm is understood, legitimated 
and contested from global to local scales. Structurally this maintains the study’s critical 
constructivist agenda, i.e., unearthing documented political promises vs. every-day 
political realities. Ultimately then, the goal in the following empirical chapters is to 
reconstruct actors’ perceptions about the legitimacy of their rights to the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery through how they understand the regional and development norms 
constructing governance of the fishery, be it shared or contested perspectives.    
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CHAPTER 5 
GOVERNING THE BARBADIAN FLYINGFISH FISHERY: 
A SOCIO-POLITICAL CHRONOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a socio-political chronology of the governance of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery. Its contributions are significant to this thesis because my observations 
revealed that the regional and development norms deemed pertinent for constructing 
governance of the fishery have been forged through the social relations of race/colour, 
class, nationality and gender. This chapter aims therefore to present a summative account 
of how these social forces have shaped the present-day politics of the fishery explored in 
the empirical chapters (see chapters 6 and 7). Given that gender in Barbadian fisheries is 
significantly under-researched thereby leaving little material to draw on, the narrative is 
heavily weighted towards exploring the social constructions of race/colour, class, and 
nationality. The chapter however opens the space for further exploration of the fishery’s 
gendered dynamics. Because of its historical premise, this chapter ought to be read as a 
bridge between this study’s theoretical and empirical chapters, and methodologically, as a 
partially descriptive/partially empirical chapter. My observations are based on archival 
and secondary data including newspaper articles, academic articles, government reports. 
These are supplemented with accounts from Key Informants (KIs). The findings 
reported from the study’s KIs are from a Barbadian perspective and documented with 
anonymity to the extent possible.  
 
I present an understanding of how the norms explored in this study have emerged, what 
it means to be a Barbadian, and how Barbadian fisherfolk and the rights afforded to them 
have been constituted. This chapter’s importance is thus evidenced through its key 
findings. The flyingfish fishery has been formative to Barbadian life and national identity. 
Barbadian society nevertheless has been constructed through embedded stratifications of 
race/colour and class evident in distinction between a white elite, poor whites 
(descendants from white indentured servants), and blacks (descendants of enslaved 
Africans). These stratifications have informed a power sharing agreement between white 
capital and black politics, and thus, tensions abound regarding who controls the island’s 
productive resources. Regarding this, fishing has been characterised as a peasant industry 
and fisherfolk are principally from the black peasantry. Therefore, fisherfolk and their 
rights have largely been excluded from high-level decision-making and governance. 
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Notwithstanding, a significant amount of attention has been placed by the Barbadian 
authorities on developing the fishery domestically and expanding it regionally76. This is 
attributed to Barbados’ early political leadership forging both a national and regional 
identity. It is also notable that although under-researched, gendered roles have impacted 
the distribution of power in the industry via the harvest and post-harvest sub-sectors— 
with men dominating the former and women the latter.  
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 1 covers the period of 1627-1970 
and unearths the historical background fuelling the emergence of how this study’s 
fundamental principles (type 1 norms) have come to be constituted. Its subsections 
discuss the impact of the Indigenous, Africans and Europeans in shaping the early 
governance of the fishery (1627 -1834); how governance of the fishery evolved during 
emancipation and the early colonial era (1834 –1950); and, during the birth of an 
independent Barbados (1950-1970). The overall narrative is also heavily weighted towards 
the historical era because of the availability of primary and secondary literature. Section 2 
covers the period from 1970 – present day. An understanding is gained of how the 
fishery’s standardised procedures (type 2 norms) have been shaped by the historical 
institutional environment described in Section 1 to establish top-down governance. Its 
subsections discuss governing the flyingfish fishery in contemporary Barbados; and, the 
impact of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery’s key stakeholders in shaping the contemporary 
governance of the fishery. The structure of Section 2 departs from Section 1 as it rests 
heavily on empirical data gathered from the field in 2016. The conclusion sums up the 
chapter’s findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 An academic KI has argued of the need to realise that this has not been consistent due to the lack of sustained energies to develop 
Barbadian fisheries (cf. ACDM4, interview, 2016). 
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1. The Plantation, Colonial Fisheries, and Independence 
 
1.1. The Beginnings: Indigenous, Africans and Europeans (1627 -1834)  
Barbados’ first formal settlement was established by British colonists in 162777 (Beckles, 
1990, pp. 7). However, before the arrival of the colonists, the islands of the West Indies, 
of which Barbados is a part, had already been settled by aboriginal natives (Parry, Sherlock 
and Maingot, 1987). Historic literary sources observe that fish was an important source 
of food security for the Barbadian aboriginal natives (cf. Bair, 1962; Welch, 2005).  This 
claim has been shored up by archaeological findings which reveal excavated flyingfish as 
well as other pelagic fish bones and fishing tools in the North and South of Barbados78 
(cf. Barton, 1953; Drewett and Oliver, 1997; Fitzpatrick, 2000). Within these sources 
however, there is minimal detail regarding how the Europeans interacted with the 
aboriginal natives to develop Barbadian fishing traditions. This is perhaps because as 
several academic KIs relayed “Barbadians were taught in school that were no or few 
Amerindians here when the British settled” 79 (ACDM3 cf. ACDM1, ACDM4, interviews, 
2016). 
 
The mainstay of the early British Barbadian colonists was the production of tobacco and 
cotton, for which, a significant labour force was amassed based on enslaved labour80. 
Interestingly, with Barbados’ it was white indentured servants who first bore the burden 
of Barbadian labour. White indentured servants were poor British men and women who 
were contracted for up to 7 years to work as servants for white planters81. By 1637, sugar 
was introduced to the island along with enslaved Africans to cultivate the sugar 
plantations. Unlike the indentured whites, Africans were enslaved for life and their 
offspring born into slavery (Beckles, 1990, pp. 15; Alleyne, 1998, pp 46). What emerged 
is the beginnings of a highly stratified Barbados with a rich agro-mercantile elite whose 
labour demands were satisfied by both enslaved blacks and poor white indentured 
servants (McConney et al., 2003a, pp. 14). I draw attention to these domestic divisions of 
                                                          
77 The first official colonial settlement was on the leeward coast of Barbados, present day Holetown. For a precise history of the early 
colonial Barbadian settlements (cf. Beckles, 1990). 
78 Drewett and Oliver’s (1997) study reveals pre-historic Amerindian presence and evidence of fishing at one of the study’s research 
sites, i.e. the Six Men’s, Heywoods. Heywoods is the site on which Port St. Charles is now located. This is discussed further in chapter 
7.  
79 While British colonists produced the first formal Barbadian settlement, both Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors reported landing 
there in the early 16th century. Throughout the West Indies the native Amerindian population were largely wiped out by the Spanish. 
For more information (cf. Parry, Sherlock and Maingot, 1987; Beckles, 1990). 
80 This model of slave labour was formalised through the plantation system created by the Spanish and later cemented by the British 
(cf. Beckles, 1990). 
81 The contributions of white indentured servants to the early Barbadian plantation economy is often over-looked in the literature (cf. 
Beckles, 1990). 
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race/colour, class, and nationality because these early social dynamics helped to shape the 
rights afforded to these plantation labourers. Moreover, they influenced how fishing came 
to be characterised as the main peasant industry in colonial Barbados.   
 
The social order of early colonial Barbados had the plantocracy controlling the island’s 
political and social system. Blacks were at the bottom. White indentured servants on the 
other hand, although the conditions of their employment were akin to black slavery, were 
not slaves. In fact, they were afforded rights, such as the right to complain about ill 
treatment from their masters (Beckles, 1990, pp. 17, 33). Despite sugar’s dominance, one 
of the most common themes in Barbados’ early colonial literature is the abundance of 
flyingfish in Barbadian waters (cf. Ligon, 1657; Hughes, 1750; Schomburg, 1848). This 
literature details scenes which suggest that a flyingfish fishery was well established on the 
island within the early days of European settlement. Welch (2005, pp. 22) provides 
illustrations from two British surgeons. The first from John Atkins, who in 1722 
observed: 
 
the way of feeding such a Multitude, and of providing the 
Necessaries in an island yielding little besides sugar is 
principally by their fisheries and importations. The sea 
gives them plenty of fish …particularly flying fish [sic].  
 
The second is from George Pinckard in the late 18th century, whose vivid imagery detailed 
that “…the fish is about the size of a herring. They are caught in great numbers near 
Barbados, where they are pickled, and salted, and used as a very common food” (Welch, 
2005, pp. 22). According to Welch, these observations illuminate the importance of 
flyingfish to the early Barbadian diet. This was particularly so in a time when most of the 
arable land that could be utilised to grow local food crops was set aside for planting sugar, 
and the bulk of food required to maintain the diets of free and enslaved people imported 
(Ibid, 2005, pp. 22). Barbados’ dependence on imported foods during the early colonial 
days, particularly dried salt fish harvested in the North Atlantic, to supplement the diets 
of enslaved Africans is well documented. This was a common practice throughout the 
British Caribbean’s plantation system (cf. Williams, 1944; Halcrow and Cave, 1947; Welch, 
2005). Antoine-Belle (2011) observes the reason for this was that despite the Caribbean’s 
exploitable maritime bounties, salt fish was cheaply imported, and so long as it remained 
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competitive with other meats, there was no incentive to develop or expand local fisheries. 
Local fisheries therefore were not an organized industry during early colonial Barbados 
(Bair, 1962).  
 
Literature that speaks to the social dimensions of Barbados’ early colonial fish trade 
provides only a generalised account. Price's (1966) Caribbean Fishing and Fishermen: A 
Historical Sketch observed that enslaved plantation workers who also fished (mostly men) 
occupied a unique position in the plantation’s social strata due to their exchanges of 
fishing techniques with the early colonists. According to Price, the enslaved who fished 
were therefore perceived to be non-threatening to the plantation economy and culture. 
The accuracy of Price’s account is debatable however, particularly given that the most 
basic precepts of justice that would provide for the rights of slaves were certainly not 
secure (Antoine-Belle 2011). How fisherfolk were constituted by their gendered roles is 
also important. This is because, as Welch (2005, pp. 28) highlights, the practice of fishing 
did not only include fishermen. In urban market centres enslaved persons and free 
coloureds82 were identified participating in the early fishing industry through fish sales, 
vending, and frying. Although Welch does not explicitly document females dominating 
these occupations, the evolution of gendered roles in the fishery indicate this was probably 
the case. A distinguishing feature of Barbados’ enslaved black population was its female 
majority. There was no sexual division of field labour83 (Beckles 1990, pp. 51). However, 
this was presumably different for women in fisheries, i.e. men’s roles were limited to the 
sea and females to the land84. 
 
These domestic social realities crafting early governance of the fishery would also be 
influenced by the ideas and traditions attached to Anglo-Caribbean regionalism as a 
formative aspect of British colonialism. The project of Anglo-Caribbean regionalism dates 
to the pre-emancipation era. Initially, it was a construct of the British colonial authorities 
as an administrative cost-saving device for their colonial holdings (Revauger, 2008, pp. 
856). The first attempt was in 1663 to federate the Leeward Islands that were being 
governed from Barbados (Sewell, 1997, pp. 14-15). The second attempt where Barbados 
                                                          
82 Free coloureds were identified as the descendants of white slave owners who slept with slave women and fathered mulatto children. 
These children born into slavery had to be granted manumission from their white slave owner fathers.  Manumission is referred to 
freedom as a gift. They were also free blacks who were granted who were granted manumission (Beckles, 1990, pp. 63-66). 
83 For more information on the history and role of enslaved women in early Barbadian society (cf. Beckles, 1989) 
84 An academic KI closely tied to the history of Barbadian fisheries, relayed that one of Barbados’ prominent female vendors, Berinda 
Cox, shared with him that women going to sea, at least occasionally, was more prevalent in her childhood (early 1900s) than in the 
1990s (cf. ACDM3 interview, 2016). 
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was as the centre of Anglo-Caribbean regionalism was in 1876, where the governor of 
Barbados, John Pope Hennessy, sought to establish a confederation comprised of 
Barbados, the Windward Islands (St Lucia, Dominica and Grenada) and Tobago. These 
efforts failed largely because the white planters of Barbados wanted to maintain autonomy 
and control over the island’s fiscal resources (Williams, 1942, pp. 139). In this chapter, I 
will continue to explain why Barbados’ centrality in actualising Anglo-Caribbean 
regionalism is important for understanding how regional governance of the flyingfish 
fishery came to be constituted. 
 
1.2. Emancipation and Colonial Fisheries (1834 –1950)  
The plantation labour of enslaved blacks and white indentured servants greatly influenced 
Barbados’ colonial social structures. A society was constructed wherein the ownership of 
land and property—alongside race/colour and class—determined one's social status and 
political power (Alleyne, 1998, pp. 46). The political tide which had justified the practice 
and traditions of enslaved labour to fuel the Caribbean British plantation system began 
to shift with the abolition of slavery in 1834 and emancipation in 1838 (McConney et al., 
2003a, pp. 14). However, the white plantocracy did not easily relinquish its social and 
political power over the island’s newly free but largely poor population (Alleyne 1998, pp. 
46). Beckles (2004a) explains that the colonial agenda for emancipation was to construct 
a “landless freedom” for the newly free black community. Beckles suggests this was so 
because “landlessness for blacks was considered the principal modality by which the 
White community could maintain its monopoly hold on the economy, the political 
process, and ensure white elitism” (Beckles, 2004a, pp. 44). White indentured servants 
also had limited opportunity to acquire land after their contract of servitude expired, 
thereby creating a white working proletariat. Given their lack of land rights after 
emancipation, most of the poor whites settled in rural Barbados and took part in 
subsistence farming (Beckles, 1990, pp. 47). On the other hand, newly freed blacks tended 
to congregate near urban centres like Bridgetown where skilled apprenticeships and wage 
labour was readily available (Beckles, 2004b). This highly uneven distribution of 
productive land resources based on a divisive creed of race/colour and class influenced 
the development of the island’s fisheries, and particularly its fishing communities. In this 
chapter, I will show how these social divisions of race/colour and class positioned 
fisheries as one of Barbados’ national development priorities.  
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According to Welch (2005, pp. 3), “one of the first post-slavery references to fishing 
relates not to Africans, but to poor whites”. Welch cites a report from Major Colthurst85, 
a stipendiary magistrate, documenting: 
   
that the greater number of the lower order of whites were 
born in the colony and are a most idle and good for nothing 
set – proud, lazy, and consequently miserably poor. They 
usually live around the coast as fishermen (Ibid, 2005, pp. 
30).  
 
Halcrow and Cave (1947, pp. iv-v) also observed that many of the former enslaved 
Africans did not have the opportunity to own land until 189586. This is important because 
fisherfolk were mostly characterised as being from the black peasantry competing for 
scarce non-plantation land after slavery (McConney, 1995, pp. 35, 37).   
 
The rights afforded to former enslaved Africans and poor whites in Barbadian fisheries 
during abolition and emancipation are not well-documented. However, Welch (2005, pp. 
31) also provides an account from the 1868 memoir of John Bezsin Tyne, a white 
Barbadian, who captured the racial divisions of labour in the fishery. Tyne observed “a 
few of the poorest classes of whites ‘fish for a living’ literally …but the Negroes are the 
chief fishermen”.  Interestingly, contrasting with other British colonies that supplemented 
the diets of their poorer classes with mainly imported salt fish, flyingfish was also 
important to the freed blacks and poor white population of Barbados. This was due to 
the abundance and ease of harvesting flyingfish in Barbadian waters, particularly at a time 
when imported salt fish was priced out of the reach of underpaid labourers (Welch, 2005). 
The importance of flyingfish to the Barbadian diet during this era was captured in an 1897 
British weekly newspaper, The Graphic. Here again, a gendered division of labour is 
evident. The Graphic described: 
  
how flying fish [sic] were harvested, transported to 
market, and procured by fishwives clad in white with 
short skirts showing bare shiny black legs, who hoist 
                                                          
85 Welch’s summary of Major Colthurst’s report is adapted from Marshall's (1977) The Colthurst Journal, pp. 237 (cf. Welch, 2005, pp. 
30).  
86 Halcrow and Cave (1947, pp. iv-v) claim that numerous Barbadians of African origin went to work in Panama or elsewhere, and, as 
a result, gained improved purchasing power in the Barbadian economy. 
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the baskets containing flying fish [sic] on their heads, 
and cry their wares through the town (Cumberbatch 
and Hinds, 2013, pp. 121).  
 
The early post-emancipation era also brought with it social transformations in the years 
following World War 1 (1914-1918) due to black political mobilisation. This is a significant 
point because a radical political movement which sought to enfranchise the black working 
class took root. Emboldened by the teachings of Jamaican visionary, Marcus Garvey and 
his transatlantic Pan-Africanism, as well as British Fabian and Marxist socialism, the need 
to forge an alternative path of anti-colonial consciousness for the labouring working class 
was born. However the legislative influence of the working class population was limited 
due to the lack of universal suffrage87  (Beckles, 1990, pp. 154-157). Indeed, throughout 
the colonial West Indies, this lack of universal suffrage gave rise to labour movements in 
the form of trade unionism as an outlet to mobilise support for the social and political 
demands of the working class (Revauger, 2008, pp. 858).  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that no formal governance apparatuses existed for British 
colonial fisheries in general until the onset of World War II (1940-1944). In Barbados 
however, it was the riot of 1937 that prompted its colonial authorities to take a keen 
interest in developing the local fishing industry (Bair, 1962; Parker, 2002). The Barbadian 
economy and social life suffered because of sugar’s demise in the early 20th century. 
Fuelled by a century of “landless freedom” and the rise of the labour movement, the 1937 
riot was largely the result of rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions upon the 
working class of Barbados. Barbadian national identity was again evolving. This was the 
first attempt to significantly shift the power structure of democracy on an island mired 
by racial stratification88 (Beckles, 2004a, pp. 56).   
 
The entry of Grantley Adams into Barbadian politics during the early 1930s is important 
in this regard. According to Beckles (1990, pp. 159-161), Adams, a coloured Barbadian 
educated at the University of Oxford, was viewed as the formulator of conservative 
political opinions. Adams represented the liberal black middle class who, on the one hand, 
wanted an alternative to the radical politics of black nationalism and socialism, and on the 
                                                          
87 Beckles (1990, pp. 157) documents that Barbados’ 1901 Representation of the People Act had placed an income qualification on 
the voting franchise of £50 per annum and a freehold qualification of the rental of land and properties at £5 or more annually. 
88 Other Caribbean scholars outside of Beckles have written on the social and economic history of the Caribbean. See for example, 
the work of (Brewster and Thomas, 1967; Lewis, 2004). 
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other, wanted to limit the white plantocracy’s domination over the economy. Yet this 
remained stymied by Barbados’ socio-political structures. Although the post-
emancipation Barbadian black community was highly educated89, there was no parallel 
growth of their participation or representation in the institutions of resource ownership 
(Beckles, 2004a, pp. 56, 60). Here it is important to explain the relationship between 
race/colour and class in post-emancipation Anglo-Caribbean society. Throughout the 
Anglo-Caribbean, one’s identity and the entitlements afforded to them have largely been 
structured on stratifications particularly borne of British plantation society. As Premdas 
(1996, pp. 6) explains “today, for the most part, the Black-White cleavage has been 
institutionalised mainly in a colour-class system of stratification in which race, culture, 
and economic factors are combinationally [sic] nuanced”90. This undoubtedly affected the 
formation of a hierarchical Barbadian national identity within which the rights afforded 
to one to participate or be represented in institutions of resource ownership was based 
on a long-standing creed of race/colour and class relations. 
 
Notwithstanding, the 1937 riot led to a visit in 1938 from the Royal Commission to 
conduct investigations into all facets of the island’s economic life, including fisheries. 
Their findings indicated that the large imported quantities of salt fish provided evidence 
that fish was a popular item in the Barbadian diet. The Commission therefore engaged 
the idea that if fresh fish was available it would be preferred. With the food shortages 
brought by the onset of World War II, initial efforts to formally govern Barbadian 
fisheries were then enacted by the British government (Bair, 1962). This was done 
alongside attempts to consolidate governance of the colony islands under the Anglo-
American Caribbean Commission91. Part of the mandate of the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission (not to be confused with the Royal Commission) was on 
improving the “coordination of research related to human nutrition, agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries” (Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, 1943, pp. 1). Barbados was 
chosen as the administrative centre of the British headquarters of the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission and for the Royal Commission. This naturally enhanced the 
importance of Barbados to the British empire and illuminates the centrality of Barbados’ 
                                                          
89 Beckles (2004a) explains that these landless masses constituting former freed black salves cultivated a deep obsession with education 
as the only way up from poverty and despair. For more information on the literacy levels of post-emancipation Barbadian society 
(Beckles, 2004a, pp. 196). 
90 A good resource to understand race/colour and class relations in post-emancipation Anglo-Caribbean society is (Holt, 1992). 
91 The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was an official international advisory body which represented the interests of the 
United Kingdom, United States, France and Netherlands, particularly during the onset and aftermath of World War II. For more 
information on the work of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (cf. McConney et al., 2003a; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013 ). 
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role as a regional centre for the Anglo-Caribbean and colonial fisheries (Ibid, 1943, pp. 
1).  
 
During the post-World War II era, the pursuit of political independence was widespread 
throughout the Caribbean. Rooted in nationalist thought and linked to the labour 
movements of the 1930s, there were calls for unification and integration amongst the 
Anglo-Caribbean’s domestic political leaders. The rise of the labour movements was 
significant because, in 1938, Barbados’ first major political party, the Barbados Labour 
Party (BLP), was founded92. However, its leader, Adams, was characterised as a colonial 
moderate by several of the BLP’s rank and file (Beckles 1990, pp. 168). As Beckles (1990, 
pp. 169) explains, Adams “was considered the kind of man the Colonial Office wanted 
to lead … to undermine radical black nationalists and socialists alike”, and, as such, had 
“cemented his reputation in the Colonial Office as a man to be trusted to protect British 
colonial interests (Ibid 1990, pp. 184). Despite this, having to appease his political base, 
Adams became a staunch advocate for Barbados’ labour movement and the fight for 
universal adult suffrage throughout the 1940s (Ibid 1990, pp. 177-178).  
 
By the 1940s, Barbados claimed the reputation of having the most developed political 
and judicial administration of the British colonies (Beckles, 2004a, pp. 62). This too was 
reflected in the regulatory beginnings of the island’s fisheries. The first detailed and 
comprehensive report of Barbados’ fisheries was conducted in 1942 by British scientist, 
H.H. Brown. Upon Brown’s recommendations, the Fisheries Division was established in 
1944 to be overseen by a Fisheries Officer and assisted by a Fisheries Advisory 
Committee (Parker, 2002). Much of the developments in the fishing industry in the 
subsequent half-century focused on economic and technological advancements93. In 
comparison, social changes affecting Barbadian fisherfolk and the rights afforded to them 
are not well-documented (McConney et al., 2003a, pp. 14). The following therefore 
provides some insight into these social changes leading up to Barbados’ independence in 
1966. 
 
                                                          
92 The Barbados Labour Party changed its name to the Barbados Progressive League in 1938 and later back to the Barbados Labour 
party in 1944 (Beckles 1990). 
93 See Appendix C, Exhibit 1 for a timeline of these economic and technological advancements. 
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According to Barbados’ first Fisheries Officer, Dudley Wiles94, who was a white 
Barbadian:  
 
prior to 1942, little to no attention had been paid to 
the fishing industry by the Government, so much so, 
that the Barbadian fisherman found himself in a class 
below that of the agricultural labourer economically; 
as such, he set his own standards, which to him may 
have been satisfactory, but to other more intelligent 
people repulsive, unreliable and uncooperative (Wiles, 
1949, pp. 68).  
 
Wiles’ observations could have been due to the perception that fisherfolk had low socio-
political status in Barbadian society. It is also worth mentioning that legislative price 
controls were instituted by the Barbadian colonial government in 1942 to ensure that 
staple commodities, like fish, did not did not become targets of the black-market95 during 
World War II.  Because of this, the formal emergence of gendered dynamics also factored 
in the early governance of the flyingfish fishery. Before the development of primary 
landing and distribution sites, excess landings were normally sold to women, generally 
vendors and hawkers— the latter who transported fish further inland (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94 The available literature and personal reports from the study’s Key Informants indicate that Wiles was presumably descendant from 
the plantocracy or white indentured servants. 
95 Within this study’s context this term black-market means illicit or contraband.  
107 
 
Figure 1. Picture of Barbadian Hawker Woman Transporting Flyingfish 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016 via Barbados Fisheries Division). Photograph taken by author at 
Barbados Fisheries Division during the 2016 Fisherman’s week Display.  
 
However, it has been generally considered that when the legislative price controls were 
instituted, a process began whereby Barbadian fishermen have continued to express a 
sense of marked disadvantage to Barbadian female fish vendors96. This is because as 
women began to solidify their status in Barbados’ public markets particularly after World 
War II, and especially when landings of flyingfish were low, fishermen (excluding 
boatowners) were seen to have limited bargaining power and not able to amass any 
substantial profits. The perception existed (and still exists to present-day) about vendors 
and hawkers (mostly women) habitually colluding on the price they pay fishermen for 
flyingfish. This resulted in fishermen having a low self-perception of their status in 
Barbadian society (Bair, 1962; Parker, 2002). The evolution of these ‘inverse’ gendered 
norms wherein women are seen as superior to men within Barbados’ flyingfish fishery 
economy are certainly worthwhile themes to explore in further research. 
 
By 1944, one of the mandates of the newly minted Fisheries Division was the upgrading 
of fish landing and marketing sites. This point is important because it provides insight 
about the distribution of land and capital for fisheries development pre-independence. In 
1947, the Barbadian fishing industry was still characterised as a peasant industry wherein 
                                                          
96 The legislated price controls of fish were lifted in 1972. For more information (cf. Parker 2002). 
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all landed fish was consumed locally (Halcrow and Cave, 1947, pp. vii). Fishing was 
characterised as a small-scale individualistic operation. It was a common practice for 
fishermen, who normally owned their own boats, to land and sell their catches close to 
home from the beach where their boat operated. Their customers were largely people 
who had foregathered and who lived in the immediate community, thereby establishing 
true fishing communities (Bair, 1962).  
 
1.3. The Birth of a Nation (1950 – 1970)  
By the 1950s, Barbados’ colonial authorities had a clear interest in advancing local 
fisheries. This was evidenced with the first Fishing Industry Act being passed in 1952 as 
well as the investments in new and upgraded landing sites close to the island’s major 
marketing centres—Bridgetown, Oistins and Speightstown (Colonial Office, 1954; 
Parker, 2002). Throughout the 1950s-70s, Barbados’ socio-political structures would 
again be transformed. Beckles (2004a, pp. 83) has documented that due to the attainment 
of universal adult suffrage in 1950, with a black majority populace, the white Barbadian 
elite recognised “the ‘only way’ to protect their economic power was to accommodate 
black political power within the context of popular democracy”. At the same time, the 
global and regional landscape of the British West Indies was also evolving. The United 
Kingdom put its colonies on a formally federated path of regionalism as well as 
nationalised self-government. It was in this context that Barbados’ present-day dominant 
political parties were established. Adams’ BLP government successfully contended the 
1951 elections. However, Adams’ political conservatism and protection of the white 
corporate elite would be challenged by socialist factions within his own party through the 
leadership of Errol Barrow. Barrow and his followers ceded from the BLP to establish 
the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 1955. Adams and the BLP were nevertheless 
successful in the 1956 elections (Beckles 1990, pp. 185-193). Perhaps given his close 
alliances with both the British colonial agenda and calls for nationalised Anglo-Caribbean 
independence, Adams’ re-election was significant as his politics continued to fuel the 
construction of a Barbadian national identity tied to both Caribbean regionalism and 
nationalism. 
  
The idea of integrating the Caribbean through a federalised union had been a priority of 
the colonial authorities especially after World War II. It is therefore relevant to explain 
the history behind Anglo-Caribbean regional integration to understand how the regional 
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norms governing the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery have emerged. In the years 
leading up to Barbadian independence, regional integration of the Anglo-Caribbean was 
accomplished through the formation of the Federation of the British West Indies. 
Federation discussions date back to the 1947 Montego Bay conference in Jamaica. This 
led to the official creation of the Federation in 1958 established by the British Caribbean 
Federation Act of 1956 with the mandate of establishing a political union among its 
members. The Federation comprised the ten British colonial territories of: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the then St Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago97 (Revauger, 2008, pp. 859; 
The Caribbean Community Secretariat, 2011). Arguably for Britain, the idea of a 
‘Federation’ grew out of the desire to disassociate from the unpopular legacy of colonial 
slavery and to prepare the colonies for their collective desire for independence (Brzovic 
2015, pp. 13-14). In 1958, Adams emerged as both Premier of Barbados and Federal 
Prime Minister of the British West Indies98. It is notable that the main countries that stood 
behind the Federation were Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. These 
territories were considered the most economically important islands in Britain’s 
Caribbean colonial empire due to their population, land mass, potential for development 
and colonial interests. Essentially, the Federation laid the political foundations for the 
establishment of a contemporary regional community for the Anglo-Caribbean colonies. 
It was headquartered in Trinidad where Adams took up his post (Beckles, 1990, pp. 194-
195).  
 
From its inception however, the Federation’s prospects were hindered by differences in 
national political jurisdictions, geographical distance and economic wealth. Most 
problematic was the reluctance of the larger countries, chiefly, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago, to assume financial responsibility for the smaller Anglo-Caribbean states 
(Brzovic, 2015, pp. 13). Furthermore, Beckles (1990, pp. 196-197) suggests that Adams’ 
liberal politics was considered “anachronistic by both the radical nationalist Eric Williams 
and Fabian socialist Norman Manley” of Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, respectively. 
By 1960, the Federation was crumbling due to the Anglo-Caribbean leaders’ inability to 
come to terms on how integration would be actualised. Its most ardent supporters were 
                                                          
97 For more information about evolution of the Anglo-Caribbean’s regional institutions (cf. The Caribbean Community Secretariat, 
2011). 
98 Before Anglo-Caribbean colonies achieved independence, the title of Premier was used to refer to the first/head of government. 
The title of Federal Prime Minister was used to refer to first/head of government of the British West Indies Federation colonies each 
of which had their own Premier. After the Anglo-Caribbean colonies achieved independence the title of Prime Minister  was used to 
refer to the  first/head of government. 
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also replaced by new Anglo-Caribbean leaders who were anti-federal in ideology. The 
political priority for the region’s new political leaders shifted to securing independence 
and establishing true self-government. The Federation’s impending collapse and Adams’ 
absence from Barbados’ domestic scene eventually led to his political demise. In 1961, 
Barrow of the DLP was elected as next Premier of Barbados99.  By 1962, the Federation 
was fully dissolved. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were the first two islands to gain 
independence in 1962 with Barbados and British Guiana following suit in 1966 (Brzovic, 
2015, pp. 14; Payne, 2008). 
 
By the mid-1960s, most of Britain’s other Caribbean colonies were also on a path to 
achieving self-government. Embarking as newly independent states with limited financial 
and political resources, integration remained high on the regional political agenda. This 
led to the conception of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARFITA) in 1968, then 
the Caribbean Community in 1973, and later, in 2001, the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM)100. Barbados continued to play a central role as a founding 
nation-state in establishing the regional governance mechanisms of the present-day 
CARICOM, including those for fisheries. However, the viability of the CARICOM 
integration project continues to be questioned, insofar as it is hindered by Anglo-
Caribbean state’s interests in maintaining national sovereignty, thereby foregrounding the 
normative tensions around what a regional community ought to mean (cf. Bravo, 2006; 
Bishop and Payne, 2010; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013).  
 
On the domestic scene, Beckles (1990, pp. 201) argues that the election of Barrow and 
his DLP government represented a progressive departure from Barbados’ colonial 
foundations. By 1966, distinct ideologies had come to characterise the island’s two main 
political parties. The first was Adams’ BLP that drifted to the right for the protection and 
enhancement of the powerful corporate elements of the former white planter elite. The 
second, Barrow’s DLP, maintained its image of being left of centre and was seen to be in 
opposition to big business. Yet, the DLP had also amassed significant mercantile support 
and going into the post-independence era, there were criticisms levelled against both 
parties by the black majority populace that they were too cautious about addressing white 
                                                          
99 See supranote 106. 
100 The decision to establish the Caribbean Community was brought into fruition at the Eighth Heads of Government Conference of 
CARIFTA held in April 1973 in Georgetown, Guyana. Original signatories to the Treaty were Prime Ministers Errol Barrow for 
Barbados; Forbes Burnham for Guyana; Michael Manley of Jamaica; Eric Williams for Trinidad and Tobago (cf. The CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2011). For more information on the phases of Caribbean integration and the regionalism project (Bishop and Payne, 2010; 
Gilbert-Roberts, 2013). 
111 
 
economic domination (Beckles, 1990, pp. 204; 2004a, pp. 85-86). This foregrounds the 
argument presented in Chapter 7 that Barbados’ working-class interests were constructed 
to be less important to that of the economic interests of the white elite in forging 
Barbados’ national development priorities.  
 
Barrow served as Barbados’ Premier from 1961-1966 and Prime Minister from 1966-
1976101. Under his leadership, the embedded stratifications of the colonial era continued 
to define Barbados’ social structures. Beckles (2004a, pp. 87) explains that Barrow, a 
staunch labour advocate, sought to loosen the white commercial elite’s hold over policy 
and the economy by diversifying the country’s economic base away from sugar to tourism. 
With the decline of sugar, throughout the Anglo-Caribbean, tourism was positioned as 
the main driver of national development and economic growth because harnessing the 
wealth of natural coastal resources had proved lucrative. However, in Barbados, Barrow 
failed to achieve a corresponding structural change in the white elite’s ownership of the 
island’s productive resources because of the embedded stratifications of the colonial era. 
This affected how Barbadian fisherfolk and the rights afforded to them to access 
Barbados’ valuable coastal space were constructed in early post- independent Barbados. 
Regarding this, McConney et al. (2003a, pp. 17) observe the settlement patterns along the 
Barbadian coast, whereby, a few landing sites became associated with fishing 
communities. Interestingly, part of the mandate of the Fisheries Division was also to 
secure ownership for access to beach areas for fisheries development. Bair (1962, pp. 44) 
documents that “fishermen were to be assured free use of beaches and unmolested entry 
to them”. Quite strikingly, Bair also captures the potential of political undercurrents, 
intimating that rivalry with tourism for valuable coastal space would be inevitable, this 
time foregrounding the normative tensions around what ‘sustainable development’ ought 
to mean.  
 
Notwithstanding, during the 1960s-1970s, Barbadian fisheries and fisherfolk were still 
receiving significant attention from its government authorities. Official aid and direction 
for the industry was received from Barbadian development partners, such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation and the United Nations Development Programme102. 
However, the dominant theme was increased production and expanding the range of 
                                                          
101 See supranote 106. 
102 Noted is that this development assistance for Barbadian fisheries was focused on expanding the distant water shrimp fleet and 
not necessarily the flyingfish fishery (ACDM3 interview, 2016). 
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fishing activities; institutionalising the rights of Barbadian fisherfolk was not a priority  
(McConney et al., 2003a). The colonial reports for the years 1956 and 1957 still refer to 
the island’s fishing industry as a peasant industry, thereby intimating that the rights of 
Barbadian fisherfolk were not a part of any formal regulatory colonial agenda (Colonial 
Office, 1959). In fact, the interests of ordinary Barbadian fisherfolk were not represented 
until 1961 on the Fisheries Advisory Committee (FAC) that was established almost 20 
years prior. McConney et al. (2003a, pp. 23) note that the early FAC comprised elite 
actors, namely, civil servants and sports fishing businessmen. Notwithstanding, fishing 
was still perceived to be an insecure occupation, and, both men and women involved in 
fisheries were of low socio-political status.  Nevertheless, the Barbadian flyingfish fishery 
has attracted much of the attention of the Barbados Fisheries Division over the last 50 
years because of the fishery’s importance to the island’s food security (Parker, 2002). 
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2. Governing the Flyingfish Fishery in Contemporary Barbados (1970 – 
Present) 
 
2.1.  Contemporary Governance Dynamics of the Barbadian Flyingfish Fishery 
Continued social relations of race/colour, class, nationality and gender have been 
reproduced in the contemporary governance structures of the island’s flyingfish fishery. 
This is important because the fishery’s standardised governance procedures (type 2 
norms) have been shaped by the historical institutional environment described in Section 
1 of this chapter to establish top-down governance. Moreover, these reproductions of 
top-down governance have affected how Barbadian fisherfolk and the rights afforded to 
them have come to be constructed in contemporary Barbados. To explain, Barbados’ 
post-independence environment essentially resulted in a socio-political arrangement 
between white corporate power dominating the economy and black political power the 
state. Control over the state has vacillated between the islands two main political parties 
the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP)—with the 
former ideology right of centre and the latter left of centre (Beckles, 2004a).  
 
The historical accounts documented in Section 1 of this chapter identified that poor 
whites and blacks have contributed to the development of the fishing industry; however, 
with blacks dominating its labour-intensive aspects. In the present-day, whites, many 
descended from white indentured servants, are recreational fisherfolk (i.e. tournament 
anglers, sport fisherfolk) (ACDM3 interview, 2016). It is worth mentioning here that 
governing responsibilities for Barbadian fisheries have historically fallen on the 
government agencies directly concerned with it (McConney, 1995).  In post-
independence Barbados, this is now the Ministry Agriculture, Food, Fisheries, and Water 
Resource Management (BIG, 2018). The government agencies with direct portfolio 
oversight are the Ministry of Agriculture’s Fisheries and Markets Divisions – the former’s 
emphasis is on the industry’s harvest and the latter its post-harvest activities103 (McConney 
et al., 2012). Governance is formally administered from the top-down by the Minister of 
Agriculture, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture (who acts as the 
sector’s executive decision maker), and the Chief Fisheries Officer. These actors are 
                                                          
103 See Appendix C, Exhibit 7 for a sex disaggregated illustration of the current governance structure of the Barbados Fisheries 
Division. See Appendix C, Exhibit 8 for an illustration of the current governance structure of the Barbados Markets Division. There 
is a significant amount of overlap between the jurisdictions of the Fisheries and Markets Divisions especially as it pertains to the 
activities at public markets, and thus, post-harvest activities of the fishery. Explaining those overlaps is out of the scope of this study. 
For more information (cf. GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; McConney et al., 2003a). 
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advised by the Fisheries Advisory Committee (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003). After 
Wiles’ departure in 1967, Barbados’ second appointed Fisheries Officer was also a white 
Englishman Robert Hastings. Hastings was relieved of his post in 1983 (ACDM3 
interview, 2016). Since then, the Chief Fisheries Officer104 and Minister of Agriculture 
have been black Barbadians. Despite this, McConney (1995, pp. 174) has charged that the 
ties between fisherfolk and government are few and weak. A reason for this could be that 
fisherfolk are still characterised as being from the former black peasantry. Moreover, the 
social image of fisherfolk being “uncooperative” captured earlier being expressed by 
Wiles, Barbados’ first Fisheries Officer, has persisted (McConney, 1995, pp. 37). In turn, 
Barbadian fisherfolk have come to “hold stereotypical images of government officials as 
self-serving and oppressive of lower classes”, and so, unable to communicate effectively 
on matters particularly affecting their rights (Ibid, 1995 pp. 90).   
 
Since the late colonial era, national regulatory oversight of Barbadian fisheries has 
received minimal attention. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, the contemporary 
governance environment for Barbados’ flyingfish fishery has been shaped by the 
following instruments detailed at length in Appendix C. Their political implications are 
discussed in the study’s subsequent empirical chapters. Barbados is signatory to several 
binding international agreements and a member of several international and regional 
inter-governmental organizations that have stakes in the contemporary governance of 
Caribbean flyingfish, the most notable being, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Western Central Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (FAO-WECAFC), and the Caribbean Regional Fisheries 
Mechanism (CRFM)105. Barbados also has several domestic government agencies and 
departments as well as non-governmental organizations and institutions that have a direct 
association with the contemporary governance mechanisms of the fishery, the most 
notable being, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food, Water and Resource 
Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade106. There are also 
several pieces of national legislation that are the core of the island’s fisheries policies, 
                                                          
104 The title of Chief Fisheries Officer was only created in 1990 before that the head of the Barbadian fisheries department was simply 
characterised as Fisheries Officer (ACDM3 interview, 2016). 
105 See Appendix C, Exhibits 2 and 3 for the international agreements that Barbados is signatory to as well as the international and 
regional inter-governmental organizations of which Barbados is a member that are relevant to the contemporary governance of its 
flyingfish fishery. 
106 See Appendix C, Exhibits 4 and 5 for the local Barbadian governance agencies and departments and non-governmental 
organisations and institutions that are relevant to developing the contemporary governance mechanisms of the flyingfish fishery. 
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though none are specific to the flyingfish fishery107. The most significant are the Fisheries 
Act (1993, amended 2000) and the Fisheries (Management) Regulations (1998). There 
also exists  the 2004 – 2006 Barbados Fisheries Management Plan108 (GOB Fisheries 
Division, 2003).   
 
It is worth briefly unpacking how Barbadian fisheries are governed by its most significant 
national regulatory instruments. The Fisheries Act of 1993, as amended in 2000, is largely 
based on the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean states harmonised legislation109. The Act 
covers: fisheries management and development schemes; the establishment of a fisheries 
advisory committee; fisheries access agreements; local and foreign fishing licensing; sport 
(recreational and game) fishing; registration of fishing vessels; construction and alteration 
of fishing vessels; fisheries research; inspection and safety at sea; fisheries enforcement; 
obligation to supply information; and, prohibiting the use of explosives, poisons or other 
noxious substances. Section 4(1) of the Fisheries Act mandates the Chief Fisheries 
Officer  to “develop and keep under review schemes for the management and 
development of fisheries in the waters of Barbados” (McConney et al., 2003b, pp. 27). 
This was accomplished in 1997 through a fisheries management planning process which 
resulted in the island’s first Fisheries Management Plan (FMP). The Fisheries 
(Management) Regulations of 1998 were borne as an output of the 1997 fisheries 
management planning process (McConney et al., 2003b, pp. 27). The regulations cover 
prohibited fishing methods and closed seasons for specific fisheries, such as, the sea-egg 
fishery; the harvesting of lobsters and turtles carrying eggs; the regulation of tuna catch 
sizes; and, the protection of coral (ILO, 2014).  The 2004-2006 Barbados FMP is the 
island’s third. This FMP covers the period 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2006 and 
contains information on the status of the local fishing industry and planning processes. 
It also outlines broadly the strategies for the development and management of the fishing 
industry and is said to inform the basis for fisheries policy, management and 
administration and guide the formulation and implementation of fisheries legislation 
(GOB Fisheries Division, 2003). Although these instruments impart a significant amount 
of governance oversight, the rights of Barbadian fisherfolk are not articulated or 
represented, nor, as mentioned before, is there any specific governance guidance related 
                                                          
107 See Appendix C, Exhibit 6 for the Barbadian legislations that are relevant to the contemporary governance of the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery.  
108 This is the third iteration of the Barbados Fisheries Management Plan. 
109 Barbados is not a member of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. The political reasons for Barbados’ adoption of 
harmonised legislation and the island’s lack of Membership in this sub-regional Eastern Caribbean organisation is out of the scope of 
this thesis. 
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to the flyingfish fishery. Moreover, through to the present-day, attempts to revise these 
policy instruments have been patchy at best. 
 
In fact, there exists only two main mechanisms for the formal inclusion of fisherfolks’ 
interests in the contemporary decision-making apparatuses of the fishery. The first is the 
Fisheries Advisory Committee (FAC) slated to be representative of industry 
occupations110. However, academic studies (cf. McConney et al., 2003a), as well as reports 
from this study’s KIs, highlight that conflict exists between state officials with oversight 
for Barbadian fisheries and the FAC. Several academics as well as fisherfolk who served 
in leadership roles on the FAC claimed that the FAC is now largely defunct (cf. ACDF1, 
ACDF2, ACDM4, BNFF1, BNFF2, interviews, 2016). Several of these academics also 
expressed strong sentiments that “ninety percent of the Ministers [we’ve] had don’t care 
about fisheries anyway” (cf. ACDF1 and ACDM3 interviews, 2016). Interestingly, a 
government official attached to the Markets Division equally shared that “governance of 
the island’s fisheries has been archaic”. Ironically, he went further to charge that “there is 
a dependency on fisherfolk to lead and guide the management and development initiatives 
of the industry”. This official suggested that because of this “responsibilities for 
governing Barbadian fisheries should be removed from the state and transferred to the 
fisherfolk” (GOVMM5 interview, 2016). It is perhaps unsurprising that the then 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture was uncertain of any strategic plan 
being in place for Barbados’ fishing industry, and, described the sector as an “informal 
industry” (GOVMM2 interview, 2016). The second mechanism is the Barbados National 
Union of Fisherfolk Organisations (BARNUFO). BARNUFO was conceived in 1999 to 
interface with the state as an umbrella fishing organisation representative of the interests 
of its member fisherfolk organisations and individuals  (Blackman et al., 2013; McConney 
et al., 2017).  This study’s subsequent empirical chapters reveal that although BARNUFO 
has been welcomed by the state, Barbadian fisherfolk tend to be wary that BARNUFO is 
not holistically representative of their interests.  
 
Despite the perception that Barbadian fisherfolk have weak status and political authority 
in contemporary Barbados, they have received support and benefitted from several 
government concessions. Namely, direct subsidies and subsidised services including: tax 
                                                          
110 See Appendix C, Exhibit 9 for a composition of the Fisheries Advisory Committee.  
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and duty-free subsidies on fishing equipment and boat repair; a $0.75 cents (BDS)111 daily 
charge for the use of marketing facilities for fish vending; and, free use of water and 
electricity at boatyards and landing sites. Moreover, most persons attached to the industry 
do not pay any taxes or simply avoid doing so112. Since 2000, the Barbadian government 
has also provided an annual subvention of $50,000 (BDS) to facilitate the operations of 
BARNUFO (cf. McConney, 2011, pp. 67; GOVMM2; SXMM5; BNFF1; BNFF2 
interviews, 2016). One might question then the socio-political implications of 
characterising the industry as “informal” captured earlier being expressed by the then 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Permanent Secretary. The Permanent Secretary who went as far 
to equate Barbados’ fisherfolk to “people selling nuts and coconuts on the side-walk” 
explained that “these peasant industries thrive when the economy is suffering because 
they are easy to join” (GOVMM2 interview, 2016). However, several older fishermen 
viewed the government’s support and incentives as an issue of dependence on the state, 
fuelling the belief that fisherfolk are not recognised as adequately contributing to the 
economy (SPTM1 and BTGM 3 interviews, 2016). The latter accounts sit in stark contrast 
to the perception that Barbadian “fishermen feel government should look after them” 
(Cecil, 1999, pp. 15), and also supported by an academic who expressed that, “fisherfolk 
don’t pay anything and think that government is supposed to give them everything” 
(ACDF1 interview, 2016). 
 
2.2.     The Barbadian Flyingfish Fishery’s Key Local Stakeholders  
How the social intersections of race/colour, class, nationality and gender have continued 
to factor in the constitution of the fishery’s key local stakeholders are also relevant. This 
is because despite the industry’s perceived informality, the surprising and overwhelming 
view held by this study’s KIs is that fishing is the island’s second most important industry 
behind tourism. Of course, this sentiment expressed by the study’s KIs might be 
construed as a biased assessment given that they are involved in fisheries. Nevertheless, 
the flyingfish fishery as a local industry has been particularly beneficial for the livelihoods 
and food security of the poorer classes of Barbadians. The sector has supported several 
small businesses and self-employed persons who otherwise would have limited 
opportunities (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003).  
 
                                                          
111 The Barbados dollar is fixed to the US dollar and pegged at an exchange rate of 2:1. 
112 Note that there is a fish landing ‘toll’ – a tax usually paid by boatowners (when not cheating the system) as mostly the primary 
landing sites, like the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex (ACDM3 interview, 2016). 
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The most significant underexplored social theme in the contemporary era is how 
gendered dynamics have continued to play a role in constructing governance. Although 
not much has changed in the labour divisions of the flyingfish fishery from the earlier 
accounts, gender in Caribbean fisheries has significant potential for important research 
findings113. For example, recent research has focused on aligning the regional and national 
policy space with the normative declarations found in various global instruments which 
seek to link fishing rights with human rights114  (cf. CERMES - GIFT, 2017). In Barbados, 
the extant research on gender in fisheries has evaluated the social relations of kinship ties, 
social networks and livelihoods in the industry’s harvest and post-harvest sub- sectors (cf. 
McConney, 1995, 1997; McConney et al., 2012).  The socio-political implications of the 
distribution of power in the gendered relations of the fishery do not factor in these studies 
however. It is appropriate then to briefly unpack how these gendered relations have 
influenced the constitution of the fishery’s key local stakeholders and the distribution of 
power in the industry via its harvest and post-harvest sub-sectors. 
 
Men tend to dominate the harvest sub-sector of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery with the 
primary stakeholders being fishermen and boat-owners. A distinction should be made 
here between fishermen characterised as having limited bargaining power— and boat-
owners characterised as having more rights and power in the industry. The post-harvest 
sub-sector is dominated by women. It involves the activities of the fishery after the catch 
is landed until it reaches the consumers.  In the Barbadian flyingfish fishery women tend 
to occupy the roles of vendors, small-scale processors, hawkers, boners, scalers and 
exporters (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003). According to the current President of 
BARNUFO, who is a woman, it is important also to account for “women as wives of 
fishermen and boatowners” (BNFF1 interview, 2016). Her point was that gendered 
relations affect the distribution of power in the fishery from the marketplace to the 
household, for example, women being in control of the sale of fish and how money is 
spent in the household.  
 
It is also worth drawing attention to the evolution of gendered roles in the flyingfish 
industry. It was mentioned earlier in Section 1.2, that after World War II, women 
                                                          
113 Gender in fisheries is generally a relatively new research space. For more information (cf. Gee, 2016; FAO, 2017b).  
114 The push to solidify the Caribbean research agenda on gender in fisheries has been guided recently by the 2012 Voluntary 
Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure (Part 3B, Section 4), as well as the 2015 Voluntary Guidelines to Secure the 
Rights of Small-Scale Fisheries (Part 2, Section 8). For more information (cf. FAO, 2012, 2015). 
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benefitted from the introduction of formal public markets.  According to a high-level 
official attached to the Fisheries Division: 
 
from a cultural and socio-economic standpoint, 
women have benefited from education. Females 
are no longer interested in going home and 
boning and scaling fish with their mother 
(GOVMM5 interview, 2016).   
 
Moreover, it was documented in Section 1 of this chapter that surprisingly going against 
gendered norms, Barbadian fishermen often feel marginalised by Barbadian female fish 
vendors and hawkers due to the latter’s practices of colluding on the price of fish after it 
is landed (Parker, 2002). My field observations in 2016 indicate that these sentiments have 
continued. Despite this, in recent years, and particularly at times of high unemployment, 
gendered divisions of labour have been eroded in the flyingfish industry. Historical roles 
held by men and women have continued to evolve and along with it the distribution of 
power. There are a handful of women who do go out to sea with their male counterparts, 
and there are also several women who are boat-owners. Male vendors also exist, and more 
men have been joining the industry occupying roles of boners and scalers predominantly 
held by women. Gendered relations have also factored in the high-level decision-making 
apparatuses of the fishery. Although positions of authority are largely male dominated, 
women have occupied and continue to hold strategic roles in administering governance. 
Namely, Former Chair of the Fisheries Advisory Committee, Deputy Chief Fisheries 
Officer (current), and past President and current President of BARNUFO (McConney, 
1995; Burke, 2016).  
 
Divisions of race/colour and class continue to influence who dominates control over the 
island’s productive resources, including fisheries. To explain, the industrialised 
commercial sector (i.e. the large-scale processors) also has substantial investments in both 
harvest and post-harvest activities. There are currently five large processing plants 
identifiable by person and not anonymous corporate structure. They harvest and sell fish 
for export and to major local retailers like supermarkets and hotels (McConney, 1995; 
GOB Fisheries Division, 2003). This is highlighted because there exists a minimally 
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discussed politics surrounding the distribution of power amongst the fishery’s ‘elite’ and 
‘ordinary’ stakeholders (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Simplified illustration of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery’s primary 
harvest and post-harvest stakeholders 
  
Source: (McConney et al., 2003a) 
 
Regarding the minimally discussed politics surrounding the distribution of power between 
the fishery’s ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ stakeholders, my field observations in 2016 revealed that 
the founding owners of the large processing plants are mostly white Barbadian men. 
McConney (1995, pp. 150) explains that the dominant perception has existed that the 
post-harvest sector yields the most power in the industry, while the state is subordinate 
to the elite in the post-harvest sector. Indeed,  McConney et al. (2003a, pp. 17) intimate 
that the power hierarchy which “puts large-scale processors over vendors, boat owners 
and fisherfolk in that order” reflects the income earning ability and political influence of 
these stakeholders. Further understanding is required of the socio-political implications 
of the distribution of power among the industry’s ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ key local 
stakeholders, thereby highlighting an area for extended research.  
 
In foregrounding the study’s subsequent empirical chapters, it is certainly notable that 
throughout history, the Barbadian fishing industry, particularly its flyingfish fishery, has 
undoubtedly served as a safety net for the marginalised and poor coastal dwellers of 
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Barbados. However, present day Barbadian societal tastes and values have transformed 
the flyingfish fishery (Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013). My observations indicate that 
Barbadian fisherfolk and the rights afforded to them have been influenced by local and 
regional politics emerging since the 1970s and the proclivity of elites to enact top-down 
governance. This study’s empirical chapters thus go on to demonstrate how top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve or frustrate the governance goals of the 
Barbadian flyingfish fishery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented a socio-political chronology of governing the Barbadian flyingfish 
fishery. Its contribution to the thesis was to build on the sparse literature addressing the 
socio-political dimensions of the fishery’s evolution, bridging between the study’s 
theoretical and empirical chapters. It unearthed the emergence of the norms being 
explored in this study and thus the historical basis upon which rights afforded to 
Barbadian fisherfolk have been constructed. Within this context, the norms being 
explored in this study were seen to have been forged through the social constructions of 
race/colour, class, nationality and gender. The narrative was weighted towards exploring 
the constructions of race/colour, class and nationality because of the scarcity of research 
in gender in Barbadian fisheries. This however opened several areas for further study, 
which are revisited in the concluding chapter.  
 
The chapter was divided into two main sections. The first, the Barbadian Plantation, Colonial 
Fisheries and Independence, covered the period of 1627-1970. The second, Governing the 
Flyingfish fishery in Contemporary Barbados, covered the period of 1970 – present-day. The 
narrative was also weighted heavily towards the former historical era because of the 
availability of primary and secondary literature. Section 1 highlighted the beginnings of 
the normative tensions constructing governance of the fishery explored in this study’s 
subsequent empirical chapters. The first of these tensions was the emergence of the 
norms of a Caribbean regional community and Caribbean national sovereignty as guiding 
fundamental principles constructing the regional governance of the fishery. The 
development of these norms is particularly significant because one could argue that they 
evolved in tension based on Barbados’ early political leaders’ ideologies of forging both a 
national and regional identity. The second of these tensions was the emergence of the 
norm of development as framed within sustainable development and its application to 
fisheries and tourism as national priorities. How these norms evolved are also important 
because one could argue that they were built on a political agreement between white 
capital and black politics, whereby, the white elite’s continued control over the island’s 
productive resources, including tourism and fisheries, has produced tensions about who 
has precedence to access Barbados’ valuable coastal space. Even though a significant 
amount of attention was paid to developing the fishery both regionally and domestically, 
solidifying the rights of Barbadian fisherfolk and fishing communities was not a political 
priority. 
123 
 
Section 2 described the contemporary governance of the fishery. It situated how the 
emergence of this study’s standardised procedures (type 2 norms) were reliant upon the 
historical institutional environment described in Section 1, and thus, the establishment of 
a top-down governance environment. Section 2 also demonstrated that the social 
constructions of race/colour, class, nationality and gender continued to influence the 
constitution of the contemporary governance apparatuses of the fishery as well as that of 
its key stakeholders. This affected the constitution of the rights afforded to Barbadian 
fisherfolk in the contemporary era. Having laid out this extensive empirical and 
descriptive context, the thesis progresses to its empirical chapters.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSTRUCTING THE REGION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is set in the context of constructing governance of the regional Eastern 
Caribbean flyingfish fishery. Empirically it draws on observations related to the long-
standing maritime/fisheries dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, the information presented in this chapter is solely from a Barbadian 
perspective. In chapter 5, I demonstrated that the norms of regional community and 
national sovereignty emerged as guiding fundamental principles constructing governance 
of the regional Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. This chapter’s findings ultimately 
suggest that although the norms of regional community and national sovereignty have 
both been widely accepted as guiding fundamental principles—they have also been 
contested institutionally, procedurally, and at the level of the locale. I found that there 
were legitimacy gaps in governance given that state and technocratic actors constructed 
governance from the top-down, in contrast with fisherfolk who constructed governance 
from the bottom-up. These legitimacy gaps pointed to two overarching ways in which 
the top-down governance of the regional fishery is being challenged: 1) the 
appropriateness of high-level negotiations to conclude a fishing agreement between the 
states, and, 2) the inclusivity of fisherfolks’ interests in these high-level negotiations.  
 
This chapter’s key findings are the following: The historical foundation of governing the 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery was been built upon regional exchanges between 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless, despite the political foundations 
bolstering a regional community, enactments of top-down governance embolden the 
maintenance of national sovereignty, and, are challenged by conflicting meanings of 
borders and competing national vs. regional identities. Enactments of bottom-up 
governance by Barbadian fisherfolk however demonstrate recognition of a regional 
community of fisherfolk with a shared identity and stakes in harvesting Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish resources, thereby highlighting fisherfolks’ practices of informally demarcating 
shared distributive rights to the fishery115. Consequently, acknowledging bottom-up 
governance is important because it presents an alternative account to top-down 
governance by including the perspectives of often marginalised actors in the policy and 
                                                          
115 Given that Trinidadian and Tobagonian fisherfolk were not interviewed this study, an alternative reading of this chapter’s findings 
could be that Barbadian fisherfolk have a stake in harvesting fish outside of their country’s territorial waters because their own stocks 
are over-exploited and Tobagonian fisherfolk have a stake in stopping the Barbadian fisherfolk.  
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political process. This leads to the finding that the nuances of governing informally need 
to be considered as a veritable part of governing this regional fishery. Essentially then, as 
the bearers of implementing the regional governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish 
fishery, fisherfolks’ interests ought to be democratically represented as an inclusive part 
of the governance process.  
 
Section 1 provides a descriptive historical background of the distributive mechanisms 
governing ‘who gets the fish’ in the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. Section 2 
documents the fundamental principles and standardised procedures (type 1 and type 2 
norms) which undergird the top-down governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish 
fishery and shows how these political dynamics created legitimacy gaps in governance. 
Section 3 brings to the fore local norms (type 3 norms) and unearths the bottom-up 
governance of the regional fishery as well as showing the way in which top-down 
governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery is being challenged. The 
conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings. 
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1. A Shared Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish Fishery  
 
1.1. Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish Fishery 
Scientific reports indicate that Eastern Caribbean flyingfish are shared resources “on 
either a regional or international basis” and are classified as “straddling and migratory 
pelagic stocks” (Ministry of Agriculture Barbados, 1992, pp. 99). Comprehensive regional 
and national stock assessments for the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery are relatively 
few and dated. The available data illustrates that in terms of proportion of total fish catch, 
Barbados and Tobago have the largest stakes out of the seven Eastern Caribbean states 
involved in the regional flyingfish fishery116 (Oxenford, 2007, pp. 46). Within these 
Eastern Caribbean states that have overlapping maritime borders, the fishery is either 
targeted as bait or food, the latter predominantly for Barbados117. Chapter 4 documented 
that Barbados is the land of flyingfish and has the largest domestic, cultural, and commercial 
stake in the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery (Oxenford et al., 2007; CRFM 
Secretariat, 2014). Historically, flyingfish typically accounts for around 65 % of the total 
Barbadian fish catch on an annual basis. Barbados also lands the majority (~65%) of the 
reported regional catch (Parker, 2002, pp. 18). A cultural and dietary staple—flyingfish is 
the most widely eaten fish in the country by both locals and tourists (Nyman, 2012, pp. 
146). 
 
Following on from chapter 5, very little has been recorded about Barbados’ role in 
establishing the early regional flyingfish fishery (cf. Parker, 2002; Cumberbatch and 
Hinds, 2013). What is known is that technological advances in Barbados’ fleet influenced 
the later politics of the states demarcating shared distributive rights to the fishery. From 
the 1800s through to the mid-1950s, Barbadian fishermen harvested the fishery using 18 
to 28 ft. wooden sail-boats that ventured offshore no more than five miles. In the late 
1950s sail-boats were replaced by day-boats powered by diesel engines, allowing fisherfolk 
to stay out to sea for the entire day to a range of up to thirty miles offshore (see Figure 
1) (Willoughby, 2007). In the late 1970s through to the early 1980s ice-boats were 
introduced to Barbados (see Figure 2) (Parker, 2002). 
 
                                                          
116 The Eastern Caribbean states that have stakes in the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery are: Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St. 
Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, and Martinique (a territory of France) – see also Chapter 4. Trinidad does 
not have substantial flyingfish landings. If interested in detailed stock assessments of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery, you can 
find the available data in (cf. Oxenford et al., 1994; Gomes et al., 1997; Samlalsingh et al., 2007; Medley et al., 2009). 
117 St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent and Grenada largely are also largely bait fisheries (GOVRF2 interview, 2016). 
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Figure 1. Illustration of a typical Barbadian day-boat. 
 
Source: (My Guide Barbados, 2017) 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a typical Barbadian ice-boat 
 
Source: (My Guide Barbados, 2017) 
 
Departing from the traditional near shore fishing practices of a day-boat flyingfish fishery, 
ice-boats brought an increased capacity for Barbadian fisherfolk to stay longer at sea (up 
to around two weeks), and, to fish further from Barbados in areas of potentially higher 
fish densities (up to 400 miles offshore) (FAO, 2005; Mohammed et al., 2015, pp. 16). 
The available data indicates that the current Barbadian flyingfish fleet comprises 
approximately 240 day-boats and 168 ice-boats (FAO, 2010, pp. 71). 
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These facts matter because Barbados had positioned itself as the only Eastern Caribbean 
state that had built the capacity for a long-range commercial flyingfish fishery. To meet 
local demand, Cumberbatch and Hinds (2013, pp. 124) explain that “the abundance of 
[flyingfish] in Barbadian waters is not so much a matter of the fish being available, but 
rather where they are at a particular point in time”. Historically, the resource was plentiful 
around Barbados and could be bought very cheaply at any fish market along the coast. In 
recent years however, the fish have been migrating south, particularly to Tobagonian 
waters (Blake and Campbell, 2007, pp. 328; BGTM3 interview, 2016). There are also 
claims from KIs at all levels of interaction with the fishery that, in the past 5 years, the 
abundance of flyingfish in Barbadian waters has been further affected by external 
environmental factors, such as, climate variability and change, as well as an influx of 
sargassum118. This has led to unpredictability in the supply and price of flyingfish. It was 
suggested that these external environmental factors have further propelled some 
Barbadian fishermen to harvest flyingfish in what they believe are the more productive 
waters of Tobago—as one fisher based in Bridgetown stated, “simply because of the 
abundance of flyingfish in the area”119 (BGTM3 interview, 2016). 
 
As mentioned, the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish are a shared straddling and migratory 
stock. Thus, in constructing governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery, it is 
important to keep in mind that Barbadians attribute intrinsic cultural values and social 
needs for accessing flyingfish resources. The dominant view as expressed by a retired 
fisherman was that: 
 
Barbados is one of the only countries in the 
world that has created an entire industry off 
harvesting and processing flyingfish and the way 
it is cooked. Consequently, a lot of the decisions 
made about fishing in Barbados are based on 
flyingfish alone (BNFM1 interview, 2016). 
                                                          
118 According to local and regional fisheries experts,  data collection has deteriorated significantly, resulting in the fisheries statistic 
department having no real proof of the matter of fisheries landings declining because of an influx of sargassum (ACDF1 interview, 
2016). Sargassum is a genus of large brown seaweed (a type of algae) that floats in island-like masses (NOAA, 2018). 
119 During field observations in Barbados in 2016, it was reported by some fishermen that landings could top over 40,000 flyingfish 
per trip, particularly if the fishermen had ventured into Tobagonian territory (BGTM3 interview, 2016). 
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Indeed, there are reports which suggest that as a traditional Barbadian food source, 
Barbadian fisherfolk believe they have a right to catch flyingfish wherever they may be 
(cf. Blake and Campbell, 2007, pp. 328; Nyman, 2012, pp. 146). Some might argue then, 
that Barbadian cultural identity is best served by allowing them to catch flyingfish even in 
the waters of other states, in this case, its twin-island neighbour, Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
1.2. Trinidad and Tobago and the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish fishery 
Flyingfish is also an important economic resource for Trinidad and Tobago. Despite 
limited quantities off the north and east coasts of Trinidad, the fish concentrate to spawn 
in the inshore and coastal waters of Tobago between November and July each year (i.e. 
the stated flyingfish season). This has made Tobagonian waters a prime fishing ground in 
the Eastern Caribbean (Jordan, 1984, pp. 177-178). It is worth noting that the Tobagonian 
flyingfish harvesting season is between February and March, whereas, Barbadians harvest 
the fishery throughout the entire November – July season120 (Jordan, 1984; BGTM2 
interview, 2016). The relevance of this is later explained in Section 3 of this chapter. 
 
Little is also known about Tobago’s role in establishing the early regional fishery (Ballah, 
1992; Samlalsingh et al., 2007). However, according to one of Barbados’ prominent 
historians, “Barbados and Tobago have a long history of regional exchanges. In fact, at 
one point, Tobago was under Barbadian control during British colonial reign” (ACDM1 
interview, 2016). This historian was referring to the fact revealed in chapter 5 that 
Barbados had long served as the regional administrative centre for the Anglo-Caribbean’s 
colonial interests. These regional exchanges notwithstanding, Tobago’s flyingfish industry 
was reported as being established in 1962 by a Barbadian entrepreneur, who became 
aware of the abundance of fish off the Caribbean coast of Tobago and with the help of 
experienced Barbadian fishermen, introduced commercial harvesting to Tobago. Catches 
were either taken back to Barbados for human consumption or sold as bait. These 
Barbadian fishermen are reported to have settled in the western part of Tobago (Jordan, 
1984; SXMM4 interview, 2016). There are also personal reports which claim that the 
Tobagonian flyingfish industry continued to develop under Barbadian influence during 
the 1970s and 1980s with assistance from Ms. Carlita Fraser, one of Barbados’ most 
prominent nutritionists. According to a government representative: 
                                                          
120 Given that Trinidadian and Tobagonian fisherfolk were not interviewed this study, an alternative argument could be made here 
that Barbadian fisherfolk, technocratic and political authorities have a responsibility to engage in conversation to rebuild the Eastern 
Caribbean flyingfish stocks. 
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Ms. Fraser travelled often to Tobago where she 
trained many persons in the art of preparing 
flyingfish. Consequently, the Trinidadian and 
Tobagonian citizens started to understand the value 
of flyingfish and its importance to livelihoods both 
in Trinidad and Tobago (GOVM1 interview, 2016). 
 
Despite these regional exchanges, what is particularly different about the Tobagonian 
flyingfish fishery is the capacity and size of their fleet which consists of 126 pirogues and 
just one ice-boat (see Figure 3) (FAO 2010, pp. 71). This is important because unlike 
Barbadian fisherfolk who concentrate on a full day’s journey in day-boats, and long-
distance fishing for up to two weeks in ice-boats, Tobagonian fisherfolk normally fish 
only five to eight miles from shore in waters that are on average only one hour away 
(Parker, 2002; Samlalsingh et al., 2007). Furthermore, Tobago also has a very small 
population to satisfy. 
 
Figure 3: Photograph of a pirogue used for fishing  
in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Source: (Peake Yacht Services, 2017) 
 
Another significant difference is that flyingfish is not viewed as a traditional food source 
for either Tobagonians or Trinidadians121 (Jordan, 1984). According to a female fisher, 
“Tobagonian fishermen tend to target larger pelagics like marlin, tuna and dolphin-fish” 
which are a part of the multi-pelagic fishery (BNFF2 interview, 2016). Notwithstanding, 
                                                          
121 This is attributed to taste preferences and also the preparation of the fish, removing numerous bones and cooking (Jordan, 1984). 
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to the present-day, there exists in Tobago a thriving processing industry retailing 
flyingfish, particularly to Barbados via exports (Jordan, 1984; BGTM3 interview, 2016). 
It was also reported by several KIs representative of government and the fishing industry 
that a few of Barbados’ prominent fish processors established businesses in Tobago to 
export flyingfish to Barbados. These business strategies were viewed by many of this 
study’s KIs as a problem affecting an already competitive local flyingfish industry (cf. 
GOVM1, BGTM2, FPM1, FPM2, BNFF2, interviews, 2016). These historical 
foundations forged the interdependent interests of the states in governing the Eastern 
Caribbean flyingfish fishery and influenced how the distributive rights afforded to 
Barbadian fisherfolk to this shared fishery came to be constructed. 
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2. Constructing Governance of the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish Fishery from 
the Top-Down  
 
2.1. The Principled Governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery 
(Type 1 Norms) 
Governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery has largely been politicised 
through two key institutional arrangements: the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and 
the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It has been where the 
principled norms of regional community and national sovereignty found their 
expressions, and where shared distributive rights to the fishery have come to be 
legitimated and managed from the top-down. The CARICOM was formally officially 
established in 1973 under the Treaty of Chaguaramas122 (CARICOM Secretariat, 2010). 
To recall from chapter 5, there has been a history of regional projects in the contemporary 
era. The precursors to CARICOM were the West Indies Federation (1958-1962) and the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (1965-1973) (Malcolm, 2004; Bravo, 2006; Bishop and 
Payne, 2010). The dominant view expressed by several of the Barbadian government 
representatives interviewed for this study was that CARICOM’s integration is a perpetual 
battle between Caribbean regionalism and national sovereignty, wherein different 
identities clash. In making an appeal to a lost common Anglo-Caribbean identity, a 
government representative lamented that, “despite there being a regional vision of 
community shared by the four Prime Ministers behind CARICOM who studied together 
at the University of the West Indies (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and 
Guyana), we now find ourselves in a position where we don’t know what we want for the 
region” (GOVM5 interview, 2016). Similar sentiments were expressed by other Barbadian 
government representatives, one of whom said that “there has always been high tensions 
in an integrated area and this occurs when one set of people believe that they are better 
than the others. Indeed, everyone has a Caribbean identity, but their destiny lies to a 
greater degree in their own hands”123 (GOVM2; cf. GOVM9 interviews, 2016). 
 
Regarding this, chapter 5 argued that Caribbean regionalism was a formative aspect of 
Barbadian national identity. Indeed, the dominant position reported from the Barbadian 
                                                          
122 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that was established in 1973 was later re-branded as the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM) in 2001 under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. See this chapter for more. 
123 Good resources on Caribbean regionalism and the Anglo-Caribbean integration project include (Bishop and Girvan, 2011; Knight, 
Castro-Rea and Ghany, 2016). 
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perspective was that “Barbados, particularly, has always been at the forefront of the 
regional integration movement.” Moreover,  
 
historically, Barbadians, particularly Barbadian governments, 
have perceived themselves as the intellectual power house of 
the Anglo-Caribbean. It is not surprising then, that within this 
context, a lot of leadership [on regional issues] would come 
from Barbados— including, recently, advancing the Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy and the CARICOM Common 
Fisheries Policy (ACDM4; cf. GOVM1 interviews, 2016). 
 
It can certainly be suggested that in national discourse, it is very important for Barbadians 
to proclaim a leadership role on regional issues. Indeed, the perception shared between 
an academic and government KI was that “Barbados has earned the right to be respected 
and acknowledged because of its strength in supporting regionalism”. At the same time, 
they both acknowledged that “what the priorities are for integration” throughout the 
region has hindered the progress of the movement” (ACDM4; cf. GOVM1 interviews, 
2016). An interpretation of these sentiments relayed by these interviewees could mean 
that it remains unclear if the development of CARICOM ought to be actualised through 
a union or as a collective of sovereign islands. The view expressed by another government 
KI however, was that because Barbados is isolated in the Atlantic “the Eastern Caribbean 
is Barbados’ only sphere of influence” (GOVM9 interview, 2016). Perhaps it is because 
of this perception of isolation that Barbados has advocated Caribbean regionalism. The 
sentiments held here are not new, as there is much literature that addresses the long-
standing institutional hindrances to Anglo-Caribbean regionalism (Bishop and Payne, 
2010; Girvan, 2013a). Although these facts highlight that the norm of regional community 
has found weak institutional expression in CARICOM, CARICOM is the standing 
institutional basis upon which the top-down governance of the Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish fishery has come to be constructed. 
 
The second institution is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III). Before the end of World War II, national sovereignty was understood to 
end at the outer edge of a state territorial sea, three nautical miles from a nation’s 
shoreline. However, there was no consensus on the limit of a state’s claims to resources 
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of the sea or seabed (Nemeth et al., 2014). Traditionally, marine resources, including 
fisheries, were, in principle, treated as part of a res communes i.e. a commons or as common 
property124 (Pomeroy, 1994; Munro, 2007). As discussed in chapter 2, fisheries were open-
access resources that could be harvested beyond the territorial waters of a state by anyone 
(Watson, 2012). Historically, straddling and migratory stocks, like flyingfish have been 
treated as open-access resources (cf. Watson, 2012). However, with UNCLOS III (1973-
1982)125, formally ratified in 1994, the fundamental principle of national sovereignty 
became rooted with the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Defined in 
Articles 55 and 56 of UNCLOS III, the EEZ is an area which usually extends 200 nautical 
miles off the coast, and, where relevant, also includes an extended continental shelf of up 
to 350 nautical miles (cf. United Nations, 1982). EEZ provisions essentially changed 
fishing rights from open-access common property to property under the exclusive 
sovereign control of a country. 
 
The proposed adherence to the EEZ principles enshrined in UNCLOS III was significant 
because, in February 1978, Barbados first passed an “Act to provide for the establishment 
of Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction”. Barbados then formally ratified UNCLOS III in 
1994 (Government of Barbados, 1978; Office of Legal Affairs, 2012). In 1986, Trinidad 
and Tobago passed its “Archipelagic Waters and Exclusive Economic Zone” Act and 
also ratified UNCLOS III in 1994 (Government of Trinidad & Tobago, 1986; Office of 
Legal Affairs, 2012). However, there have been challenges raised about the viability of 
applying the EEZ concept in coastal CARICOM states like Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago. These challenges have been centred around a geographical reality of coastal 
states, like those found in CARICOM, being unable to delimit the full extent of their 200 
nautical miles EEZ without encountering the adjacent boundaries of neighbouring states 
(Lovell, 2008, pp. 1). Indeed, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago’s overlapping EEZs 
contain not just migratory flyingfish but also proven hydrocarbon sources (Griffin, 2012, 
pp. 186). Pragmatically implementing the norm of national sovereignty borne from 
UNCLOS III’s provisions was therefore politically problematic because what was an 
open-access flyingfish fishery for Barbadians off the coast of Tobago was now under the 
                                                          
124 See Chapter 2 for more detail on the commons, common property and common pool resources. 
125 UNCLOS III formalised a complex governance system in 17 parts, 320 articles, and 9 annexes – dealing with a broad array of 
human uses of marine resources. Its negotiation period was 1973-1982, being formally ratified as international law in 1994 (cf. 
Behuniak, 1978; Barnes, 2009). 
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exclusive control of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago (Blake and Campbell, 2007, 
pp. 327). 
 
2.2. Negotiating Competing Perspectives of the Region in the Policy Making 
Process (Type 2 Norms) 
Given the conflicting institutional mandates of CARICOM and UNCLOS III, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that normative tensions abound in constructing the top down 
governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. However, standardised 
procedures were put in place to resolve these normative tensions. In Articles 63 and 64 
of UNCLOS III and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement for the “Management of 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Stocks” (cf. United Nations, 1982, 1995), declarations 
were also made to account for the technicalities of the migratory characteristics of 
resources, like flyingfish. As signatories to both instruments, Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago were urged to “agree upon measures necessary to conserve straddling and highly 
migratory stocks”, like their shared flyingfish fishery, and to cooperate “either bilaterally 
or through appropriate sub-regional, regional or international organizations” (Watson, 
2012, pp. 8). 
 
These UN declarations which urge co-operation in shared fisheries are important because 
they situated a procedural space for the norm of regional community to be enacted from 
the top-down. Given Barbados’ and Trinidad and Tobago’s interests in CARICOM, the 
states both agreed membership of CARICOM’s Caribbean Regional Fisheries 
Mechanism (CRFM)126. The states also maintain membership in larger multi-lateral 
regional commissions like the FAO-Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(FAO-WECAFC). For both institutions, the management of the Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish fishery is a central part of their governance agenda (Singh-Renton and 
Haughton, 2004; CRFM, 2015; FAO, 2017a). Therefore, with both Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago supporting the mandates of CARICOM, as well as the CRFM and 
the FAO-WECAFC, it seemed that the principled norm of regional community backing 
co-operation in a shared fishery was secure. But influenced by the principled norm of 
national sovereignty, strengthened by UNCLOS III’s EEZ provisions, the states would 
                                                          
126 The CRFM’s members are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and the Turks 
and Caicos Islands (cf. CRFM, 2015). 
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repeatedly contest the notion of shared distributive rights to the Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish fishery. 
 
The argument could be made here that there does not exist a popular culture or viable 
history to apply the principled norm of regional community to fisheries procedurally. 
There is support for this claim. An academic KI suggests that, “the lack of commitment 
and a pre-programmed failure in the policy and political space for implementing 
Caribbean regionalism has translated to a lack of precedence upon which to base 
governance of regional fisheries” (ACDM1 interview, 2016). This sentiment is significant 
to this case study, because, as far back as 1944, scientific reports indicated that Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago ought to pursue efforts to create and coordinate policy for the 
management of their shared flyingfish fishery (cf. Brown, 1942a; Brown, 1942b). 
However, formalised procedures would not be introduced until the late 1970s. 
 
The first agreement was bi-lateral and authorised on April 30th, 1979. “Both countries 
entered a Memorandum of Understanding on Matters of Cooperation that covered, inter-
alia, hydrocarbons exploration and fishing” (Griffin, 2012, pp. 185). However, with 
Barbados gaining the capacity for a long-range fishery and both states ratifying UNCLOS 
III, top-down enactments of the norm of national sovereignty were seemingly taking 
precedence while the norm of regional community violently exploded. From as early as 
1988, Trinidad and Tobago’s coast guards began to arrest Barbadian fishermen for 
illegally fishing in their EEZ (United Nations, 2008). In Barbados, these arrests were 
largely seen to be in disaccord with the norm of a CARICOM regional community. This 
initial disagreement over shared distributive rights afforded to the fishery led the 
governments of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago to negotiate and make public their 
first and only official fishing agreement in November 1990, i.e. the “1990 Fishing 
Agreement”127 (Willoughby, 2007; Nyman, 2012). The agreement lasted for one full year 
from November 23, 1990 to December 31, 1991 and advised, inter-alia, the following: 
 
1. Access of up to 40 Barbadian boats to fish in Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ; 
2. A license fee of USD$800.00 for Barbadian vessels which permitted five trips per 
season; 
                                                          
127 The Agreement is formally referred to as the “Fishing Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago and the Government of Barbados” (cf, Government of Barbados and Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 1990). 
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3. Trinidad and Tobago to grant licenses to export up to 300 metric tonnes of flyingfish 
and associated pelagic species to Barbados; and 
4. The Government of Barbados was to grant, if requested, Trinidad and Tobago 
unlimited access to Barbados’ EEZ (Government of Barbados and Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1990). 
 
Several KIs attached to academia and who work as fisherfolk viewed the 1990 Fishing 
Agreement to have been poorly negotiated because of what they perceived to be 
inequitable conditions for Barbadian fisheries to harvest flyingfish in Tobago’s EEZ. 
Here, it is important to point out that existing in Article XI of the 1990 Agreement is the 
“Preservation of Rights” language (Government of Barbados and Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1990, pp. 11). The Government of Barbados held the position that 
while the states had entered into a “fishing agreement”, this did not mean Barbados would 
recognise Tobago’s sovereignty over the disputed EEZ area in the form claiming 
ownership over the disputed resources (United Nations, 2008, pp. 177). The arrests of 
Barbadian fishermen for illegally fishing flyingfish without formal rights to harvest 
resources in Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ continued. A major premise for Trinidad and 
Tobago to conclude a new fishing agreement was the need for stock assessments due to 
their claim of the stock being overfished (Government of Trinidad & Tobago, 2004; 
GOVM1 interview, 2016). This proposed need for stock assessments once again 
highlights the contestability of borders in negotiating governance arrangements for rights 
to harvest straddling and migratory stocks like flyingfish. 
 
Negotiations restarted in 2002 and came to head in 2004 (Blake and Campbell, 2007). 
During this period, there were reports of several heated exchanges between the Prime 
Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur, and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Patrick Manning. The Barbadian Prime Minister threatened Trinidad and Tobago with 
economic sanctions, i.e., “they were going to restrict imports from Trinidad and Tobago 
just as the Barbadian fisherfolk were restricted from fishing” (Nyman, 2012, pp. 149). 
This was controversial not least because Trinidad and Tobago has a large trade surplus 
with Barbados (Ibid 2012, pp. 149). More significantly, at the time, the idea of applying 
the norm of regional community to fisheries was ostensibly being strengthened with the 
“Revised Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market” in 2001 
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(The CARICOM Secretariat, 2011). Guided by the Revised Treaty128 and endorsements 
particularly from Prime Minister Arthur, the Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) negotiations which date back to 1989 was also officially established in 2001 
(Nyman 2012, pp. 158). The CSME is the plan and intention of CARICOM Member 
states that there will be one single market for all CARICOM countries. It also includes 
provisions for the free movement of skilled workers, capital and businesses across the 
region without discrimination based on nationality, including those connected to fisheries 
(Haughton, 2007; The CARICOM Secretariat, 2010). CARICOM could now be viewed 
as having a common market including for fisheries, at least in theory (Griffin 2012, pp. 
187). Prior to, there had been no formal policy suggesting the removal of the fixed and 
unfixed borders of CARICOM Member states and the ceding of sovereignty to the supra-
national (Haughton, 2007). However, as Nyman (2012, pp. 159) suggests, “given 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are two of the most prosperous and politically 
powerful members of CARICOM and the CSME, conflict with each other over rights to 
flyingfish resources detracted from their message of Caribbean unity and co-operation”. 
These normative tensions continued to evolve when the states’ enactments of the norm 
of national sovereignty yet again took precedence. 
 
Apart from negotiating a fishing agreement, between 2000-2003, Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago were also holding bi-lateral discussions to legally demarcate their maritime 
boundaries and EEZs. These negotiations also came to a stalemate due to Barbados’ 
objection of the 1990 “Treaty between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the 
Republic of Venezuela on the delimitation of Marine and Submarine areas”. Griffin 
(2012, pp. 187) explains that the Government of Barbados took the position that Trinidad 
and Tobago appropriated to “Venezuela and Tobago an enormous part of Barbados’ and 
Guyana’s maritime territory”. The dominant view held among this study’s elite actors and 
supported by secondary literature was that the maritime border issue was much larger 
than flyingfish and really about access to and control of potential hydrocarbon resources 
(cf. Griffin, 2012; Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013). This is because, in 2003, Barbados 
discovered by happenstance, “a Memorandum of Understanding between Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela related to commercial oil exploitation in the disputed area” (Blake 
                                                          
128 The Revised Treaty is a binding document which was signed on 5th July 2001 by all Heads of Government of CARICOM countries 
to promote, among other things, efficiency in the production of goods and services in the region, and to make easier access by 
nationals of all CARICOM countries to the resources of the region without discrimination (Haughton, 2007). 
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and Campbell, 2007, pp. 329). This sentiment was supported by Barbados’ Deputy Prime 
Minister at the time, Mia Mottley, being quoted saying, “…this dispute goes deeper than 
where flyingfish swim” (Gollop, 2003 qtd. in Griffin, 2012, pp. 186). The empirical 
findings suggest that, arguably, it was Trinidad and Tobago’s disregard for the principle 
of regional community that really brought the dispute over distributive rights to the 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery to a head. Indeed, the dominant sentiment expressed 
by a Barbadian academic KI and shared between other academics as well fisherfolk in 
leadership roles was that “the act of Trinidad and Tobago clandestinely negotiating with 
its non-CARICOM brother against the interests of its CARICOM brothers did not sit 
well, particularly for promoting the idea of CARICOM regional community” (ACDM4, 
cf. ACDM3, ACDF1, ACDF2, BNFF1, BNFF2 interviews, 2016). 
 
Given that Barbados’ and Trinidad and Tobago’s conflicting national interests were 
indeed delegitimising their bi-lateral attempts to share regional maritime resources, in this 
case, fisheries and/or hydrocarbons, Barbados, on February 16th, 2004, triggered its right 
under UNCLOS III to initiate arbitration dispute settlement procedures (United Nations, 
2008). Seeking mediation from an external international authority, the Barbadian 
government requested, among other things, to be granted what they considered to be 
their traditional rights to fish flyingfish off the coast of Tobago; whereas, Trinidad and 
Tobago called for all exclusive rights to the fishery to be held under its control (Blake and 
Campbell 2007, pp. 329). It is worth noting here that during the arbitration, there are 
claims that Deputy Prime Minister Mottley, was instructing Barbadian fisherfolk to 
continue to fish in Tobagonian waters (cf. Nyman 2012, pp. 151). Notwithstanding, the 
Tribunal’s conclusions are noteworthy. The Tribunal found that: 
 
it had no jurisdiction to allow Barbadian fisherfolk 
access to the flyingfish stocks in Trinidad and Tobago’s 
EEZ. The Tribunal also determined that Barbadian 
fisherfolk had not traditionally fished in the area 
concerned but had only fished there since the late 
1970s; nor would a loss of access to the area in question 
catastrophically impact the livelihoods of the fisherfolk 
or the economy of Barbados. Trinidad and Tobago 
however, was reminded of its obligations under 
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UNCLOS and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, to 
negotiate in good faith and conclude an agreement that 
will accord fisherfolk of Barbados access to fisheries 
within its EEZ129 (Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013, pp. 
125). 
 
Figure 4 below illustrates the final award of the EEZ allotted to Barbados and its relative 
fishing areas by the Arbitral Tribunal “Barbados vs. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago” 
in 2006. 
 
Figure 4. Barbados’ EEZ and Relative fishing areas  
 
Source: (United Nations 2008) 
 
                                                          
129 For a more detailed account of the Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago UNCLOS Arbitration Findings cf. (United Nations 2008, 
pp. 221-227). 
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After the Arbitration Tribunal’s verdict, by January 2007, through their government 
representatives, the states agreed to advance a new draft fishing agreement. However, 
Trinidad and Tobago raised again the issue of the need for stock assessments to again 
provide evidence that Eastern Caribbean flyingfish was not overfished in their national 
waters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Barbados, 2011). The states agreed 
to initiate stock assessments this time through regional instruments, namely, the FAO 
Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission’s (FAO-WECAFC’s) and the Caribbean 
Regional Fisheries Mechanism’s (CRFM’s) Sub-Regional Fisheries Management Plan for 
the flyingfish of the Eastern Caribbean (Sub-Regional FMP for the EC)130 (FAO, 2002; 
FAO, 2010; Mohammed, 2016). To recall, the governance mandates of the CRFM and 
the FAO-WECAFC validated the procedural application of the norm of regional 
community to fisheries. Highlighting the centrality of Barbados’ and Trinidad and 
Tobago’s co-operation in realising the Caribbean vision for a regional fishery, is an 
academic’s claim that “the Sub-regional FMP was really written only for Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago, but the plan was pushed as a trial for how the region could work 
together to share resources” (ACDF1 interview, 2016). However, the negotiations 
surrounding the Sub-Regional FMP have also been contested. Scientifically-based 
governance assessments suggest that the implementation of the Sub-Regional FMP had 
stalled largely because both technical and political co-operation were being undermined 
by Barbados’ and Trinidad and Tobago’s insistence on their sovereign distributive rights 
to the fishery (cf. Mohammed, 2016). 
 
Indeed, despite these international and regional attempts, bi-lateral negotiations stalled in 
2011 due to the arrests of Barbadian fishermen by the Tobagonian authorities for illegal 
fishing yet again (Daily Nation, 2011b; Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013). Given that the 
1990 fishing agreement was deemed unsuccessful and over twenty years of varied high-
level negotiations have failed to conclude a new fishing agreement, it can be argued that 
resolving the normative tensions of the principled norms of national sovereignty and 
regional community from the top-down has been an ill-fated political exercise. There is 
certainly tremendous contestation around the question: was the government of Barbados 
arbitrating a fishing agreement that considered the traditional rights of their fisherfolk or 
                                                          
130 The negotiations of the Sub-Regional FMP date back to 1987, conceived through the 1987-1993 IDRC Eastern Caribbean 
Flyingfish Project. The Project was then taken over by the FAO-WECAFC Ad Hoc Working Groups on flyingfish, whose reports 
served as the basis for negotiations for the Sub-regional FMP for the EC which was authorised for implementation by the CRFM 
Ministerial Sub-Committee in May 2014 (Hunte, 1987; Oxenford et al., 1993; FAO, 2002; FAO, 2010; Mohammed, 2016). 
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rather a maritime boundary agreement which would give Barbados more access to 
hydrocarbons? Regarding this, an academic involved in the UNCLOS Arbitration 
proceedings stated, “Barbados really sought to illustrate the supporting relationships 
between the fishing agreement and the boundary demarcation”. More importantly, he 
explained his perspective on how UNCLOS’ provisions on national sovereignty ought to 
be interpreted: 
 
Persons can put their own construction on things. [In 
his view] UNCLOS preserves yet disputes sovereignty 
because UNCLOS is not interested in allocating 
resources, but in delimiting boundaries. For example, 
UNCLOS is not responsible for the allocation of fish, 
oil or mining resources to any country. Once the 
delimitations and the conditionality’s of boundaries are 
set by UNCLOS, the various countries are expected to 
come together to form an agreement as to how the 
maritime space, particularly, the overlapping portion to 
which both are entitled will be used. Therefore, it is not 
solely about the oil or about fish, but about protecting 
and owning the maritime space to which you are 
entitled (ACDM2 interview, 2016). 
 
This academic also challenged the “ownership” of migratory stocks by arguing that “the 
notion that fish are born in one country and therefore are owned by the country is untrue” 
(ACDM2 interview, 2016). It is also certainly worth noting the then Barbadian Chief 
Negotiator’s131 supporting remarks on the matter who claimed, “fishing has always been 
derivative secondary to the wider picture of demarcating boundaries”. The Chief 
Negotiator also claimed that Trinidad and Tobago’s non-adherence to CARICOM 
principles of regional community due to their clandestine agreement with Venezuela 
influenced the weight placed on fisheries compared to the boundary: “Barbados saw the 
move as an alliance in oil and felt that its intellectual identity as a regional leader and the 
                                                          
131 Barbados’ Chief Negotiator of the fishing agreement who was also Barbados’ Ambassador assigned to the CARICOM retired from 
office in 2017. A new envoy has assumed duties of Barbados’ CARICOM Ambassador on January 2018. It is not clear if the new 
envoy has the responsibilities of continuing to negotiate a fishing agreement with Trinidad and Tobago. 
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ownership of its maritime space had been compromised”. The Chief Negotiator also 
lamented the style of rationality used to negotiate the fishing agreement [dating back to 
the 1990 fishing agreement]. Meaning, on the one hand, “the inequitable conditions of 
granting reciprocal access rights to harvest the fishery” and, on the other, “giving Trinidad 
and Tobago the rights to sell fish back to Barbados”. In his view, “Barbados possessed 
no other points which could be used to lure Trinidad and Tobago to the table. Trinidad 
has nothing to gain. Barbados wants their fish and Trinidad and Tobago doesn’t want 
anything from [us]”. Drawing on the norm of regional community as perhaps the only 
equitable standing between the states politically, he argued, “therefore, the CSME, with 
its proposed establishment of free movement of skilled labour is an important negotiating 
tool” (GOVM1 interview, 2016). 
 
The Chief Negotiator also said that differences in the states’ national identities were 
political factors influencing bi-lateral negotiations. This meant that promoting the idea of 
a regional community premised on a shared regional identity was still fractured. To recall, 
before the UNCLOS Arbitration came to a head, there were heated exchanges between 
the Prime Ministers of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. It was the Chief Negotiator’s 
view that because “Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister at that the time was a 
Tobagonian, he did not want to seem to be compromising the rights of his local country-
men to access the fishery”. In fact, this social recognition of the difference between 
sovereign national identities certainly factored in how the Chief Negotiator planned to 
construct his diplomacy in future negotiations. In his words: 
 
Prior negotiations between the states, recognised the 
presence of two different sovereign states, and as a 
result, national interests come above all other matters. 
However, when viewing interests from different 
angles such as regional, national and local— the local 
level is of the utmost importance to each country. 
Therefore the interests of the locale should not be 
placed in any compromising situations which can be 
disadvantageous (GOVM1 interview, 2016). 
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The Chief Negotiator’s perspective on not placing the interests of the locale in any 
compromising situations could certainly be viewed as an electoral issue. However, this 
perspective also shores up the argument that a better understanding is needed of how 
local norms i.e. bottom-up governance interacts with top-down governance to frustrate 
or achieve governance goals. Essentially, these top-down accounts constructing 
governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery illustrate contested perspectives 
of Anglo-Caribbean sovereignty, particularly, conflicting meanings of CARICOM’s 
borders and competing regional vs. national identities.  
 
Despite this, fisherfolk attached to civil society were finding a different expression in 
enacting the norm of regional community through their own bottom-up negotiations. 
After the 2011 arrests, the Barbados Union of National Fisherfolk Organizations 
(BARNUFO)—the umbrella organization representing Barbadian fisherfolks’ interests— 
initiated a fact-finding mission to Tobago to reduce tensions arising from the UNCLOS 
Arbitration and the arrests of Barbadian fisherfolk. This resulted in discussions between 
representatives of BARNUFO and the All Tobago Fisherfolk Association. The 
organisations are considered to have a co-operative relationship by the representatives of 
BARNUFO that were interviewed132. This was demonstrated through the proposed 
outcomes of their discussions that were based on what these organisations would ask 
their respective governments to agree. These outcomes covered, inter-alia, sovereign rights 
over fisheries resources within their respective EEZs; access to markets and surplus 
fishery resources between the states; and, the enforcement of fisheries laws and 
regulations (BARNUFO, 2011). Although no formal arrangement was reached between 
the fisherfolk organisations to conclude a fishing agreement, it is worth noting that the 
2011 negotiations initiated by the fisherfolk organisations provided the political will for 
the only formal reciprocal cooperation in fisheries between the states by way of the “2014 
Fishing Protocol” (Government of Barbados and Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 2014; GOVM1 interview, 2016). Regarding how the protocol 
ought to be enacted, the then Chief Representative of Barbados negotiating the protocol, 
Ambassador Morris, stated: 
 
                                                          
132 As indicated no interviews took place with Tobagonian fishers or members of the All Tobago Fisherfolk association to fully 
substantiate these claims made by the representatives of BARNUFO. 
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the protocol formalises common procedures 
related to the arrest of crew and detention of 
fishing vessels. Furthermore, the protocol sets 
the basis for a fishing agreement to be negotiated 
in the future, in that, it sets out best practices in 
terms of how Barbadian fisherfolk are dealt with 
if they are found in the waters of Trinidad and 
Tobago (qtd. in Joseph, 2014). 
 
Ambassador Morris also signalled that the conclusion of any fishing agreement in the 
future should be predicated on CARICOM’s regional development model of the CSME 
that allows for the free movement of capital, labour and services (cf. Joseph, 2014). As it 
relates to the interaction of the states’ national politics aligning with the regional vision 
for a shared fishery, the Ambassador’s assertion certainly carries a tremendous amount 
of weight. This is because irrespective of the states’ sovereign claims to the fishery, with 
the protocol now in place, the norm of regional community still factored as a political 
force in high-level negotiations. However, as explained earlier this study’s empirical 
findings indicate that the CSME is still contested, particularly because the idea of an 
integrated borderless CARICOM commons in which skilled nationals, goods, and 
services move freely has been difficult to substantiate in practice (cf. 9b). Indeed, the 
dominant sentiment shared between KIs involved in the political process was that “the 
issues we have over free movement of people not only occurs in CARICOM, it also 
happens in the European Union. People want to maintain sovereignty”133 (GOV1M; cf. 
GOVM3, GOVM5, GOVM4, interviews, 2016). 
 
This inability of the states to reconcile the norms of regional community and national 
sovereignty on either international, regional or bi-lateral terms points to two overarching 
ways in which the top-down governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery is 
being challenged: 1) the appropriateness of high-level negotiations to conclude a fishing 
agreement between the states, and, 2) the inclusivity of fisherfolks’ interests in these high-
level negotiations. This study’s empirical evidence suggests that replacing the norm of an 
open-access fishery with one mandating exclusive ownership rights over fisheries 
                                                          
133 From the author’s own knowledge of the state of Anglo-Caribbean politics, it should be stated that it is not just about sovereignty, 
but development disparities also factor. 
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resources is the major strain in the regional fishery’s top-down governance that has 
created a legitimacy gap. Regarding this, according to both local academic and regional 
experts, “getting the governments to co-operate in providing or sharing data is 
impossible” (ACDF1; cf. GOVRF1 interviews, 2016). The experts attributed the lack of 
co-operation between the governments towards them wanting to maintain their sovereign 
claims to the flyingfish resources of the Eastern Caribbean. This has led to adverse 
perceptions among elite actors about the prospect of formal/exclusive fishing rights 
being implemented in practice. Consequently, “when discussing the specifics of how the 
stock would be distributed, for example, individual country quota allocations of 5,000MT 
of flyingfish, negotiations would break down” (ACDF1; cf. GOVRF1 interviews, 2016).  
 
The empirical evidence also points to the lack of Barbadian fisherfolks representative 
interests in the high-level negotiations as the additional overarching strain in the top-
down governance of the regional fishery that has created a legitimacy gap. The dominant 
view shared amongst the study’s KIs at all levels of interaction in the fishery was that the 
ideas governing Caribbean regionalism in fisheries are negotiated at political and technical 
levels—and then directives need to be communicated in the locale by politicians, technical 
experts, and civil society—to then be implemented by the fisherfolk. One might wonder 
then, how are fisherfolks’ interests represented in high-level negotiations? According to 
a regional expert, “it is the responsibility of Member states to conduct fisher consultations 
and to ensure that they bring their fisherfolks’ interests to bear” (GOVRF1 interview, 
2016). An academic involved in high-level negotiations indicated however that: 
 
the various levels of meetings present conflicting 
interests…some are high-level ministerial, or 
science-based or sub-committees. More 
importantly, very rarely is there adequate 
communication of directives between technocrats 
and politicians. This results in no directions being 
sent down to the community (ACDF1 interview, 
2016). 
 
Interestingly, the dominant view held by both academics and technocrats, and 
substantiated by secondary data, was that, there is generally a low response rate from 
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government representatives to regional management or governance assessments of 
fisheries (cf. CERMES, 2012). The claim that technocratic governance assessments are 
indeed contested by political representatives was supported. The Barbadian Chief 
negotiator explained that “it’s mainly due to the language of exclusion and restricted 
access”. Consequently, “[he] can’t be expected to negotiate an agreement and provide a 
report to fisherfolk that says fisheries needs to be controlled” (GOVM1 interview, 2016).  
 
Up to submission of this thesis in 2018, a formal fishing agreement is yet to be concluded 
between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. These findings ultimately show that despite 
the political foundations bolstering a regional community to construct governance of the 
Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery, enactments of top-down governance have instead 
emboldened the maintenance of national sovereignty. This proclivity for elite actors to 
embed sovereign claims in their negotiations has made the idea of formally demarcating 
shared distributive rights to the fishery seemingly unlikely. This now leads to the question: 
have actors in Barbados’ locale accepted or contested the mechanisms which underpin 
how their distributive rights to the fishery have been shaped by top-down governance, 
and, as such, is the top-down governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery 
being challenged? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
3. Constructing Governance of the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish Fishery 
from the Bottom-Up (Type 3 norms)  
 
3.1. Informally Demarcating Shared Distributive Rights to the Eastern 
Caribbean Flyingfish fishery 
Section 2.2 of this chapter highlighted a legitimacy gap in governance wherein I 
questioned whether attempts to conclude a fishing agreement from the top-down were 
perceived to be appropriate by actors in Barbados’ locale. In answer, this study’s empirical 
evidence suggests that while the principled norm of national sovereignty is still a 
legitimating factor constructing governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery in 
Barbados’ locale, Barbadian fisherfolk have found a different expression in enacting the 
norm of regional community. As the Barbadian fisherfolk have indicated this was 
demonstrated through their enactment of a shared identity as Eastern Caribbean 
fisherfolk with shared stakes in harvesting Eastern Caribbean fisheries. 
 
Contrary to the expectation that fisherfolk who are not formally engaged in politics or 
the political process might not be aware of the norm of regional community, they clearly 
demonstrate that they are. Referencing CARICOM’s instruments, Barbadian fisherfolk 
also mentioned the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) to lay claim to their 
shared distributive rights to the fishery. In also making an appeal to CARICOM’s strained 
regional identity conflicting with a culture of regional exchanges, a fisher stated, “we are 
Caribbean neighbours, especially with the CSME in play… how can you deal with me on 
one hand and line [our] supermarkets with goods from Trinidad and Tobago, and on the 
other not finish the fishing agreement…do they have double standards in fisheries?”134 
(SXMM1 interview, 2016). The dominant view among Barbadian fisherfolk was also that 
the mind-set of ownership and sovereignty will prevail in political negotiations. It could 
be argued then that the fruitless efforts of elite actors to conclude a fishing agreement on 
international, regional or bi-lateral terms via the UNCLOS Arbitration marginalised views 
from the locale, particularly those of Barbadian fisherfolk. 
 
                                                          
134 The perception shared by this fisher about the commercial dominance of Trinidad and Tobago is a Caribbean wide problem. Apart 
from Trinidad and Tobago’s imports dominating the produce found on Barbadian supermarket shelves, they also now own several 
businesses in Barbados that used to be locally owned. In Jamaica, there have also been waves of calls for boycotting the imports and 
purchase of goods from Trinidad and Tobago, especially over disagreements about the free movement of citizens within CARICOM. 
It should be stated there also exists border politics between Barbados and Guyana about the free movements of citizens within 
CARICOM. 
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Intriguingly, Barbadian fisherfolk who were both involved and on the side-lines of the 
UNCLOS Arbitration were conflicted about the utility of the Arbitration to conclude a 
fishing agreement. This is largely because the dominant view shared among the study’s 
KIs was that the Arbitration proceedings were predominately about the politics of oil. 
However, given the Arbitration’s verdict (see Section 2.2 of this chapter), several 
Barbadian fisherfolk did express feelings of marginalisation on the premise that from 
“Trinidad’s point of view, Tobago gained more confidence in the fishing industry than 
Barbados” (cf. BNFF1 and BNFF2 interviews, 2016). Arguably, it was the case that the 
Barbadian national identity best served by exploiting the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish was 
being threatened. Indeed, in Carol Williams’, L.A. Times article, Island’s Icon Up in the Air, 
Williams documented that the Arbitration dispute and the sanctions enforced by Trinidad 
and Tobago not only left many Barbadian fisherfolk idle but had also bruised national 
pride (Williams, 2004). Cumberbatch and Hinds (2013, pp. 125) explain that Barbadians 
were obliged to “depend on the imported catches of Tobagonian fishermen— many of 
whom were trained by Barbadians, but sadly don’t know how to fillet flyingfish properly”. 
Nevertheless, in drawing on the shared regional identity being enacted by fisherfolk, a 
Barbadian fisher claimed, “it is so funny that Tobago was once considered a part of 
Barbados, so the fact that, we, fisherfolk, must pay for our governments’ disagreements 
is ridiculous” (BGTM3 interview, 2016). 
 
It is also worth mentioning that fisherfolk tied to the leadership of BARNUFO and the 
then Barbadian Chief Negotiator reported that a few regional exchanges occurred 
between Barbadian and Tobagonian fisherfolk during and just after the Arbitration. 
Regarding an exchange that exposed the Tobagonians to a typical Oistins Friday Night 
Fish Fry (a cultural Barbadian tourist commodity), the Chief Negotiator put forward an 
important claim that: 
 
part of the negotiations was to build relationships 
with alliances, where Barbados needed access to 
the flyingfish and Trinidad needed aid in 
establishing a business based on tourism in 
Tobago. From this vantage, it was less about 
extractive negotiations, but rather, paying more 
attention to collaboration and an understanding of 
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our shared Caribbean heritage (GOVM1 
interview, 2016). 
 
It can be argued here that Barbadian identity is being spatialized by fisherfolk to account 
for their cultural desires to catch flyingfish even in the waters of other nations, in this 
case, Tobago. Furthermore, Barbadian fisherfolk also accept that Trinidad and Tobago’s 
interests are best served by accessing Barbadian heritage and waters. In fact, several 
fisherfolk based at Bridgetown shared, “we have no problem with the Trinidadian and 
Tobagonian fisherfolk, the St. Lucians and our other neighbouring Caribbean fisherfolk 
coming to fish in our waters. These informal agreements between us fisherfolk sharing 
Eastern Caribbean fishery resources are a common practice” (BGTM3 interview, 2016; 
cf. BGTM2, BGTM5, BGTM6 interviews, 2016). It is the case then that Barbadian 
fisherfolk claim that fisherfolk on both islands seem to be happy to acquiesce to these 
demands for reciprocity. This is at odds with the top-down notion of existing in a 
bounded territory in which no divisibility of shared distributive rights to the Eastern 
Caribbean flyingfish fishery can be accepted. 
 
The UNCLOS Arbitration also brought to bear how the meaning of traditional rights to 
the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery were interpreted within the locale. This is 
significant because the sentiment relayed by a female fisher involved in the Arbitration 
proceedings was that “when the decision was finally taken by the Barbadian government 
to include [us] in negotiations, [our] affidavits to support [our] traditional fishing rights 
were merely used as pawns” (BNFF1 interview, 2016). This was supported by other 
fisherfolk who also serve in leadership roles with BARNUFO, as well as an academic (cf. 
BNFF2, BNFM1, ACDM3 interviews, 2016). This meant that even though Barbadian 
fisherfolk claim traditional rights to the flyingfish resources of the Eastern Caribbean, the 
context in which the testimonials from fisherfolk were used as a basis to justify Barbadian 
claims was contested. This is because the meaning of “traditional rights” had not been 
validated within the locale. Regarding this claim, Section 2.2 of this chapter documented 
that the first instance the rights of Barbadians to the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery 
were formally evoked in negotiations was in the “Preservation of Rights” language used 
in the 1990 Fishing Agreement. Consequential is the then Barbadian Chief negotiator’s 
interpretation of this language. He claimed: 
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The Barbadian government was trying to give the 
impression that they were given a right in history 
based on action. Throughout the world, this has 
always been a major part of fishing agreements 
[artisanal rights]. Therefore, the argument that 
you were destroying the livelihoods and 
traditional rights of a special group of people was 
a strong one. Trinidad however argued that what 
was once traditional practice in terms of a day-
boat fishery is now long gone. What we are 
talking about now is a modern industrial 
commercial fishing business driven by a long-
range ice-boat fishery” (GOVM1 interview, 
2016). 
 
It could also be challenged then that the notion of traditional rights made dominant by 
elites marginalised localised perspectives. To explain, the then Chief Negotiator also 
charged that “there was a deliberate attempt by the Barbadian government of the time to 
persuade fishermen to fish in Trinidad and Tobago’s waters”. He claimed, “this was 
political manoeuvring because, Barbados, in reciprocity, accepted Trinidad and Tobago’s 
rights to arrest our fishermen” (GOVM1 interview, 2016). To recall, section 2.2 
referenced claims of the then Deputy Prime Minister doing just this. A fisher and leader 
of BARNUFO reflecting on the matter also stated, “the arrests have been used as a 
political tool to cause or prolong regional conflict” (BNFF1 interview, 2016). Tellingly, a 
leading academic held the perception then that, “if [Barbadians] can continue the practice 
of fishing at will with knowing that there is a diplomatic resolve, then they will continue 
to do so. Therefore, any serious regional effort to manage and govern flyingfish may not 
actually benefit Barbados as a nation drastically” (ACDM1 interview, 2016). It is indeed 
unclear if the Barbadian government advocated for the arrests of its fisherfolk to 
undermine the high-level negotiations of concluding a new fishing agreement because 
such an agreement would inevitably leave the distributive rights of Barbadian fisherfolk 
to the fishery worse off. 
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For their part, Barbadian fisherfolk were split on the issue of whether their traditional 
rights to the fishery ought to be actualised based on the terms of national sovereignty or 
a regional community. There were reports from some boat-owners and fisherfolk that it 
was important to recognise and respect a county’s sovereign territorial rights and borders. 
In addition, if Barbados was put in a similar situation [they] would be equally opposed to 
any agreement that could potentially threaten the livelihoods of their countrymen and 
women (cf. BGTF1, BGTF2, BGTF3 BGTM1, BGTM4, OISM2 interviews, 2016). 
There were also claims from small-scale artisanal and industrial commercial fisherfolk of 
the benefits to be gained from Barbadians being unable to openly access Tobagonian 
waters. They shared that “Tobagonian waters would be flooded, creating an influx of 
flyingfish in the Barbados market and a reduction of the fish price” (BGTF2 cf. FPM3 
interviews, 2016). Intriguingly, there were also reports from fisherfolk and shared by the 
then Chief Negotiator, that the fishermen are the ones to blame for conflicting 
enactments of Barbados’ traditional rights. The perception was that “due to ice-boats 
being equipped with GPS technology, fishermen are aware of the co-ordinates of 
Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ, and thus, the illegality of their actions” (SPTM1, cf. BNFF2, 
GOVM1 interviews, 2016). There were, however, competing views from fisherfolk and 
government officials about fishermen not being adequately educated about the 
boundaries, and, as mentioned before, due to the migratory and straddling nature of 
flyingfish, fishermen will indeed follow the fish. As several KIs explained in their own 
terms, “fish don’t pay attention to the boundaries” (BNFM1 interview, 2016) and “if we 
share a Caribbean Sea, and the fishermen go where the flyingfish migrate, but not with 
the aim of purposely breaking the law, how can you penalize them?” (GOVM3; cf. 
BGTM4 interviews, 2016). 
 
These contested meanings of CARICOM’s borders and traditional rights has a 
temporality to it, especially in terms of the politics of the flyingfish season. Surprisingly, 
Barbadian fisherfolk were evenly split on the supposed need to go to Tobago to harvest 
the fishery. There were conflicting reports from the then Chief Negotiator and some 
fisherfolk, that during certain times of the year, flyingfish could be caught in abundance 
and easily in the South-East of the island to supply Barbadian local demand (cf. GOVM1 
BGTF1, BGTM1, BGTM3, OISM2 interviews, 2016). It was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter that Tobago’s flyingfish season begins very early during February and April, 
whereas, Barbadian fishermen tend to recognise the entire November to July season. 
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According to a Barbadian fisherman based at Bridgetown this adherence to seasonal 
standards, “influences fishermen to travel to Tobago to be ‘early’ in the race to catch 
flyingfish” (BGTM2 interview, 2016). This adherence to normative seasonal standards 
highlights that of course there is a dominant territorial politics to dispute surrounding 
flyingfish being a shared resource or not and how to police distributive rights to it. But, 
there is another often marginalised politics then that leaves unasked the question: do 
Barbadians need to catch flyingfish in waters considered to be illegal?135 
 
One of the most intriguing findings of this study is that fisherfolk were engaged in 
informal acts of reciprocity constructing governance of the fishery from the bottom-up. 
The dominant view held by Barbadian fisherfolk is that they and Tobagonian fisherfolk 
co-operate daily in demarcating shared distributive rights in the multi-species fishery. 
Barbadian fisherfolk attributed this to different interests in the fishery, meaning, “the 
Tobagonians largely want to target larger pelagics like mahi-mahi and the Barbadians the 
flyingfish.” These fisherfolk therefore “end up sometimes sharing bait and even 
informing one another where fish can be found in abundance” (BGTM3 cf. BGTM5, 
SXMM4, interviews, 2016). As mentioned earlier by a fisherman based at Bridgetown, 
these informal agreements between fisherfolk sharing the fisheries resources of the 
Eastern Caribbean are a common practice (BGTM3 interview, 2016). It was also 
documented earlier in this chapter that on-the-ground negotiations occurred between the 
leaders of BARNUFO and the All Tobago Fisherfolk Organisation, mainly to reduce 
tensions arising from the UNCLOS Arbitration and the arrests of Barbadian fishermen. 
According to members of BARNUFO, this was a collaborative regional effort 
coordinated through the Caribbean Network of Fisherfolk Organisations (CNFO). In 
recent years, the CNFO has been positioned as the institutional space for Caribbean 
fisherfolk to get a seat at the policy negotiating table to advocate for policy change, 
especially that related to the rights of small-scale fisherfolk. Herein, national fisherfolk 
organisations like BARNUFO and the All Tobago fisherfolk organisation have mobilised 
to form a basis for a regional network of fisherfolk, further advancing the notion of a 
regional community of Caribbean fisherfolk (Lay et al., 2013). 
 
                                                          
135 I am aware that this could be addressed by natural scientists in the terms of programmatic policies for alternative livelihoods, 
vulnerabilities and resilience. However, addressing these questions of scientific governance assessments is out of the scope of this 
study. 
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Notwithstanding, representatives of BARNUFO charged that “when the politicians 
became aware of the regional exchanges, particularly of Barbadians going to Tobago, 
[our] presence was denied”. The perception was held therefore that “even if the 
Tobagonian fisherfolk were interested in co-operation, and from Barbadian assistance, 
further developing their flyingfish industry, when politicians are included in negotiations, 
all fails” (cf. BNFF1, BNFF2, BNFM1 interviews, 2016). Here it is worth noting an 
academic’s interpretations of the political value of these informal regional exchanges 
between fisherfolk, who argued: 
 
whether we want to acknowledge them or not, 
there were de-facto informal agreements among 
the fisherfolk that were working. What has 
occurred is that co-operation [in fisheries] has now 
been triggered by circumstances where a country 
seeks the need to assert their sovereign de-jure 
rights (ACDM2 interview, 2016). 
 
It can certainly be suggested then that bottom-up governance was conceived much 
differently from the earlier top-down governance accounts constructing governance of 
the regional fishery. This has been demonstrated through how the norm of regional 
community has been given recognition by Barbadian fisherfolk to make way for acts of 
reciprocity to realise shared distributive rights in the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. 
In illustrating why local norms matter then on this account, on the one hand, the norm 
of regional community cannot viably be enacted to conclude a fishing agreement without 
first accounting for the differences between national and regional identities, i.e. 
CARICOM as a union and CARICOM as a collective of sovereign states. On the other 
hand, even though the actors that are implementing governance, namely fisherfolk, do 
have conflicting enactments of the norm of national sovereignty, over-time, Barbadian 
fisherfolk have indicated that they also have been able to co-operate based on a shared 
identity as a regional community of fisherfolk with shared stakes in the Eastern Caribbean 
flyingfish fishery. This has been actualised principally through their informal means of 
demarcating shared distributive rights to the fishery. 
 
155 
 
3.2. Inclusivity and Representation of the Barbadian Fisher – A Bottom-Up 
Reading 
Section 2.2 of this chapter also positioned the lack of fisherfolks representative interests 
in the policy-making process of concluding a fishing agreement as an overarching tension 
imposed by top-down governance, thereby highlighting whether fisherfolk ought to have 
a seat at the negotiating table. This also highlighted a legitimacy gap in governance 
wherein I questioned whether the debates to conclude a fishing agreement were publicly 
accessible to Barbadian fisherfolk, and, as such, their minority positions counted as a 
collective and inclusive part of the negotiating process? 
 
The empirical findings indicate that the fisherfolk whose distributive rights would be most 
affected by the efforts to negotiate a fishing agreement do perceive the lack of their 
democratic representation to be restraining the conclusion of a positive outcome. This 
exclusion of fisherfolks interests in the policy making process was the contested factor 
through which fisherfolk expressed the most dissatisfaction with top-down governance 
of the regional fishery. The sentiments expressed by the leader of BARNUFO and 
supported by an academic was that “Barbadian fisherfolk had to fight for a seat at the 
negotiating table” (BNFF2 cf. ACDM3 interviews, 2016). Validating the concern which 
questioned the true inclusivity of top-down governance, the leader of BARNUFO 
lamented that, “getting [them] to do a report that you can relate to and then communicate 
with the fisherfolk is impossible” (BNFF2 interview, 2016). Perhaps, more importantly, 
although the fisherfolk that were not involved in negotiations were largely aware of the 
political disputes that were taking place bi-laterally, and in the international arena like the 
UNCLOS Arbitration, they were largely unaware of how their distributive rights would 
be affected. For example, most fisherfolk expressed no knowledge of regional efforts like 
the Sub-Regional Fisheries Management Plan for flyingfish of the Eastern Caribbean. 
Furthermore, if fisherfolk were invited to, or attended meetings, they found the 
negotiations to be premised on scientific approaches and/or political jargon that did not 
account for their minority positions. Instead strong statements were made insinuating a 
schism between the interests of political representatives and fisherfolk as part of a 
collective and inclusive negotiating process. The sentiment shared by a fish vendor based 
in Bridgetown and a local fish processor was that “the governments of the Eastern 
Caribbean focus only on their interests” (BGTF2 cf. FPM2 interviews, 2016). The 
dominant perspective held by fisherfolk and shared by local academics, was that, 
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fisherfolk believe that decisions are made on their behalf without a true representation of 
the politics of the fishery on the ground. In this case, despite the political encumbrances 
of contested borders, as well as competing national vs. regional identities, understanding 
the informal agreements that shore up how Barbadian fisherfolk have been able to co-
operate, as they indicate daily with fisherfolk from Trinidad and Tobago in their shared 
fishery. 
 
The empirical evidence also points to an absence of institutional mechanisms for 
fisherfolk and fishery managers to converse on issues of governance outside their national 
space. The fact that the Barbadian government body negotiating with Trinidad and 
Tobago over fishery issues was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Fisheries 
Division was highly contested. It is true that there exists no national institutionalised space 
where the interests of fisherfolk can be communicated and debated, and so, accounted 
for as a part of the governance process. The perception expressed by fisherfolk attached 
to BARNUFO and shared by academics was that, “when it got to the 'big' man level they 
shut down the fisherfolks’ negotiations. It was clear that unlike the politicians, fisherfolk 
have a willingness to work together” (BNFF1, BNFF2 cf. ACDF1, ACDF2 interviews, 
2016).  
 
The argument could also be made however, that there is also a disconnect between how 
Barbadian fisherfolk at large perceive their democratic interests to be represented by the 
governing body mandated to do so, in this case, BARNUFO. For example, in terms of 
future interactions to conclude a fishing agreement, the “2014 Fishing Protocol” that was 
established between representatives of the Governments of Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago, stipulates the rights and duties of the states if a Barbadian fisher is caught fishing 
illegally in Tobagonian waters (Government of Barbados and Government of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2014). The empirical findings suggest that although 
fisherfolks’ interests were represented in negotiations by way of BARNUFO—there were 
no tangible consultations with the fisherfolk themselves who would be affected by the 
Protocol. Because of political approaches trumping community approaches, the 
marginalised view among Barbadian fisherfolk best expressed by the leader of 
BARNUFO was that, as a sector, “the Barbadian flyingfish fishery is struggling to gain 
legitimacy as it is in a constant battle to secure identity and attention from its 
governments” (BNFF1 interview, 2016). Indeed, a former leader of BARNUFO also 
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lamented, “many governments have passed since the ‘fisheries dispute’ first started, but 
there has been no form of resolution forcing us to assume, the fisheries industry is not in 
their best interest and that a fishing agreement will not be achieved” (BNFF2 interview, 
2016). This study’s empirical findings ultimately suggest that state interests have upended 
fisherfolks’ democratic interests and minority positions in the policy-making process. 
Why local norms matter ultimately matter then within this context of the claims given by 
Barbadian fisherfolk that they co-operate daily with Tobagonians in the fishery, is 
because, these practices including their negotiations, demonstrate a regional community 
driven by the informality of bottom-up governance.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter explored whether there is acceptance or contention of the idea of shared 
distributive rights to the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery, and why or why not. Section 
1 demonstrated how the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery has been built on regional 
exchanges between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Section 2 illustrated how the 
top-down governance of the fishery was constructed. First, it explained how the norms 
of national sovereignty and regional community have evolved as fundamental principles 
constructing governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery in tension. 
Furthermore, it traced how despite over twenty years of varied high-level negotiations, 
the inability to resolve the normative tensions borne from fundamental principles in the 
policy making process lead to the failure of elite actors to conclude a fishing agreement. 
Examining how the top-down governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery was 
constructed highlighted that there is a degree of acceptance regarding how shared 
distributive rights to the fishery ought to be actualised, particularly because of Barbados’ 
continued desire to enact the norm of regional community. However, it was shown that 
when high-level negotiations incorporated the prospect of ceding sovereignty to the 
supra-national through the prospect of putting fishing rights into practice, unsurprisingly 
contention occurred between political representatives and other elite actors. Furthermore, 
Barbadian fisherfolks’ interests were arguably not democratically represented in high-level 
negotiations. I then argued that this inability of the states to reconcile the norms of 
regional community and national sovereignty via top-down governance created legitimacy 
gaps in governance. These legitimacy gaps pointed to two overarching ways in which the 
top-down governance of the regional fishery is being challenged: 1) the appropriateness 
of high-level negotiations to conclude a fishing agreement between the states, and, 2) the 
inclusivity of fisherfolks’ interests in these high-level negotiations.  
 
Section 3 brought to the fore the effects of local norms on actors implementing 
governance. It is significant to this study’s analytical design because an understanding was 
gained of governing the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery from the bottom up from a 
Barbadian perspective. This was important because in interpreting the effects of local 
norms on actors, this study was able to account for the perspectives of often marginalised 
actors in the policy and political process of constructing governance of the regional 
fishery in Barbados. The key findings of this chapter suggest that bottom-up governance 
constructed a regional community of fisherfolk willing to engage in acts of reciprocity to 
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actualise their shared rights to the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. This presented an 
alternative view of constructing governance of the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery. 
Therein, how the norm of regional community was enacted by Barbadian fisherfolk 
within the locale would be at odds with enactments of top-down governance 
emboldening the maintenance of national sovereignty illustrated taking precedence in 
section 2 of this chapter. Certainly in dominant constructivist assessments of constructing 
a regional fishery, local norms might typically go un-noticed. Why accounting for local 
norms matter then in this case, is an understanding that top-down and bottom 
governance align to achieve or frustrate the governance goals of a shared Eastern 
Caribbean flyingfish fishery and the distributive rights afforded to Barbadian fisherfolk 
via actors’ identities.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction 
This chapter’s analysis of fisheries governance is framed by Barbadian national 
development priorities, and the idea of granting reciprocal rights to luxury tourism and 
fisheries to own and physically access valuable coastal space in Barbados. Empirically, it 
draws on observations related to the developments of two luxury marinas alongside the 
Six Men’s fishing community in St. Peter. Chapter 5 argued that the norm of sustainable 
development has been accepted as a way of talking and thinking about development, and, 
has shaped the rhetoric around achieving ‘sustainable fisheries’ and ‘sustainable tourism’. 
This chapter’s findings suggest that there has been obvious friction because sustainable 
development has different meanings and uneven acceptance institutionally, procedurally, 
and at the level of the locale. I found that there were legitimacy gaps in governance given 
that the state and private sector actors constructed governance from the top-down in 
contrast with fisherfolk and the local community who constructed governance from the 
bottom-up. These legitimacy gaps pointed to two overarching ways in which the top-
down governance of Barbadian national development priorities is being challenged: 1) 
the appropriateness of integrating sustainable fisheries and sustainable tourism as pillars 
of national development in Six Men’s, and, 2) the inclusivity of ordinary Barbadians 
interests (particularly in the Six Men’s locale) in constructing national development 
priorities. 
 
The chapter’s key findings are the following: In Barbados’ north-west, there exists two 
Barbados built on embedded stratifications of race/colour and class (see chapter 5) and 
vacillating between cultural traditions and economic interests. Therein, white Barbadian 
nationals have economic interests in advancing luxury tourism on the platinum coast, 
whereas, largely black Barbadians who describe themselves as “ordinary” Barbadians, 
have interests in maintaining the traditions tied to northern fisheries. In enactments of 
top-down governance the principle of social sustainability and the inclusion of culture is 
often-overlooked in the sustainable development debate. This highlights that the socio-
cultural traditions and heritage of the Six Men’s fishery and community is at risk of being 
lost because of encroaching luxury tourism interests. Enactments of bottom-up 
governance however demonstrate that tensions between how local black and white 
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Barbadians have developed their interests in the sectors has shaped the island’s national 
development priorities, particularly in the north-west. Regarding this, the interests of 
ordinary Barbadians in constructing development in the north-west are being 
marginalised. Essentially then, enactments of bottom-up governance present an 
alternative way of thinking about sustainable development, in that, the socio-cultural 
sustainability of Six Men’s is predicated on the sectors having reciprocal rights to own 
and physically access the Six Men’s land and beachfront.   
 
Section 1 provides a descriptive background of how competing constructions of 
development framed within sustainable development have socially constructed the locale 
of Six Men’s St. Peter. Section 2 documents the fundamental principles and standardised 
procedures (type 1 and type 2 norms) which undergird the top-down governance of 
Barbadian national development priorities around the sectors of fisheries and tourism, 
showing how these political dynamics created legitimacy gaps in governance. Section 3 
brings to the fore local norms (type 3 norms) and unearths the alternative construction 
of Barbadian national development priorities. From this, it is shown how the top-down 
governance of national development priorities around the sectors of luxury tourism and 
fisheries is being challenged. The conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings. 
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1. A Tale of Two Barbados 
 
1.1. Competing Constructions of Development and of Sustainable Development 
Six Men’s, St. Peter, is characterised as one of Barbados’ last remaining ‘true’ fishing 
communities whose rights to own and physically access coastal space have become 
encumbered by luxury tourism interests. It is thus important to provide a background to 
how these sectoral interchanges have influenced notions of contested development, and 
of sustainable development, in the island’s north-west. The social and cultural fabric of 
most coastal communities throughout the Caribbean has been historically shaped by 
fishing as the main economic activity (Welch, 2005). Specific to Barbados, chapter 5 
highlighted that since the 1970s, the traditions attached to fisheries have been 
transformed via the introduction of public markets and infrastructure for fisheries 
development. At the same time, since the 1970s, tourism has been positioned as the main 
driver of the Barbadian economy and has been massively subsidised. Given that both 
sectors have been integral to sustaining Barbadian life and economy, this has inevitably 
led to competition for rights to own and physically access prime beachfront and coastal 
space, particularly in this case of Six Men’s, St. Peter.  
 
Barbados is the fourth most densely populated country in the Americas with a land area 
of only 166 square miles and with an estimated population of 285,719. About 90% of 
Barbadians are of Afro-Caribbean and mixed descent. The rest of the population is 
comprised of Europeans (4%) mostly from Ireland and the United Kingdom as well as 
Asians (World Population Review, 2017).  These facts matter because almost half of the 
island’s over 280,000 present-day inhabitants live in an urban belt extending the length of 
the sheltered and protected sandy beaches of the south, south-west, west, and north-west 
coasts (Alleyne, 1998; Barbados Statistical Service, 2013; Peterson et al., 2014). As 
mentioned in chapter 5, working class blacks tended to settle around Bridgetown in the 
south of the island, the capital of commerce and trade. Poor whites and the white elite 
tended to settle further west and north. Although blacks did settle in the west and north 
as well— their land tenure has been largely insecure (Beckles, 2004a; Welch, 2005). This 
is important because white dominance over the Barbadian economy certainly created 
spatial disparities in the distribution of the rich, middle and poor classes of communities 
in Barbados (Beckles, 2004a). 
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As a prime vacation destination, tourism plays an important role in Barbadian society and 
economy. In 2016, the island boasted record stay-over arrivals of 631,513, i.e. triple the 
permanent population (Ministry of Tourism, 2017). In 2017, the travel and tourism sector 
had a total contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 50.6% or $1.9 billion 
(USD)136.  In 2017, the sector also directly and indirectly supported 52,500 jobs, 40.5% of 
the island’s total employment (WTTC, 2018). The sector therefore impacts all business 
sectors on the island directly or indirectly including fisheries.  
 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, Barbados is known as the land of flyingfish. According to 
Cumberbatch and Hinds (2013, pp. 121) “flyingfish presents an interesting blend of being 
a tangible, yet intangible heritage resource, and is simultaneously a part of the island’s 
natural and cultural heritage”. The fisheries sector has also proven to be an important 
industry for Barbados through its contributions to domestic food security, livelihoods, 
foreign exchange earnings, as well as providing significant support for Barbados’ tourism 
industry. Given the socio-cultural status of flyingfish, it is not surprising that the motif of 
flyingfish has become associated with the Barbadian tourism product as a trademark icon 
(see Figure 1) (PCSI, 2009, pp. 30). 
 
Figure 1. Barbados Tourism Logo (with iconic flyingfish) 
 
Source: (PCSI, 2009) 
 
It has been reported that the fishery employs over 6,000 people directly (from harvesting 
and related activities)137, approximately 2% of the Barbadian population138 as well as an 
undocumented number indirectly (from related services such as tourism) (Sobers, 2010; 
                                                          
136 The total contribution of Travel & Tourism includes its ‘wider impacts’ (i.e. the indirect and induced impacts) on the economy 
(WTTC, 2018, pp. 2). 
137 Excluded from this number are family dependents, and those who, among other things, cook fish, whether in exclusive restaurants, 
at fish fry’s, or at numerous rum shops around the island; build and maintain boats; and, transport fish around the island (Mahon et 
al., 2007; Monnereau, 2016). 
138 According to (McConney, 2011) the statistics reported here is a rough estimation based on fisher registration. 
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McConney, 2011; FAO, 2017a). It should be noted that there are major differences in 
how the contributions of fisheries and tourism to the Barbadian economy are statistically 
documented. Scientific reports indicate that the contributions of the Barbadian fishing 
industry to GDP has been historically undervalued and seldom reported with accuracy 
(McConney, 1998; Mahon et al., 2007). This is perhaps unsurprising given that chapter 5 
revealed Barbadian fisheries are viewed by those in political authority as an “informal 
industry” (GOVMM2 interview, 2016). Fisheries contributions are usually cited as 
ranging between $12 - $16 million USD per annum, approximately 0.1% of the island’s 
total GDP139 (FAO, 2017a).  
 
The documented contributions of the sectors to the Barbadian economy are highlighted 
because this purview of focusing solely on economics provides an understanding of 
development which suggests that what ought to be valued is GDP growth and formal 
sector jobs. However, this study’s empirical findings reveal that as it pertains to 
constructing Barbados’ national development priorities around the sectors of fisheries 
and luxury tourism in its north-west, the development debate has become framed and 
understood in terms of socio-cultural sustainability. This is significant because while not 
discounting the importance of economic sustainability and the sectors contributions to 
that, maintaining the ties between Barbadian fisheries and socio-cultural traditions and 
heritage, particularly in rural Barbados, factored heavily in the local discourse. What this 
chapter is interested in then is exploring this context of constructing Barbadian national 
development priorities in Six Men’s, St. Peter.  
 
1.2. The Six Men’s Fishing Community and Struggles over Rights of Ownership 
The sectors of fisheries and luxury tourism have undoubtedly played an important role in 
shaping national development priorities in Six Men’s. The locale (see Figure 2) is 
significant because, to recall, the land tenure of working-class blacks that settled in the 
west and north has been largely insecure (Beckles, 2004a). Since the former 
plantocracy/white elite has maintained control over the island’s economy and productive 
resources, like tourism, Barbadian fisherfolk have been described as largely from the black 
peasantry competing for scarce non-plantation land after slavery (McConney, 1995, pp. 
35, 37). The importance of the Six Men’s locale is therefore predicated on its 
                                                          
139  The calculation of fisheries contributions to total GDP is based on ex-vessel and retail prices collected at major markets. Ex-vessel 
value refers to the raw unprocessed fish that is landed at the port and sold directly to vendors or processors (cf. Mahon et al., 2007).  
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characterisation as one of Barbados’ last remaining ‘true’ fishing communities140 (cf. 
Alleyne, 1998; Mahon and Jones 1998, pp. 18; GOVMM2 interview, 2016). Here, the 
term “true fishing community” refers to a fish landing site as well as the associated fishing 
enterprises and infrastructure (Alleyne-Greene, 2015, pp. 2). Indeed, the people of 
Barbados refer to Six Men’s as a true fishing community precisely because it embodies 
the rich traditions and heritage of artisanal fishing. To recall, Barbados’ fish landing sites 
are categorised as primary (markets), secondary (sheds) and tertiary (beaches) (Ministry 
of Agriculture Barbados, 2012). Retail and landing data are only collected from Barbados 
primary and secondary landing sites. Landings and prices at tertiary sites, like, Six Men’s 
are not counted in official statistics (FAO, 2017a). 
 
Figure 2. Map of The Six Men’s study site and other landing sites around 
Barbados 
 
Source: (Alleyne-Greene, 2015, pp. 3) 
 
As a tertiary landing site, the Six Men’s fishing community has been a significant part of 
the socio-cultural traditions and heritage of the island’s north-west. Therein, the 
surrounding settlement is highly dependent on fisheries and most of the fisherfolk reside 
                                                          
140 Note that characterising Six Men’s as a ‘true’ fishing community is not an objective claim. It is a historical construct and label that 
others have used to describe the community. 
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in the community or in neighbouring communities. The actual fish landing site which 
lacks critical physical infrastructure, such as, a jetty, ice storage and diesel supply is located 
on a narrow beach adjacent to two watercourses (see Figure 3). Fish vendors operate 
mostly on this narrow strip along the highway (see Figure 4). Flyingfish historically 
contributes between half to all of the landed fish in the Six Men’s fishery (Alleyne-Greene, 
2015).   
 
Figure 3. Picture of Six Men’s Bay Landing Site  
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken by author on site) 
 
Figure 4. Picture of Six Men’s and a cutting slab for fish and Male Fisher/Vendor 
o 
Source: (Soares, 2016, taken by author on site) 
167 
 
As it is today, the Six Men’s fishing community was built by Caribbean nationals from 
neighbouring islands St. Lucia and St. Vincent in the 1950-1970s. It is worth noting that 
there exists no academic research or technical surveys which can account for the 
migration patterns of Barbadian fisherfolk and moreover other Caribbean nationals that 
have a stake in the Eastern Caribbean fisheries, thereby highlighting another area for 
further research. It is arguable that largely because of the geographical proximity of the 
islands of the Eastern Caribbean, there has always been an interspersing of nationals.  The 
retired fisherfolk from Six Men’s that were interviewed shared that even though they were 
originally from neighbouring islands, they have been integrated in Barbadian society and 
assumed Barbadian identity where other ‘locals’ also see them as Barbadian (cf. SXMM8, 
SXMM9, SXMM6, interviews, 2016). This brings into scope that there are different layers 
of identity and belonging in Anglo-Caribbean society not the least because of the shared 
colonial legacies of slavery, but also the embedded stratifications of race/colour and class 
borne of the colonial era that have been reproduced141.  Essentially, this could be 
interpreted to mean that these retired fisherfolk from St. Lucia and St. Vincent who built 
the Six Men’s community have assimilated into the general social contract of being a black 
Barbadian, and more broadly, as descendants of enslaved Africans borne of British 
plantation society.  
 
Notwithstanding, there have been disputes plaguing the Six Men’s fishing community 
regarding who owns the legal rights to Six Men’s land, including the beachfront. The 
tensions date back to the 1980s, when a local preacher/entrepreneur, Reverend Broomes, 
is reported to have acquired Six Men’s under the registered name of Mount Six Men’s 
Limited. It is claimed that Reverend Broomes, a local black Barbadian, put forward the 
original development proposal for the area to the Barbadian government through the 
Town Planning Department, calling for, among other things, the development of a 
marina and boatyard (The Nation, 1995, 1996; SXMF6 interview, 2016).  However, news 
reports and personal reports from KIs in Six Men’s indicate that, since 1985, Mount Six 
Men’s Limited has been in a legal battle with the Crown over the rights of ownership to 
Six Men’s land and beachfront. Moreover, this legal battle has been exacerbated by an 
influx of local Barbadian informal settlers to the area (The Nation, 1996; Barbados Today, 
2015; SXMM4 interview, 2016). In fact, according to the Managing Director of Mount 
                                                          
141 Jill Sheppard’s “The Redlegs of Barbados” offers a fascinating read on the race/colour and class constructs of the Barbadian 
colonial era (cf. Sheppard, 1977). 
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Six Men’s Limited, “squatters now number upwards of 300 people, most of which are 
located on the Six Men’s main-road facing the beachfront” (SXMF6 interview, 2016). 
This legal dispute has caused confusion about the status of the Six Men’s fishing 
community, described in newspapers, for instance, as Six Men’s is “no man’s land” (The 
Nation, 1996).  
 
1.3. The Developments of Port St. Charles and Port Ferdinand 
By the 1990s, Six Men’s started to experience significant changes to its coastal landscape.  
Located just south of Six Men’s Bay, Port St. Charles officially opened in 1996. The 
award-winning facility dubbed the “showpiece of the North”, offers town-house luxury 
villas with private yacht berths ranging from $350,000 (USD) - $1.5 million (USD) (see 
Figure 5) (cf. Lewis, 1997; Action, 1998).  
 
Figure 5. Port St. Charles Marina 
 
Source: (Port St. Charles, 2017) 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the developers of Port St. Charles are local white 
Barbadians recognised as leaders in corporate Barbados (Alleyne, 1998). The project was 
pursued as a joint venture between the Williams brothers, Sir Charles and Ralph ‘Bizzy’, 
operating under the name of C.O. Williams Construction Group and Williams Industries, 
respectively, and, Bjerkhamn Associates operating under the name of JADA Construction 
Group (Sunday Advocate, 1996; Daily Nation, 1997). According to a KI representing 
Port St. Charles, apart from Port Ferdinand, “JADA Construction, owned by Bjorn 
Bjerkhamn, has built several of the other high-end properties on Barbados’ west coast” 
(SXMM2 interview, 2016). These three Barbadian companies behind the Port St. Charles 
development were working closely with the Barbadian government to expand the island’s 
169 
 
luxury tourism brand and image (Alleyne, 1998, pp. 80). In fact, a representative of Port 
St. Charles relayed that: 
  
even though whites may be in the minority, they control 
the economic power in Barbados. So, this was a pipe 
dream of the three developers who always wanted 
somewhere to park their boats right outside their homes 
(SXMM2 interview, 2016). 
 
Intriguingly, the representative of Port St. Charles also shared that: 
 
Port St. Charles and Port Ferdinand were presented as a 
joint project of sister luxury marinas to the government. 
When the development of Port Ferdinand was proving 
challenging due to ‘politics’, Sir Charles and Bizzy 
Williams got out of that side of the project. Bjerkhamn 
then found new foreign investors so the development of 
Port Ferdinand could continue (SXMM2 interview, 
2016). 
 
Port Ferdinand officially opened in 2014. It is also an award-winning facility located on a 
15-acre site across the street from Port St. Charles and adjacent to the Six Men’s fishing 
community. Port Ferdinand was conceptualised with the same high-end design of Port. 
St Charles—and price points ranging up to $6.5 million (USD) (see Figure 6) (Carter, 
2014).  
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Figure 6. Port Ferdinand 
 
Source: (Ojomu, 2015) 
 
The representative from Port St. Charles reported that the significant difference in the 
facilities is that “apart from the price points of Port Ferdinand being much higher, they 
have a fantastic layout, but a very small beach. On the other hand, Port St. Charles has 
an entire beachfront” (SXMM2 interview, 2016). The Six Men’s coastal landscape 
therefore supports not only a fishing community, but also two luxury marinas—one to 
the south and the other adjacent to the fishing community (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Aerial view showing Six Men’s in relation to Port St. Charles and Port 
Ferdinand 
 
Source: (Barbados Property List, 2017) 
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The development of the first marina, Port St. Charles, initially brought about conflict due 
to claims that its construction “wrecked the reef” and damaged inshore fish habitat 
(Morris, 1997; Alleyne-Greene, 2015). However, this study’s empirical findings suggest 
that, in recent years, local tensions have been particularly high because of Port 
Ferdinand’s construction. According to several members of the Six Men’s fishing 
community and an academic, it is widely believed that “the developers of Port Ferdinand 
are interested in acquiring the Six Men’s land and beachfront that has been held up in 
court claims” (SXMM5 cf. SXMF7, SXMM1, ACDM4 interviews, 2016). These 
seemingly competing constructions of development, and of sustainable development, 
affecting Six Men’s prompted a letter to the editor of one of Barbados prominent 
newspapers from a retired fisherman and former executive of BARNUFO, titled, “The 
Tale of Two Islands” (Cummins, 2011). The letter essentially spoke to a notion of two 
Barbados’  being built on embedded stratifications of race/colour and class and vacillating 
between maintaining cultural traditions and advancing economic interests. Essentially 
then, how the norm of sustainable development has been constituted and understood 
from the top down compared to the bottom-up has significant consequences for the 
future of Six Men’s. This is particularly with regards to the rights afforded to the Six Men’s 
fishing community to own and physically access prime beachfront and coastal space 
alongside luxury tourism interests. 
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2. Constructing Development from the Top-Down  
 
2.1. The Principled Governance of the Sustainable Development of Fisheries and 
Luxury Tourism (Type 1 Norms) 
In struggles over rights to coastal space in Barbados the discourse of sustainable 
development has been central. This is an important point to highlight because in 
interpreting the meaning of achieving sustainable development around the sectors of 
luxury tourism and fisheries in Barbados, both directly influence the attainment of the 
island’s economic and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, there is an oft-
unaddressed element of achieving sustainable development to explore regarding how the 
sectors have contributed to the island’s socio-cultural sustainability.  
 
For Barbados, the international norm of sustainable development has indeed held 
institutional significance and found traction amongst the island’s political actors as a 
widely accepted concept. As host to the 1994 Global Conference on the Sustainable 
Development for Small-Island-Developing-States (SIDS), the island was at the centre of 
the adoption of  “the Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) for the Sustainable 
Development of SIDS” (UNDESA, 1994). This was a significant institutional episode 
because the BPOA influenced Barbadian political authorities to define what the norm of 
sustainable development meant within the context of the island’s own national 
development. This was:  
 
Development which optimises the quality of life of 
every person without over-exploiting natural and 
environmental assets and services, or jeopardizing 
social and economic development (Ministry of 
Housing, Lands, and the Environment,  2004, pp. 8). 
 
According to Barbados’ Ministry of Housing, Lands, and the Environment that 
published the island’s only standing national sustainable development policy: 
  
The lynch-pin of this interpretation of Sustainable 
Development is that the pursuit of economic growth 
(economic capital) and social development (social capital) 
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in Barbados, ought to be balanced and in harmony with 
the inherent limits of our ecological capital (Ministry of 
Housing, Lands, and the Environment,  2004, pp. 8). 
 
Despite this, this study’s empirical evidence clearly suggests that there is contestation 
around the meaning of the norm when constructing governance of the island’s national 
development priorities from the top-down vs. bottom-up in its north-west. While not 
discounting that economic and environmental sustainability are important facets of 
achieving sustainable development, this study’s empirical evidence demonstrates, as 
Barbados’ national sustainable development policy alludes to, that attention should be 
paid to the principle of social sustainability as a significant pillar of achieving sustainable 
development in Barbados.  
 
It is necessary to explain how the sustainable development discourse has shaped the 
governance of tourism and fisheries in Barbados. First, the concept of sustainable tourism 
was formally introduced to the international community at the 1994 Global Conference 
on the Sustainable Development for SIDS, which, as mentioned before, was hosted in 
Barbados. The concept was adopted and reaffirmed through several subsequent 
conferences hosted by the United Nations World Tourism Organization142 (UNWTO, 
2017). In 2005, sustainable tourism was officially defined by the World Tourism 
Organization as “tourism that takes full account of its current and future economic, social 
and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the 
environment and host communities” (UNEP and UNWTO, 2005, pp. 12). It could be 
argued here that exploring the effects of tourism through an environmental or economical 
sustainability lens has been the status-quo. This is because the sector is the main 
contributor to the economies of particularly SIDS, like Barbados. Notwithstanding, the 
international community has also been urged to apply a human-centred approach to 
achieving sustainable tourism as validated with declarations made within the 2015 
SGDs143 (Kariithi, 2016). Therein, Member states were advised, among other things, to 
“improve the welfare and livelihoods of local communities”144 (United Nations, no date). 
This social sustainability emphasis in the SDGs would also be accompanied by 
                                                          
142 For more information on the evolution of the concept of sustainable tourism and its application to Small Island Developing States 
(cf. UNEP and UNWTO, 2005; UNWTO, 2017a). 
143 Tourism is expected to contribute to all the 2015 SDG goals. The parameters for achieving sustainable tourism are particularly 
reflected in Goals 8, 12 and 14 on inclusive and sustainable economic growth, sustainable consumption and production (SCP) and 
the sustainable use of oceans and marine resources, respectively (Kariithi, 2016). 
144 See Paragraph 130 of A Future We Want (cf. United Nations, no date). 
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declarations made about the principles of sustainable tourism by the World Tourism 
Organisation. These declarations called the international community to, inter-alia, “respect 
the socio-cultural authenticity of host communities, conserve their built and living cultural 
heritage and traditional values, and contribute to inter-cultural understanding and 
tolerance” (UNWTO, 2017). This chapter thus aims to account for this shift in 
development rhetoric, whereby, sustainable tourism is seen as a driver for the promotion 
and protection of socio-cultural heritage (cf. Kariithi, 2016). Here, cultural heritage as a 
concept has significant bearing on the construction of social identities, in that, “the 
definition of cultural heritage....relates not only to material expressions such as sites and 
objects, but also intangible expressions such as language and oral tradition, social 
practices, rituals….” (Robinson and Picard, 2006, pp. 11).  
  
It is important to note that this study’s empirical evidence has revealed that the concept 
of sustainable tourism has only recently been integrated as a part of Barbados’ national 
development agenda. As stated prior in this and previous chapters, by the mid-1970s, 
Barbados prioritised tourism to advance its development goals and earn foreign exchange 
(cf. Fitzpatrick, 2000). Despite this, criticisms have been lodged against Barbados’s 
tourism industry, and there are heightened concerns about the social impact of tourism. 
These social impacts have been largely attributed to the annual influx of tourists 
historically outnumbering the local population, which, the statistics presented in 2017, 
report to be approximately 3:1 (Greenidge and Greenidge, 2007; WTTC, 2017). Locals 
have complained about loss of beach access, dislocation from areas of traditional 
economic activity, as well as being pushed out from their traditional Barbadian lodgings 
by the white Barbadian elite and foreign oligarchs with large monetary interests in 
Barbadian tourism (cf. Greenidge and Greenidge, 2007; Bootle, 2018).  
 
These concerns are particularly pertinent throughout the west coast of Barbados, known 
both by locals and tourists, as the “platinum coast”. This is because, according to the 
representative from Port. St Charles, “Barbados’ luxury tourism brand has historically 
been restricted to the west and north-west coast and this has continued as a trend” 
(SXMM2 interview, 2016). It is perhaps unsurprising then, that fishing communities, 
particularly in Barbados’ north-west, like Six Men’s, have had to compete with high-end 
tourism developments for rights to own and physically access prime beachfront and 
coastal space. Essentially then, achieving socio-cultural sustainability in Six Men’s as a 
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luxury tourism host community can only be understood in tandem with that of achieving 
the socio-cultural sustainability of Six Men’s as a fishing community.  
 
The concept of sustainable fisheries was formally introduced to the international 
community at the 1991 Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO’s) Committee on 
Fisheries (FAO, 1995). Notwithstanding, chapter 2 mentioned that throughout the 20th 
and 21st centuries, the concept has been directed to its biological/ecological dimensions 
“in the effort to bring stocks back to sustainable levels and to protect the marine 
environment” (Urquhart et al., 2014, pp. 1). Thus, while the sustainable fisheries concept 
is not new, conservation and rationalisation paradigms have largely “omitted 
consideration of social and cultural dimensions that are integral to understanding the idea 
of sustainable development” (Urquhart et al., 2014, pp. 2).  
 
The first formal global declaration of achieving the socio-cultural sustainability of 
fisheries was in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. Therein, it was stipulated that the international 
community ought to “take into account the traditional knowledge and interests of local 
communities, small-scale artisanal fisheries and indigenous people in development and 
management programmes” (Urquhart et al., 2014, pp. 3). Agenda 21 led to the 
formalisation of the 1995 Global Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which, in 
Article 6.9, calls for states to ensure that their fisheries are integrated into coastal area 
management, development and planning145 ( FAO, 1995 pp. 6).  Although no specific 
mention is made about sustaining the socio-cultural heritage of fishing communities, the 
FAO Committee on Fisheries has also validated this human-centered approach to 
sustainable fisheries by way of the 2015 SDGs146 (COFI, 2016). Integrating the social and 
cultural concerns of achieving sustainable fisheries in the global sustainable development 
agenda has been shored up in recent years by several FAO instruments— specifically the 
2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure and the 2015 Voluntary 
Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries, which call for the secure tenure,147 
meaning, access rights, either formal or customary of fisherfolk to coastal space (FAO, 
2012, 2015). This normative ideal of securing the tenure rights of small-scale fisheries and 
                                                          
145 The Global Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is a non-binding voluntary instrument. For more information on the Code 
and its principles (cf. FAO, 1995). 
146 Fisheries are related to several SDGs. However, the sector is particularly relevant to the achievement of SDG 1 (end poverty in all 
forms); SDG 2 (end hunger); and SDG 14 (conserve and sustainably use oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable 
development). For more information (cf. COFI, 2016). 
147 How people, communities and others gain access to land, fisheries and forests is defined and regulated through systems of tenure. 
These tenure systems determine who can use which resources, for how long, and under what conditions. For more information on 
understanding secure tenure (cf. FAO, 2013, 2017b). 
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fisherfolk is very relevant for small-scale artisanal fishing communities, like Six Men’s. 
This is because in fisheries policy development “the idea of community has not been 
given a high priority” (Jentoft, 2000; Urquhart and Acott, 2014, pp. 258). Moreover, there 
are studies which argue that the contributions of fisheries to the social and cultural fabric 
of rural coastal communities is often-overlooked in the sustainable development 
discourse (cf. Urquhart and Acott, 2014; Khazad and Griffith, 2016). This is significant 
when one considers that “coastal communities exist on the littoral boundary between land 
and sea” and that fishing activity bounds up relational processes and encounters that lead 
to the “creation of particular individual and community identities linked to a fishing way 
of life” (Urquhart and Acott, 2014, pp. 257).  
 
Like the concept of sustainable tourism, the concept of sustainable fisheries has not been 
overtly articulated in Barbados’ national development plans. Despite this, Barbados’ 
flyingfish fishery, its fisherfolk, and the communities which fisherfolk inhabit have 
undoubtedly played a significant role in the island’s national development, and, are 
certainly a feature of the island’s socio-cultural heritage. To recall, flyingfish was the main 
source of protein for the enslaved black Barbadian population, whose descendants 
comprise the majority of Barbados’ present-day population. In fishing communities like 
Six Men’s then, wherein fisherfolk have been characterized as the black peasantry, the 
traditions and cultural values attached to flyingfish were cemented as part of Barbados’ 
social structure as a “poor man’s food”148 or “slave fish” (McConney, 1995; Welch, 2005; 
ACDM1 interview, 2016). Indeed, the dominant view amongst this study’s KIs was that 
Barbados’ flyingfish fishery has sustained the life and diet of the “ordinary” Barbadian, 
because the resource was caught easily close to shore and bought cheaply (GOVMM2, 
GOVMM10, FPM2, BGTM2 interviews, 2016).  
 
Highlighting these socio-cultural dynamics of the fishery is important. In fact, case studies 
and personal reports from local community members recall that, during the 1960s, Six 
Men’s benefitted from a small-fish processing plant owned by a white Barbadian in the 
area that is now occupied by Port Ferdinand (cf. Alleyne-Greene, 2015; SXMM7 and 
SXMF1 interviews, 2016). As a rural fishery with limited infrastructure— the fishery has 
                                                          
148 The gendering of this term is not intentional. It is reported as relayed by the KI: ACDM1. 
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thrived off the inputs of the erstwhile near-shore fishing of day-boats149 (Alleyne-Greene, 
2015). This is significant because historical records and personal reports from KIs in Six 
Men’s observe the local Barbadian preference for purchasing fish directly from the beach, 
and, specifically, un-iced flyingfish directly from day-boats150 (cf. Crown Agents, 1990; 
Cecil, 1999; ACDF1, GOVMM6, SXMM7, interviews, 2016). Several Six Men’s fish 
vendors also reported that their fish is sold either to locals, returning customers or general 
passers-by, and because of the association of Six Men’s with “fresh fish”, the fish is mostly 
sold at marked-up prices151 (SXMF1, SXMF2, SXMF3 interviews, 2016). These traditions 
of openly accessing fresh fish on the beach of the Six Men’s fishing community have 
become a recognised part of the socio-cultural traditions and heritage of locals in the 
island’s north-west. Despite this, given the luxury tourism developments of two port 
marinas encroaching upon the community, as well as the legal dispute over who owns the 
rights to the Six Men’s land and beachfront, the dominant perspective shared by this 
study’s KIs was that the future of the Six Men’s fishing community is uncertain. It is the 
case then that in exploring how Barbadian national development priorities have come to 
be constructed via top-down governance in Six Men’s, it is important to acknowledge 
that the locale is both a fishing community and luxury tourism host community with 
significant socio-cultural sustainability concerns. Namely, whether luxury tourism 
interests in Six Men’s are promoting and protecting the socio-cultural traditions and 
heritage of Six Men’s as fishing community with secure tenure rights. 
 
2.2. Negotiating National Development Priorities in the Policy Making Process 
(Type 2 Norms) 
It can be argued at this point in the chapter that to achieve socio-cultural sustainability 
around luxury tourism and fisheries in Six Men’s, both sectors ought to have reciprocal 
rights to own and physically access the Six Men’s land and beachfront. This means that 
how the sectors have been positioned as national development priorities in the policy-
making process carries a significant amount of weight. In the case of fisheries, there is 
academic literature which claims that the sector has received minimal policy attention in 
                                                          
149 To recall, the traditional practices of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery evolved from a fleet of sail-boats to an inshore day-boat fishery 
and an off-shore long-range ice-boat commercial fishery (see Chapters 5 and 6). Near-shore within this context is meant as fishing in 
Barbadian territorial waters up to 30 miles offshore. For more on the fishing practices of the Barbadian fleet (cf. Willoughby, 2007; 
Mohammed et al., 2015 and Chapter 6). 
150 Fish landed from day-boats have had to contend with phytosanitary and HAACP concerns to validate the health of un-iced fish.  
Most of the larger processors in the industry thus are of the idea that iced-fish are of a better quality, but this does not align with local 
Barbadian traditions (GOVMM6, FPM2, FPM3, interviews 2016). 
151 These marked up prices that the Six Men’s fish vendors speak of are correlated with the going prices at the Bridgetown fisheries 
complex. Bridgetown, located in the south of the island, is the major primary market for Barbadian fisheries. 
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Barbados’ national development plans. Indeed, the space allotted to fisheries 
development has been remarkably short, about a-half to one-page out of fifty to one-
hundred pages on average, and detail is often centred on infrastructural and technical 
developments, as well as increased production and fleet expansion. There have been 
minimal specifics articulated about the social and cultural state of the island’s fisheries or 
fisherfolk (cf. Cecil, 1999, pp. 138-139; ACDM3 interview, 2016).  
 
As documented in chapter 5, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Water 
Resource Management of Barbados has primary responsibility for oversight of the 
island’s fisheries. Fisheries are governed by the Fisheries Act (1993, amended 2000); 
Fisheries Management Regulations (1998); and, the 2004-2006 Barbados Fisheries 
Management Plan (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; FAO, 2017a). Within these national 
governance instruments for Barbadian fisheries no specific reference is made about 
securing the tenure rights of Barbadian fishing communities, and, for over ten years, there 
have been no viable updates to these governance instruments. Nevertheless, academics 
expressed that the “idea is that fisheries are self-governing, particularly the tertiary sites, 
like Six Men’s, so they are left alone” (ACDF1; cf. ACDM4 interviews, 2016). This notion 
of tertiary sites like Six Men’s being self-governing is intriguing because chapter 5 
mentioned that when the Fisheries Division was established in 1944, part of their stated 
mandate was to secure the rights of Barbadian fisherfolk to own and physically access 
beach areas for fisheries development; an intention that has been encumbered by how 
much attention the fisheries sector has received as a vehicle for national development.   
 
In contrast to the fisheries sector, tourism has arguably received a significant amount of 
policy attention from the Barbadian authorities. The governing authority for coordinating 
the sector’s various stakeholders is the Ministry of Tourism along with several other 
public and private sector interests152. The regulatory environment for tourism is guided 
by two primary pieces of legislation: the Tourism Development Act (2002)153 and the 
Special Development Areas Act (1996, 2001). Of particular interest to this thesis is the 
Special Development Areas Act which declares “defined geographical areas within 
                                                          
152 There are several public and private sector agencies which have been established to work in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Tourism to promote the Barbados tourism product and investments globally. For example, the Barbados Tourism Authority which 
was established in 1985, Barbados Tourism Marketing Inc. and the Barbados Tourism Investment Inc. (BTA, 2015; BTI, 2017; BTMI, 
2017). 
153 The 2002 Tourism Development replaced the 1956 Hotel Aids Act. 
 
179 
 
Barbados” for tourism development (Government of Barbados, 2001; PCSI, 2009, pp. 
46). These designated areas include Speightstown and its environs in St. Peter154 (BTI, 
2017). The Barbadian government has also commissioned both a White Paper on the 
Development of Tourism in Barbados155 and the Barbados Tourism Master Plan (2014-
2023). In both policy instruments, provisions are made about the necessity to respect the 
status of host communities (Strategic Solutions, 2012; HLA Consultants, 2014). It is thus 
relevant to unpack how Barbadian coastal space has been appropriated for tourism 
development in the policy-making process.  
 
Potter (1983) explains that the spatial distribution of hotels has coincided with the 
principal beaches on the sheltered south and west coast of the island (see Figure 8). Note 
that these areas later became “Special Development Areas” under the 2001 Special 
Development Areas Act. Potter (1983) goes on to observe that the 1979-1983 Barbados 
Development Plan156 states the physical development strategy for tourism is “concerned 
essentially with matching social and economic market strata with particular zones”. 
Meaning the spatial distribution of land has been based on class constructs. Arguably, it 
is because of this policy that the west, particularly the north-west, has been designated for 
luxury tourism (Potter, 1983, pp. 47). Interestingly, prefiguring the discourse on 
sustainable development, the 1979-1983 Barbados Development Plan also states that 
“ultimately, the survival of tourism in Barbados depends on the continued positive and 
healthy attitude of Barbadians to visitors…” (pp. 76 in Potter, 1983, pp. 49). This can be 
read as concern about a second-class Barbadian citizenry being socially constructed as 
subservient to luxury tourism on the west coast. This brings into focus how top-down 
governance has reconciled whether the sectors ought to have reciprocal rights to own and 
physically access prime coastal land and beachfront. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154The other defined areas under the Special Development Areas Act are the Carlisle Bay Redevelopment area in St. Michael; St. 
Lawrence Gap in Christ Church; The Scotland District Conservation Area (BTI, 2017). 
155 The 2012 “White Paper on the Development of Tourism in Barbados” was preceded by the 2001 “Green Paper on the Sustainable 
Development of Tourism in Barbados – A Policy Document”. For more information (cf. Strategic Solutions, 2012). 
156 The 1979-1983 Barbados Development Plan positions on tourism development were based off recommendations from the 
Organization of American States (OAS) produced 1977 Barbados Tourism Development Plan (cf. Potter, 1983). 
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Figure 8.  Tourism Development Zones in Barbados, circa 1980. 
 
Source: (Potter, 1983, pp. 48) 
 
The declaration of Speightstown, St. Peter, as a Special Development Area was 
particularly significant because that area would extend from Speightstown to Six Men’s 
(The Barbados Advocate, 1996). It is worth noting that before luxury tourism, fisheries 
was the national development priority for the area. There is academic literature which 
indicates that as far back as 1953, there were plans for the development of a fishing facility 
in the north of the island to be situated somewhere between Speightstown and Six Men’s, 
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and that, political considerations were paramount in deciding the location (Cecil, 1999, 
pp. 112). Here, it is important to highlight that St. Peter was the parliamentary 
constituency of Prime Minister Owen Arthur (1994-2008) and was his constituency until 
he announced his retirement from electoral politics in early 2018. Notwithstanding, it was 
also documented that 1997 brought renewed government interest in establishing primary 
fish markets in St. Peter. Cited in Cecil (1999, pp. 78) is an October 10, 1997, Nation News 
report which relays that Prime Minister Arthur announced an ultra-modern fisherfolk and 
boat building facility for Six Men’s. In 1998, the government then commissioned a study 
for a “Northern Fisheries Development Plan”. This Plan called for the revitalisation of 
fishing infrastructure in both Speightstown and Six Men’s, St. Peter.  Within the Plan, Six 
Men’s was noted as the preferred location for a northern fisheries complex, largely 
because of its representation as a “true fishing community” (Mahon and Jones, 1998, pp. 
18).  
 
Arthur’s Barbados Labour Party (BLP) 1999 political manifesto also made declarations  
about the government’s intentions to construct a northern fisheries complex (BLP, 1999). 
Interestingly, in the final report of the 1999 “Barbados Tourism Development 
Programme”, illustrations were included about where the northern fisheries facility 
should be located in Six Men’s as there also “would be some tourism development 
opportunities” (Design Collaborative, 1999, pp. 51). Indeed, in Figure 9 below, clearly 
marked is the development space that was to be allotted for both sectors to operate in 
tandem. This illustration is therefore quite significant because it provides hard evidence 
that there was acceptance, via national development policy, of reciprocal rights being 
granted to both sectors to own and physically access the Six Men’s land and beachfront.  
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Figure 9. Illustration showing where the proposed northern fisheries facility would 
be in conjunction with tourism developments in Six Men’s. 
 
Source: (Design Collaborative, 1999) 
 
Subsequent declarations were also made in the 2003 Amended Physical Development 
Plan for Barbados, as well as the BLP’s 2003-2008 “Agenda” and 2008 political manifesto 
about the intentions of the government to construct a new fishing facility in Six Men’s 
(Government of Barbados, 2003, pp. 7-7; BLP, 2003, pp. 39; BLP, 2008 pp. 41). BLP’s 
2003-2008 Agenda even went as far to state that efforts should be made to integrate “into 
the planning process those communities which live on or make a living from the sea”, 
and, where applicable, that “the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO)-Six Men’s 
model will be utilized for developing projects with coastal communities” (BLP, 2003, pp. 
183 
 
51). Apart from this declaration in the 2003-2008 BLP Agenda, I was unable to locate any 
additional references that could explain what exactly the PAHO – Six Men’s model would 
entail. Despite this, it could be argued that as a high-ranking black political figure who 
was both the Prime Minister and Member of Parliament for the area, Arthur’s 
involvement in setting the Six Men’s national development agenda seemed to validate the 
vision of holistically integrating luxury tourism and fisheries in the island’s north-west. 
Nevertheless, the dominant perspective expressed by KI’s in Six Men’s was that luxury 
tourism interests have upended the development plans for northern fisheries.   
 
Regarding this, when the BLP rose to power in 1994, its manifesto depicted tourism “as 
the principal engine for economic development” and that numerous measures were to be 
introduced to assist it (BLP, 1994, pp. 13). Specific mention was made about the 
development of marinas in Bridgetown and Speightstown (Alleyne, 1998, pp. 80). 
Similarly, in the BLP’s 2003 and 2008 political manifestos, tourism was also depicted as 
the prime catalyst energising other sectors of the economy (BLP, 2003a, 2008). These 
political declarations are important because despite the northern fisheries proposal being 
on the table, in 1996, Port St. Charles was officially opened. This was not without 
technical opposition. The site was of significant archaeological importance and due to the 
altering of the coastal landscape rigorous environmental impact assessments were 
required (cf. Alleyne, 1998; Fitzpatrick, 2000). In fact, Alleyne’s (1998, pp. 85) case study 
observed that the Chief Town Planner relayed that the project could not be sustainable 
from an environmental perspective. However, recognising the liability of an unfulfilled 
manifesto promise, the project was authorised to proceed. On this account, several KIs 
in Six Men’s as well as the representative of Port. St. Charles shared that the Six Men’s 
community was largely in accord with Port St. Charles because the development legally 
sits on property of the Crown. Moreover, in 2005, the Six Men’s fishing community 
benefitted from the introduction of seven stalls for fish processing and vending provided 
by the government (cf. SXMF1, SXMM4, SXMM6, SXMM7 interviews, 2016). Despite 
this, the sentiment shared by the leader of BARNUFO and supported by a long-time Six 
Men’s resident and fisherman, was that “this was the government’s attempt to quiet the 
confusion about the northern fisheries project and appease the fisherfolk with improved 
facilities. The stalls from Six Men’s were transferred from the Oistins fish market in the 
south of the island”—the latter which was being transformed into a tourist attraction and 
fish fry (BNFF1 interview, 2016; cf. SXMM6, interview, 2016). The donations of the 
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fishing stalls could indeed be viewed as political concessions, particularly given that the 
designated stall owners also benefit from free water and temporary electrical supply (see 
Figure 10) (Alleyne-Greene 2015; SXMF1 interview, 2016).  
 
Figure 10.  A Six Men’s Vendor’s Fish Stall while vendor is filleting and selling 
flying-fish 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016 taken on-site by author) 
 
By 2008, the development vision for Six Men’s began to shift. Arthur and the BLP lost 
the 2008 election. While Prime Minister Arthur remained the parliamentary representative 
for St. Peter, power over the state was transferred to Prime Minister David Thompson 
(2008-2010) and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP)157.  Chapter 5 noted that since 
Barbadian independence in 1966, control over the state has vacillated between the islands 
two main political parties, the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) and the Democratic Labour 
Party (DLP), with the former’s ideology right of centre and the latter left of centre. 
Moreover, it has also been noted that the Barbadian populace has been largely critical of 
the efforts of both political parties to regulate the white elite’s control over the economy 
(Beckles, 2004a). This is an intriguing point because esteemed Barbadian historian, 
Beckles, argues that part of Arthur’s mandate was to exorcise white racial domination of 
the Barbadian economy and to uplift the oppressed spirits of the black political majority 
                                                          
157 Prime Minister David Thompson died from pancreatic cancer in 2010.  The Democratic Labour Party (DLP) remains in power 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Freundel Stuart (2010 – 2018). Political power over the state has once again transferred to the 
BLP under the leadership of Prime Minister Mia Mottley with the May 2018 elections. 
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in post-colonial Barbados (Beckles, 2004a, pp. 161-162). Understanding the effects of 
these identity dynamics of Barbadian race/colour and class underpinning the port 
developments is pertinent to this study. This is because, as previously mentioned, Port St. 
Charles and Port Ferdinand were conceived as sister projects, but when “politics” started 
to challenge the Port Ferdinand development, the projects were separated. Intriguingly, 
the local community seemed to be more accepting of the Port St. Charles development 
on the premise of being familiar with the white Barbadian nationals and their ostensibly 
known interests in constructing development in Six Men’s. However, when the Williams 
brothers pulled out of Port Ferdinand’s development, and Bjerkhamn partnered with 
foreign investors, this same project was viewed quite differently. This is certainly an 
important finding of identity politics around the development plan and the people 
involved in constructing development priorities in Six Men’s. Namely, because this can 
be interpreted as local white capital and control over the Barbadian economy is perceived 
as legitimate, or at least, inevitable. However, foreign capital and infrastructural 
investments are viewed with skepticism.  
 
It should be stated that my efforts to contact representatives from Bjerkhamn’s JADA 
company were unsuccessful.  Nonetheless, in seeking some background on the “politics” 
surrounding Port Ferdinand’s construction, two long-time Six Men’s community 
members who are also retired fisherfolk shared conflicting accounts. On the one hand, 
there was the view that “Owen Arthur wanted to sell out and completely eradicate Six 
Men’s” (SXMM7 interview, 2016).  This contrasted with the view that: 
 
Owen Arthur said that St. Peter didn’t need another 
marina, so they [the white corporate elite] decided to 
canvas against him and the BLP. They refused to sell 
Mr. Arthur [by way of the Crown/state] the land to 
build the Six Men’s fish market. The current 
government [led by the DLP] however gave Bjerkhamn 
and Port Ferdinand the approval to build where the old 
fish market we had in the 1960s used to sit (SXMM6 
interview, 2016). 
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Of course, the question remains if ‘socio-cultural sustainability’ would have been 
advanced and whether reciprocal rights would have been granted to the sectors if Arthur 
and the BLP had remained in political power. This will never be known. What is known 
is that PM Thompson and his DLP government certainly had a different development 
vision for Six Men’s. In the DLP political manifestos I reviewed, no mention is made of 
there being any plans for a northern fisheries facility (cf. DLP, 2008, 2013). Taking this 
into account, there is indeed a lot of confusion surrounding the legality of the Port 
Ferdinand development and their rights to own and physically access Six Men’s land and 
beachfront. A Nation News article titled “Squatters Forever”  articulated that squatting was 
not just for “the preserve of the poor and underprivileged….the brazen rich do too” (cf. 
Brandford, 2014). In fact, it was documented that, in 2013, the Barbados Auditor General 
issued a damning report about the “illegal occupation of Crown lands” since 2009 by a 
private developer. Not explicitly referring to Port Ferdinand, it was stated that, “the 
occupation and utilisation of land at Six Men’s, St. Peter, for a marina by the private 
developer is not keeping with the public purpose for which it was acquired” (Brandford, 
2014). Yet, nothing much seems to have come from the Auditor General’s report 
particularly given that Port Ferdinand is still in operation, and the insecure tenure of the 
Six Men’s fishing community has only increased. Indeed, a long-time resident pointed out 
that the Ministry of Housing has started to paint condemned housing on some of the 
local residences (see Figure 11).  Indeed, Beckles (2004a, pp. 112) charges that up to the 
present-day rural blacks remain “essentially a landless, resourceless [sic], alienated people, 
squatting on lands to which they have an unquestionable moral right to own and use”. 
Present day reports also quite strikingly indicate that blacks who could afford to purchase 
land on the west coast, now also known as the platinum coast, have expressed concerns 
about their rights to prime coastal land being challenged by continued racial divide. 
Particularly, that they are being  “pushed out” because of the local white elite’s interests 
in luxury tourism and the plethora of oligarchs that are not welcoming of “a black man 
on the beach”  (Bootle, 2018).  
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Figure 11. Picture of local house in Six Men’s being condemned by the Ministry 
of Housing 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken on-site by author) 
 
Several of the members of the Six Men’s fishing community expressed that because of 
these labels they feel like they are “second class citizens being pushed out from the Six 
Men’s coast and not welcome around the tourism product” (SXMM7 cf. SXMF1, 
SXMF2, SXMF3 interviews, 2016). By 2016, things proved even more uncertain for the 
Six Men’s fishing community. In the 2016 Supplementary Budget address, it was 
mentioned by the Minister of Finance that plans were in place to re-zone the northern 
corridor, including the Six Men’s area and beyond, to benefit from tourism under the 
Tourism Development Act and the Special Development Areas Act (GOB Ministry of 
Finance, 2016, pp. 34).  
 
Essentially then, despite reference to the fundamental principle of sustainable 
development, the reciprocal rights of access and ownership advanced in 
conceptualisations of sustainable tourism and sustainable fisheries has not been realised 
by top-down governance. This pointed to two overarching ways in which the top-down 
governance of Barbadian national development priorities is being challenged: 1) the 
appropriateness of integrating sustainable fisheries and sustainable tourism as pillars of 
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national development in Six Men’s, and, 2) the inclusivity of ordinary Barbadian interests 
(particularly in the Six Men’s locale) in constructing national development priorities. 
 
This study’s empirical evidence suggests that the idea of integrating luxury tourism and 
fisheries on Barbados’ platinum coast is the major strain in constructing the top-down 
governance of Barbadian national development priorities. This, in turn, has created a 
legitimacy gap. When questioning the top official in the Fisheries Division about what 
did or did not happen with the northern fisheries plan, he replied, “that is politics, so I 
will not get into it” (GOVMM6 interview, 2016). Nonetheless, an academic who has 
championed much of the flyingfish research in Barbados, relayed that “when the northern 
fisheries plan was being reviewed ten years ago, they were not well separated from the 
port developments…placing multi-million-dollar yachts in the same area as a fishing 
community was not a very good idea” (ACDF1 interview, 2016).  
 
Central to this politics has been the way in which local white Barbadian corporate interests 
have been privileged over local black Barbadian interests in national development. It’s 
worth pointing out here, that within the National Strategic Plan of Barbados 2005 – 2025, 
specific declarations are made about the need to achieve social cohesion by reconciling 
the differences of class, race, and generation in Barbadian society. The Plan goes on to 
articulate the need to enfranchise “ordinary Barbadians” and to “break down the old 
paradigm of the black community functioning in the public sector and political life, and 
the white and other minorities in the private sector”  (Research and Planning Unit, 2005, 
pp. 43-44). However, several news reports suggested that the inclusion of the “small 
man”/ “ordinary Barbadian” in development activities slated to improve the local Six 
Men’s community has been virtually non-existent (cf. Scantlebury, 1995; Cummins, 2011). 
Moreover, the Managing Director of Mount Six Men’s boldly stated that because [she] is 
a “black Barbadian” perhaps [she] is “not the right person to speak to about development, 
especially of prime beachfront” (SXMF6 interview, 2016). Indeed, up to the submission 
of this thesis in 2018, the Six Men’s fishing community has not received any formal 
recognition of their secure tenure rights, nor, has there been any further formal indication 
about the future of their status as a respected luxury tourism host community. This now 
leads to the exploration of the local norms underpinning the challenges and alternatives 
to the top-down governance of the sectors of luxury tourism and fisheries in Six Men’s.   
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3. Constructing National Development Priorities from the Bottom-Up (Type 3 
norms) 
 
3.1. Integrating Sustainable Tourism and Sustainable Fisheries from the 
Bottom-Up 
Section 2.2 of this chapter highlighted a legitimacy gap in governance wherein I 
questioned the appropriateness of integrating sustainable fisheries and sustainable 
tourism as pillars of national development in the Six Men’s locale. In answer, the study’s 
empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no question that flyingfish remains a part 
of Barbados’ preserved history, traditions and heritage as a cultural and dietary staple 
(Cumberbatch and Hinds, 2013). However, no longer is the only evidence of fishing 
activities the presence of fishing boats drawn up on the beach or moored a few hundred 
yards off the coast (see Figure 12) (Bair 1962, pp. 45). With the introduction of ice-boats 
in the late 1970s, today, the Barbadian fleet is highly commercialised (see Figure 13)  
(Willoughby, 2007). 
 
Figure 12. Picture illustrating the tradition of Barbadian fishing boats being 
moored on the beach and the community gathering in rural Barbados. 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016 - taken by author at the 2016 Fisherman’s week display at the 
Barbados fisheries division).  
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Figure 13. Picture illustration of the modern commercial Barbadian fleet at the 
Bridgetown Fishing Complex in South-East Barbados 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016 - taken by author on site). Note that this is flyingfish being off-
loaded from ice-boats. 
 
Despite the commercialisation of the modern Barbadian fleet, a significant element of the 
local discourse has been about the challenges associated with sustaining the socio-cultural 
heritage and traditions of northern fisheries alongside luxury tourism. In interpreting how 
Barbadian national development priorities have been constructed from the bottom-up in 
Six Men’s then, this study’s empirical evidence suggests that embedded racialised/colour 
and class dynamics as well as cultural spatialities have shaped actors’ perceptions about 
the appropriateness of integrating the two sectors. The Six Men’s community members, 
including the fisherfolk who are not involved in the political process, intimated that the 
rights of ‘ordinary’ Barbadians to own and physically access prime Barbadian beachfront 
and coastal on the platinum coast had not been legitimated like luxury tourism. A 
prominent Barbadian historian explained, “it is common in Barbados for fishing 
communities to be pushed out from prime beachfront on the platinum coast because of 
the standard conflicts between luxury tourism and fishing communities as social 
stratums” (ACDM1 interview, 2016). This historian’s statement could be interpreted to 
mean that fishing communities on the island’s platinum coast have not been accorded 
equitable social status alongside luxury tourism, particularly for being recognised as a 
significant contributor the Barbadian economy. This however has not been a standard of 
development throughout the island. This historian and fisherfolk from Six Men’s 
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acknowledged Oistins in the south of the island as a prime area where tourism and fishing 
communities are successfully co-existing and supporting each other (ACDM1, SXMM4, 
SXMM7 interviews, 2016). My field observations during 2016 suggest that because the 
south has been designated for middle class tourism and affordable living, fisherfolk have 
not been noticeably forced out of prime beachfront, nor did there exist any sentiments 
from locals about exclusion from property due to price inflation borne from tourism 
developments. What is particularly conflicting about the development vision for the north 
of the island is that the 1998 Northern Fisheries Development Plan observed that 
northern fisheries should be “prepared with reference to lessons learned from the 
operation of Oistins and the Bridgetown Fisheries Complex (BFC)” — both of which 
are located on the south of the island (cf. Mahon and Jones, 1998, pp. 18). One might ask 
then why efforts have been unsuccessful to integrate the sectors in the north. The 
historian continued to explain that: 
  
What has happened in the case of St. Peter is that tourism 
is more ‘up-market’ in the north. Consequently, social life 
which was focused on the locals arguably no longer exists 
in that part of the island. Furthermore, [they] haven’t 
placed the fishing community in the context of 
development on that side of the coast.  No space has 
been created for co-existence to occur (ACDM1 
interview, 2016).  
 
Section 2.2 of this chapter also documented how Barbados’ tourism development 
strategies have explicitly catered to luxury developments on the west and north-west coast 
(Potter, 1983). How, then, did locals contest this trajectory? It is worth mentioning that 
Speightstown, St. Peter benefitted from a new fisheries facility, as per the 1998 northern 
fisheries plan. After improved fishing infrastructure was introduced in Six Men’s in 2005 
via government donated stalls, in 2006, the new Speightstown fish market was opened. 
Its opening was not without local opposition. A long-time St. Peter resident explained 
that “the development of the new fish market was not parallel to structures of local fish 
markets. [It] resembles a fish supermarket, and so, locals tend not to want to buy fish 
from there” (SXMF7 interview, 2016). The leader of BARNUFO thus described the 
tensions: 
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The Speightstown fish market was built for tourists. Because 
of this, the market is largely dead. The politicians were 
interested in making the markets more European while 
throwing away Barbados’ traditional and cultural markets. A 
traditional Barbadian fish market is an open market where you 
can walk up to a vendor and view your fish being cut, while 
observing all the other activities in the market (BNFF1 
interview, 2016).  
 
A government official attached to the Markets Division also lamented that “the 
Speightstown fish market has collapsed because it strayed from its traditional historical 
roots” (GOVMM5 interview, 2016). Two long time St. Peter residents supporting this 
assertion also shared that “we now go to Six Men’s to buy fish because the people 
standing on the road-side and open access to fresh fish is what we prefer as ordinary 
Barbadians” (SPTM1; cf. SXMF7 interviews, 2016).  Clearly this notion of being an 
“ordinary” Barbadian is intimately linked to maintaining the socio-cultural traditions and 
heritage of openly accessing fisheries in St. Peter. This raises the question of whether the 
normative idea of achieving socio-cultural sustainability in Six Men’s as both a fishing 
community and luxury tourism host community has been endorsed in the locale. 
 
As observed in section 2.2 of this chapter, the Six Men’s fishing community are 
seemingly in accord with the Port St. Charles development.  In addition, both the Six 
Men’s fisherfolk and the representative of Port St. Charles documented positive 
interactions between the entities that have been driven by an informal governance 
arrangement demarcating reciprocal rights to access coastal space. According to the 
representative of Port St. Charles: 
  
particularly when there is an approaching hurricane or 
bad weather, Six Men’s fishing boats are allowed to come 
into Port St. Charles. It’s important to share your 
surroundings and support the fisherman’s livelihood. 
These are things which Bajans appreciate (SXMM2 
interview, 2016).  
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Nevertheless, in providing insight to the community politics surrounding the construction 
of the port developments alongside the fishing community, the representative from Port 
St. Charles shared that:  
 
although Bjorn Bjerkhamn and JADA has stakes in both 
ports, Port Ferdinand’s development was very forced and 
unnatural….initially there was to be a fishing village 
connected to Port Ferdinand by a canal which went right 
up to Six Men’s. However, the Six Men’s village is made 
up of squatters. If this was to be done, the squatters would 
have to be relocated and they are refusing to move. It 
became a challenge which was delaying the Port Ferdinand 
project, so Port St. Charles was separated from it (SXMM2 
interview, 2016). 
 
Here, it is worth highlighting perspectives from the locale about the appropriateness of 
Bjerkhamn’s vision of development, especially given that Bjerkhamn’s interests in luxury 
tourism in St. Peter could indeed be deemed as having taken precedence to that of 
northern fisheries. It was documented in a 2010 news report that residents in St. Peter 
would soon see “many of their community’s beachside chattel houses give way to new 
luxury residential developments” (see Figure 14). Local reactions were mixed. It was 
reported by a fisherman that those who will get new houses as well as cash settlements 
are “lucky” (George, 2010). However, criticisms were lodged against Bjerkhamn that he 
has taken advantage of local landowners and renters. One woman went as far to state that 
due to “the enduring ‘slave mentality’ in Barbados people are afraid to challenge 
Bjerkhamn’s vision, which sees workers tearing up the beach for foreign interests much 
the way they used to toil on sugar plantations” (Ibid, 2010). This brings into focus the 
implications of these feelings of marginalisation and second-class citizenry, particularly as 
it regards the socio-cultural sustainability of Six Men’s as a fishing community and luxury 
tourism host community.  
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Figure 14. Picture of archetypical Barbadian chattel houses lining Six Men’s main-
road 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken on-site by author) 
 
The highlighted race/colour and class dynamics, though, are not entirely black and white. 
Chapter 5 highlighted some intriguing identity dynamics constructing the early 
governance of the fishery. Herein, apart from fisherfolk being classified as being largely 
from the black peasantry, the industry’s development, particularly in the north, benefitted 
from the inputs of the descendants of white indentured servants. Regarding this, it was a 
noteworthy finding that a long-time Six Men’s resident and fisherman along with his 
business associate, the latter being a white Barbadian, expressed that “it was not a whisper 
in Barbados that Port Ferdinand wants the land where Six Men’s sits because the 
developers think the Six Men’s fishery is degrading to the port’s ambience”. They went 
on to charge that the “Port Ferdinand developers are on a mission to destroy the Six 
Men’s community both morally and mentally” (SXMM4 cf. SXMM5 interviews, 2016). 
These sentiments are significant within the context of the race/colour and class dynamics 
foregrounded because it would appear that the poor whites, descendants of the white 
indentured, share the concern of the marginalised in Barbadian society being destroyed 
both psychologically and through the inequitable allotment of physical space for 
development.  Despite this, the representative of Port St. Charles postured that: 
  
it will be quite difficult to destroy the Six Men’s fishing 
community because neither Bjerkhamn or the 
government have been able to get rid of the squatters, 
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and, with the on-going legal dispute over who owns 
the rights to the Six Men’s land and beach, for Port 
Ferdinand’s interests to prevail, this will not be a quick 
fix (SXMM2 interview, 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, the white Barbadian business associate of the Six Men’s fisher referenced 
earlier charged that: 
 
using the idea that the presence of locals is either degrading to 
the investors or tourists to push out black people happens a lot 
in Barbados, and, most of the coastal communities that are being 
pushed out are small fishing communities.  Some people are of 
the view that you can’t expect Barbados to develop if you're stuck 
in old ways.  That’s true to a point, but how can you push 
someone off their property just for money. Many of the locals 
are not interested in money, but in preserving their traditional 
rights to a piece of the Barbadian pie (SXMM5 interview, 2016). 
 
This sentiment highlights the competing conceptions of development, and of sustainable 
development, where actors in the locale, particularly blacks and descendants of white 
indentured servants, are depicted as valuing sustaining the socio-cultural traditions and 
heritage of northern fisheries rather than monetary economic gains. In illustrating why 
local norms matter on this account then, essentially, the locals view the integration of the 
sectors through the granting of reciprocal rights to the Six Men’s land and beachfront as 
the way to achieve socio-cultural sustainability in the locale. The dominant perspective 
from the Six Men’s fishing community was that they desire “a proper fish market with a 
place to cook, serve food and entertain tourists—without that, tourists cannot 
successfully integrate with the fishery” (SXMM1 cf. SXMF1, SXMM6, SXMF5, 
interviews 2016). However, there was also a fear that tourism will always be considered 
more “developmental” than fisheries, particularly on the platinum coast, and, 
consequently, the sustainable future of the Six Men’s fishing community with secure 
tenure rights and a respected tourist host community would be lost (SXMM1 cf. SXMF1, 
SXMM6, SXMF5, interviews 2016).  
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3.2. The Inclusivity and Representation of the ‘ordinary’ Barbadian – A Bottom-
Up Reading 
Section 2.2 of this chapter also hypothesised a legitimacy gap in top-down governance 
resulting from the absence of ‘ordinary’ Barbadians (particularly in the Six Men’s locale) 
in the policy-making process constructing development in Six Men’s. Returning to this 
now, as far back as 1999, media reports have documented that northern fisheries have 
been left out of the Barbadian national development agenda (Cecil 1999, pp. 78). In the 
case of Six Men’s fishing community, it is arguable that they lack representation because 
of a defunct Six Men’s Fisherfolk Organisation (cf. Alleyne-Greene 2015). This exclusion 
of the interests of ordinary Barbadians in national development was the prism through 
which actors in the Six Men’s locale expressed most dissatisfaction with top-down 
governance of the fishery. 
 
First, it is worth highlighting the sentiments of an academic closely involved in 
consultations with the local Six Men’s community around the construction of Port St. 
Charles. He stated: 
 
the Town and Country Planning Department, tasked 
to oversee Barbadian land developments, demands 
public consultations through town-hall meetings and 
stakeholder consultations. With the Port St. Charles 
consultations, when it got down to the local level, the 
main concern was with fisherfolk who thought the 
marina would take over their fishing ground. Other 
locals living in the area also voiced their concerns 
about the beach area becoming private thus 
prohibiting their access, but in the end, it turned out 
not to be the case (ACDM5 interview, 2016).   
 
This academic went on to explain that “public consultations are needed, but there has to 
be a level of fairness in terms of how you allocate the resources and what is allowed and 
not allowed” (ACDM5 interview, 2016). This statement could be interpreted as although 
there were concerns from fisherfolk and the local Six Men’s community about their social 
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and economic displacement, other uses of coastal space, like tourism, that bring in 
substantial economic revenue streams for the island ought to take priority.   
 
Interestingly, the inclusivity of the consultations surrounding the port developments in 
Six Men’s was contested by several KIs. According to the leader of BARNUFO that 
attended a few meetings concerning the developments of both Port St. Charles and Port 
Ferdinand: 
  
the persons in authority created a ‘flashy’ image of the benefits 
which the local community would receive if they agreed to the 
development of the ports. Moreover, the persons in authority 
were fully aware that the fisherfolk would not possess the level 
of tenacity needed to comprehend the situation. The fisherfolk 
were also more interested in the exquisite markets and other 
benefits which they were supposed to receive without 
considering the impact it would have on the true future of the 
Six Men’s fishery and their livelihoods (BNFF1 interview, 2016). 
 
It’s worth exploring here if the Six Men’s fishing community’s perceived lack of 
democratic representation is underpinned by a racial divide.  First, it was observed that in 
response to some of the initial push back that the Port St. Charles development was 
experiencing, that two of its main investors, who, to recall, are white Barbadians—Sir 
Charles and his brother Ralph ‘Bizzy’ Williams — were documented in two separate op-
eds in the Barbados Advocate. Sir Charles relayed that the “marina was being criticized with 
one charge being that it is against the poor people of Barbados” and that charges were 
also being made about wanting to take the country back to slavery (Barbados Advocate, 
1997). ‘Bizzy’ also stated that “all this talk about us paying black people pennies to look 
after expensive houses and yachts is nothing but propaganda being spewed by people 
desperate for political power” (Williams, 1997). The public consultations surrounding the 
construction of Port Ferdinand was also mired in racialized controversy. It was 
documented in a well-known Barbadian blog that black Barbadians did not take part in 
the Port Ferdinand consultations. Particularly, it was observed in a Nation News report, 
that factually in representation were white Barbadians with no “locals” present (Barbados 
Underground, 2008).    
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How access to bathe and swim in Barbadian waters has been shared between tourists and 
locals is also important. This is because locals particularly in Barbados’ north-west also 
perceive their rights and democratic interests to unimpeded beach access through a 
racialized prism. Barbados prides itself on having open access beaches for fishing 
communities, fisherfolk, local bathers, and tourists to enjoy in synchrony (NCC, 2014). 
However, with the proliferation of tourism particularly on the south and west coasts, local 
Barbadians have sought ways to protect their traditional rights to unimpeded access to 
the sea (Ibid, 2014). In fact, an active campaign was created by local conservationists 
known as the “Windows to the Sea” group. Their mandate was to lobby the Barbadian 
government against tourism acting as both physical and visual barriers to locals on the 
seaward side of major western and southern coastal roads (Potter, 1983, pp. 47). 
However, a long-time resident of St. Peter lamented that the Windows to the Sea 
campaign has lost steam, particularly in the north-west. It was shared that: 
  
while [we] do have public beach access, it is now down a 
narrow path that, in most cases, are hidden if you are not 
familiar with the new developments. There is also the matter 
of how locals feel to know that they no longer have ready 
access to the island’s public beaches and feelings of inferiority, 
especially on the west coast, when, at times, white bathers 
have been known to depart from the water when a black 
Barbadian enters (SXMF7 interview, 2016).  
 
There are also charges being levelled against how both port developments have hindered 
the local community’s access to the Six Men’s beachfront. In the case of Port St. Charles, 
two long-time residents of Six Men’s reported that the coastal space designated for the 
yacht berths have cut off what was once unimpeded access for locals to walk the entire 
coast from Speightstown to Six Men’s (see Figure 15) (SXMM3 and SXMM7, interviews, 
2016). Port Ferdinand has also built a retractable bridge to accommodate its yachts. It 
was observed in a news report that because of the bridge some residents in the Six Men’s 
community can no longer access the beach which is “virtually in their backyards” (see 
Figure 16) (Bradshaw, 2012). The dominant perspective shared by the Six Men’s fishing 
community and wider residents of St. Peter therefore, was that, “the ports are there to 
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benefit rich white Barbadians and tourists and not the average St. Peter resident” (SPTM1 
cf. SXMF1, SXMM3, SXMM6, SXMM7 and others, interviews, 2016). 
 
Figure 15. Picture of Port St. Charles breakwater and jetty cutting off coastal 
access 
 
Source: (Soares, 2016: taken by author on site) 
 
Figure 16. Picture of Port Ferdinand Bridge  
.  
Source: (Pinterest, no date) 
 
The loss of unimpeded access to the sea by the locals of St. Peter is quite significant for 
understanding how access to coastal space is informally governed on the island’s platinum 
coast. It is a known fact that all of Barbados’ beaches are public (Barbados.org, 2018). 
Indeed, there are no formal rules mandating that locals including fisherfolk cannot access 
the beach and waters occupied by both ports. However, because of the labels that have 
been cast on the locals of the Six Men’s community and sentiments of being unwelcome 
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around the island’s luxury tourism product, many fisherfolk have shared that they will not 
dock their boats or fish beside million-dollar yachts (cf. SXMM3, SXMM6, SXMM7 and 
others, interviews, 2016). This is a type of informal governance that shows that there are 
immaterial barriers at work, especially with regards to how identity dynamics have 
reinforced racial and class segregation in the Six Men’s locale. 
 
It is questionable, however, whether this issue of political exclusion can be overcome 
simply through procedural forms in consultation and the like. Again, indicating why local 
norms matter in this case, several KIs attached to the Six Men’s community expressed 
that: 
 
the black people of Barbados have a very quiet culture. 
Unlike Jamaicans, Barbadians do not retaliate against 
perceived injustices.  We are scared to be victimised and 
labelled as a troublemaker. The government will do that, 
and, this is a small island. I think it’s [our] fault because we 
have become reliant on government to give us the 
permission to act and stand up for our God-given Barbadian 
rights158 (SXMM4 cf. SXMM5, SXMF2 SPTM2, interviews, 
2016). 
 
On reflection, it seemed that if Six Men’s is to ever realise socio-cultural sustainability as 
a fishing community and a luxury tourism host community in tandem, the locals need to 
find a way to democratically assert their interests in the national development agenda. If 
they don’t, they will probably continue to be slowly be pushed out from the area. 
Nevertheless, there was hope in finding resolve for a fair and sustainably developed 
Barbados with the interests of both blacks and whites accounted for. The sentiment was 
expressed by several long-time Six Men’s locals that “we are black Barbadians and deserve 
rights to have our dreams realised too” (SXMF1 cf. SXMF6, SXMM8, SXMM9, 
interviews, 2016). 
 
 
                                                          
158 It’s worth noting in regard to this sentiment of being labeled a trouble maker that topography also matters in such local Barbadian 
politics.  Barbados is also flat with nowhere to run. There is no history of ‘maroonage ‘ like that found in Jamaica, for example. 
201 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored whether there is acceptance or contention of the idea of granting 
reciprocal rights to luxury tourism and fisheries to own and physically access coastal space 
in Barbados, and why or why not. Section 1 demonstrated how competing constructions 
of sustainable development have come to shape the governance of luxury tourism and 
fisheries in the locale of Six Men’s. Section 2 illustrated how the top-down governance of 
Barbadian national development priorities around the sectors was constructed. First, it 
explained that the norm of sustainable development has shaped the rhetoric around 
achieving sustainable tourism and sustainable fisheries in tension. Furthermore, it traced 
how despite efforts to integrate the sectors, the inability to resolve the normative tensions 
borne from the principle of sustainable development in the policy making process led to 
the failure of elite actors to grant reciprocal rights to the sectors to own and physically 
access the Six Men’s land and beachfront. Examining how the top-down governance of 
Barbadian national development priorities have been constructed, highlighted concerns 
that luxury tourism interests in Six Men’s championed by the white Barbadian elite are 
not promoting and protecting the socio-cultural traditions and heritage of the Six Men’s 
fishing community— the latter who are largely black and describe themselves as 
“ordinary” Barbadians. The socio-cultural sustainability of Six Men’s as a fishing 
community with secure tenure rights is also uncertain. Furthermore, there were 
sentiments of marginalisation and second-class citizenry, whereby, the interests of 
“ordinary” Barbadians are not democratically represented in the national development 
agenda. I then argued that these political dynamics expressive of top-down governance 
created legitimacy gaps in governance. These legitimacy gaps in governance pointed to 
two overarching ways in which the top-down governance of Barbadian national 
development priorities is being challenged: 1) the appropriateness of integrating 
sustainable fisheries and sustainable tourism as pillars of national development in Six 
Men’s, and, 2) the inclusivity of ordinary Barbadians interests (particularly in the Six Men’s 
locale) in constructing national development priorities. 
 
Section 3 brought to the fore the effects of local norms It is significant in this study’s 
analytical design because an understanding was gained of governing national development 
priorities around the sectors of luxury tourism and fisheries in Six Men’s from the 
bottom-up. This was important because interpreting the effects of local norms of actors 
showed an alternative view of governance that would help to account for the perspectives 
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of often marginalised actors in the policy and political process of constructing Barbadian 
national development. The key findings here were that embedded stratifications of 
race/colour and class that have long been part of Barbados’ social structures have 
reconstituted political tensions between how local black and white Barbadian interests in 
the sectors of fisheries and luxury tourism have shaped the island’s national development 
priorities, particularly in the north-west. Quite strikingly, it is an important finding that 
locals value sustaining the socio-cultural traditions and heritage of northern fisheries 
rather than economic gains from luxury tourism. Certainly, in dominant accounts of 
sustainable development, the status-quo has been to achieve economic and 
environmental sustainability. However, the principle of social sustainability and the 
inclusion of culture factored highly in the local discourse. Why local norms matter in this 
case then, is that, recognition ought to be given to the competing identities constructing 
development in the island’s north-west.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has engaged with debates in international politics dealing with the distribution 
of communally-held resources, in this case, fisheries. The case was made for the need of 
a more nuanced understanding of the constitutive role of norms in governance from 
global to local scales that considers the ways in which local actors can also play important 
roles in norm development. The key argument of the study is that there is a need to be 
attentive to socio-political norms that have shaped what is deemed appropriate. How 
governance, and by extension, rights to the Barbadian flyingfish fishery have been 
understood, legitimated, and contested is the empirical case I utilised to explore these 
claims by focusing on normative tensions regarding ‘the region’ and ‘development’. 
 
Brief Chapter Recap 
I began this thesis by outlining the rationale for its enquiry, its key findings and how these 
collectively constitute contributions to knowledge (see introduction). In chapter 2, I 
presented a literature review of the dominant theories of maritime governance pertaining 
to fisheries. I argued that the documented theories are built on prescriptive rationalist 
assumptions and do not provide an adequate understanding of the social motivations of 
actors in enacting governance. In chapter 3, critical constructivism was introduced as an 
International Relations (IR) theoretical approach suitable for understanding the social 
motivations of actors in enacting governance by way of studying local/bottom-up 
governance via a typology of norms. Here, I made the case for including local norms in 
this study’s conceptual framework to distinguish legitimacy gaps between top-down 
governance and bottom-up governance (see chapter 3). I then justified this study’s use of 
ethnographic methods within this IR critical constructivist approach. I also justified 
Barbados and its flyingfish fishery as an interpretive case study, and, the Bridgetown 
Fisheries Complex and Six Men’s as comparative social settings. I also offered critical 
reflection on my positionality and reflexivity and the limitations of the methodological 
approach taken (see chapter 4).   
 
In chapter 5,  I contributed to the sparse literature on the socio-political dimensions of 
governing the Barbadian flyingfish fishery. Here, my observations revealed that the 
regional and development norms pertinent to this study have been forged through the 
social relations of race/colour, class, nationality and gender. In chapter 6, the first of the 
study’s empirical chapters, I argued that tensions between the norms of regional community 
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and national sovereignty have undermined attempts to formally demarcate regionally-
shared distributive rights to the Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery from the top-down, 
though fisherfolk have enacted their own kind of informal regionalised governance.  In 
chapter 7, the second of the study’s empirical chapters, I argued that tensions within the 
norm of sustainable development have left unresolved the issue of whether fishing 
communities should have access rights to valuable coastal spaces occupied by the luxury 
tourism industry in the island’s north-west, with local communities using the language of 
social sustainability to make the case that they should have access to preserve their 
livelihoods and associated cultural traditions. 
 
Reflections: Research Questions and Concluding Findings 
The introduction of this study detailed three key findings a) socio-political insight into 
how norms become propagated ; b) how the social relations of race/colour, class, 
nationality and gender influence governing priorities for the Barbadian flyingfish fishery; 
and, c) how practices of informal governance are enacted within a top-down and bottom-
up governance regime. I offer below concluding reflections on how these key findings 
relate to the answers to the study’s main research questions.  
 
This study addressed three overarching research questions:  
1) who gets the fish and on what basis;  
2) how is this system of allocation governed and why in this way; and, 
3) is this governance being challenged? 
 
The first research question was addressed in Section 1 of this study’s empirical chapters 
and relates to the study’s finding regarding socio-political insight into how norms become 
propagated . In respect to constructing the region, I demonstrated in chapter 6 that the 
historical foundations of demarcating shared distributive rights to the fishery was built 
upon regional exchanges between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In respect to 
constructing Barbadian national development priorities around the sectors of luxury 
tourism and fisheries, I illustrated in chapter 7 a notion of two Barbados being built on 
embedded stratifications of race/colour and class and vacillating between maintaining 
cultural traditions of northern fisheries and advancing the economic interests of luxury 
tourism. From these findings, the premise was set to explore the tensions between top-
down and bottom-up enactments of governance. 
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The second research question was addressed in Section 2 of this study’s empirical 
chapters and relates to the study’s finding regarding how the social relations of 
race/colour, class, nationality and gender influence governing priorities for the Barbadian 
flyingfish fishery. An understanding was gained of the failed attempts to resolve the 
political tensions brought about by top-down governance, and, how these failed attempts 
created legitimacy gaps.  In respect to constructing the region in chapter 6, enactments of 
top-down governance highlight the proclivity for elite actors, especially political actors, 
to embed sovereign claims in their negotiations. This makes formally demarcating shared 
distributive rights to the fishery unlikely. In respect to constructing Barbadian national 
development priorities around the sectors of luxury tourism and fisheries in chapter 7, 
enactments of top-down governance suggest that what ought to be valued in 
implementing sustainable development are the principles of environmental and economic 
sustainability. Despite these findings evidencing top-down governance, in both chapters 
6 and 7, the thesis has also shown that tensions exist in terms of how such regional and 
development norms are framed and how they are implemented in practice on the ground, 
where it becomes evident that local actors are also able to exert constitutive influence.  
 
The third research question was addressed in Section 3 of this study’s empirical chapters 
and was concerned with if and how the top-down governance of the fishery is being 
challenged. Regarding this, a key analytical premise of this study was to make the case for 
why local norms matter in critical constructivist research, and, how top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve or frustrate governance goals This relates to 
the study’s finding on how practices of informal governance are enacted within a top-
down and bottom-up governance regime. In respect to constructing the region, in chapter 
6 enactments of bottom-up governance illustrated that the will of political representatives 
to exclude themselves from the informal acts of reciprocity governing the fishery from 
the bottom-up is an important governance consideration. In respect to constructing 
national development priorities around the sectors of luxury tourism and fisheries, in 
chapter 7 enactments of bottom-up governance suggested that an important governance 
consideration is that the principle of social sustainability and the inclusion of culture 
factor highly in the local discourse. Indeed, at the level of the locale, i.e., the site where 
governance is implemented, there has largely been contestation between elite and non-
elite state and non-state actors. Consequently, actors have sought to normalise/validate 
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their rights to the fishery based on their individual and collective interactions with and 
benefits gained from the resource within the locale. 
 
Reflections: Implications of the Main Contributions to Knowledge 
In this study I presented the argument that in international politics governance studies of 
regional and national fisheries have lacked a focus on localised perspectives on enacting 
governance and the social motivations for them. What I have done to try and address 
these claims is shored up by the implications of this study’s theoretical, methodological 
and empirical contributions to knowledge. 
 
The study’s theoretical contributions were grounded in an IR constructivist approach 
suitable to explore enactments of top-down and bottom-up governance and is very much 
critical within those parameters. To get to the root of actors’ social motivations for 
enacting governance, the study’s methodological contributions were to gain insight into 
local perspectives constructing governance by utilising ethnographic methods 
triangulated with archival document analyses, rather than discourse analysis which is the 
more conventional IR critical constructivist approach. These theoretical and 
methodological contributions do not discount the work of post-development/post-
structural scholars who have conducted ethnographic research beyond the parameters of 
IR constructivism to explore how political contestations emerge and thus occur between 
state and non-state actors, particularly at the level of the locale (cf. Scott, 1985; Escobar, 
1995). In reflecting on the implications of the study’s methodological and theoretical 
contributions then, these were to widen the scope of empirical analysis from the 
conventional top-down deductive approaches in critical constructivist IR scholarship so 
that insight could be gained about the power relations between dominant and 
marginalised actors in the governance process.  
 
The study’s significant contributions to knowledge were also found in its distinctive 
empirical analysis of Barbadian fisheries by focusing on normative tensions around ‘the 
region’ and ‘development’. Given the implications of this study’s critical constructivist 
stance on supporting a politics of change, I believe it is imperative to also offer a few 
policy prescriptions. This is done in the vein of recognising my own normative premises 
for the inclusion of oft-marginalised bottom-up voices in the development and 
implementation of fisheries policy mandates. With regards to demarcating shared 
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distributive rights to the regional Eastern Caribbean flyingfish fishery as examined in 
chapter 6, the representative interests of actors on the ground charged with implementing 
governance, in this case, Eastern Caribbean fisherfolk, ought to be validated and included 
a legitimate part of the governance process. Similarly, with regards to granting reciprocal 
rights to luxury tourism and fisheries to own and physically access valuable coastal space 
as examined in chapter 7, the interests of ordinary Barbadians in constructing national 
development in the north-west ought to be accounted for in the political process. Indeed, 
in revisiting the commons literature (see chapter 2), it could be argued that there is a 
rationalist preference for these normative prescriptions that is derived from Ostrom’s 
extensive analysis on the local commons whereby local communities are able to partake 
in self-governance over communally-held resources, like fisheries. My case does support 
this perspective, however, what Ostrom does not capture are the social rifts or alliances 
(i.e. the social interactions) between elite and local actors that makes governance work or 
not, and by extension, the allocation of rights to these resources legitimated or not. The 
empirical implications of these policy prescriptions then, is while they may be construed 
as normative, if the implementation of policy/governance mandates are to gain any 
substantive traction, particularly in a region where much of the international and regional 
governance prescriptions are agreed to by elite actors, but lack substantive grassroots 
implementation, it is imperative to get local actors at the negotiating table. True 
governance requires such people’s active engagement.’ 
 
The additional implication of the study’s empirical contributions is that when considering 
how top-down and bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve governance goals, there is 
no homogenous outcome. This was based on actors varied identities and interactions with 
the fishery. Consider that chapter 6 provided optimistic insights into how fisherfolk can 
work together through informal arrangements to demarcate shared rights to a regional 
fishery. On the other hand, chapter 7 provided more pessimistic insights into how 
informal arrangements have set the premise for how coastal space is governed by 
reinforced racial and class segregation in the Six Men’s locale. Essentially, these contested 
meanings of norms shaping governance of the fishery are not contested internationally 
but are contested locally precisely because they are inherently historically contingent and 
context-specific to the actors involved in the Barbados flyingfish fishery. 
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In further reflecting then on how the study has contributed to key debates in international 
politics, it is hoped that the case has been made for including and integrating small-scale 
fisherfolk as part of the SIDS development agenda and on policy and political platforms. 
Moreover, it is hoped that the importance of understanding the contextualities regarding 
how governance is implemented from the top-down and bottom-up and the social 
motivations for doing so has been situated. Even more critical, is acknowledging that the 
benefits of incorporating the informalities of governance practiced by small-scale 
fisherfolk needs to be taken more seriously. Particularly for the SIDS of the Anglo-
Caribbean, fisheries ought not to be considered an informal industry but rather as a  
concrete pillar of development. If it is the case that SIDS, like Barbados, cannot find a 
way to legitimise fisheries development and policy, there is a potential development 
disaster on the horizon. 
 
Reflections: Study Limitations and Future Research  
Here I offer some reflections on this study’s limitations and opportunities for future 
research. Empirical limitations with the case study as presented in chapter 6 were that in 
exploring the political tensions between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, no field 
research was completed in Trinidad and Tobago nor were there any interviews conducted 
with fisherfolk or technocratic and elite actors from Trinidad and Tobago. In further 
reflecting critically on my own positionality and reflexivity, I conceded that the findings 
presented on this case of regional governance of the fishery are from a Barbadian 
perspective. Consequently, I acknowledged the potential biases of this omission, for 
example, the likelihood of Barbadian interviewees downplaying overfishing of the 
flyingfish fishery. Therefore, the perspectives of Trinidadian and Tobagonian officials 
and fisherfolk ought to be accounted for in future studies. It was also mentioned in 
chapter 4 that there were some roadblocks with data collection which were largely 
associated with political reasons, namely a few elite actors declining to be interviewed. 
This mainly affected analysis in chapter 7. Here, it is important to restate that I did not 
get an opportunity to interview representatives from JADA Construction Group or Port 
Ferdinand, whose interests in the development of the Six Men’s area were discussed at 
length. In further reflecting here on my positionality and reflexivity, this meant that the 
findings presented were not balanced by the perspectives of the elites on the ground who 
played a role in crafting Barbadian national development priorities on the island’s 
platinum coast ; and, were also not devoid of my own personal biases about the political 
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tensions underpinning race/colour and class relations in Anglo-Caribbean society. 
Generally, it was also very difficult to access documents from the Fisheries Division 
library and the lack of accessibility to development bids and plans, as well as 
environmental impact assessment reports for the Six Men’s fishing village (see chapter 7). 
Therefore, to provide a more holistic assessment of how governance of Barbadian 
national development priorities around the sectors of luxury tourism and fisheries in Six 
Men’s has come to be constructed, access to these documents ought to be gained. 
Moreover, it is recommended that the perspectives of the elite actors in crafting 
Barbadian national development priorities on the island’s platinum coast, namely, 
representatives from JADA Construction Group and Port Ferdinand ought to be 
accounted for in future studies. 
 
More broadly, as mentioned, a key analytical premise of this study was to make the case 
for why local norms matter in critical constructivist research in International Relations, 
and, how top-down and bottom-up perspectives interact to achieve governance goals. 
This study’s empirical findings suggest that there has been a proclivity to shape 
governance of the Barbadian flyingfish fishery from the top-down. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the accounts of bottom-up governance that were presented in the study’s 
empirical chapters were largely concerned with fisherfolks’ attempts to get elites to agree 
or reject a formal ‘top-down’ governance system. Despite this, what this thesis has done 
is to provide a theoretical framew8ork to get at the tentative pieces of evidence that 
bottom-up governance does exist through analysing local norms and their associated 
practices. This amendment of including local norms in the study’s conceptual schema 
essentially matters because the study’s empirical findings clearly shows how top-down 
norms frequently impact on people on the ground in unforeseen and negative ways, with 
people on the ground forced into working out their own solutions. Nevertheless, there is 
scope here for further research to try and understand bottom-up governance better and 
what is happening on the ground in terms of the informal rules, customs and institutions 
of implementing governance. This could be accomplished through future research that 
has been structured as a longitudinal study. 
 
A large  analytical aspect of this study was to also foreground the post-colonial space and 
formal and informal covenants of Anglo-Caribbean fisheries governance. In this regard, 
this study highlighted complicated questions about intra-regional migration and identity. 
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It is necessary indeed to recognise the fluidity of the Anglo-Caribbean, and particularly 
the Eastern Caribbean, and how this has affected the construction of national and 
regional identities. It is arguable that because of the close proximity of the island-states 
and the traditions of inter-island migration, there is no homogenous island-state in the 
Anglo-Caribbean. This brings into scope that there ought to be a fluid notion of Anglo-
Caribbean identity. On this account, understanding Barbadian identity within trans-
nationalised contexts should also be considered. Here, it is particularly worth re-stating as 
documented in chapter 7, that there are no known academic or technical studies that can 
account for the migration patterns of Barbadian fisherfolk and other Caribbean nationals 
that have a stake in the Eastern Caribbean fisheries. Therefore, understanding the fluidity 
of Anglo-Caribbean identity and how this has shaped governance of fisheries resources 
is a fruitful area for further research.  
 
This study also brought attention to the fact that gender in Barbadian fisheries is 
significantly under-researched. Indeed, throughout the world, exploring gender in 
fisheries is a relatively new research space (cf. Kunatuba, 2017; GIFT, 2018). It is 
interesting that this Barbados case presents a diversion away from conventional gendered 
norms in that male fisherfolk largely feel marginalised by female vendors. This is 
noteworthy given that this study documented that gendered roles have impacted the 
distribution of power in the industry via the harvest and post-harvest sub-sectors— with 
men dominating the former and women the latter. The evolution of these ‘inverse’ 
gendered norms wherein women are seen as superior to men within Barbados’ flyingfish 
fishery economy, albeit in a context where men still dominate the upper echelons of 
government and business, are certainly worthwhile themes to explore in further research. 
Another fruitful area for further research is uncovering the socio-political implications of 
the distribution of power among the industry’s ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ key local stakeholders. 
Elite is this context means large-scale commercial distributors and ordinary means small-
scale fisherfolk. These considerations of the distribution of power in the industry can 
certainly be explored beyond the scope of Barbados.  
 
In concluding this study, it is hoped that insight has been gained about the importance of 
situating social science approaches to studying issues of resource governance. Moreover, 
it is hoped that voice has been given to the perspectives of the oft-marginalised actors 
who are charged with receiving and implementing governance of one of the world’s most 
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important natural resources, in this case, fisherfolk and wild marine fish. It is important 
to revisit the claim that “one doesn’t manage fish, one manages people” (Orbach, 1986, 
pp. 105). In broad terms then, it is hoped that what this study has contributed to the 
discourse is an understanding of the human interactions and social motivations of actors 
implementing governance. 
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Appendix B 
 
Interview Participants  
 
R = RECORDED 
DR = DECLINED TO BE RECORDED 
61 TOTAL PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
 
 
 
 
256 
 
 
Appendix C 
Exhibit 1.  Key Events in the History of Barbadian Fisheries Governance  
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Note: This timeline represents historical and technological advancements 
Adapted from Source: McConney et al., 2003a, pp. 14-16). 
 
Exhibit 2. Main International Agreements Relevant to the Contemporary 
Governance of the Barbadian Flyingfish Fishery  
 
Adapted from Source: (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; McConney et al., 2003a). 
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Exhibit 3. Main International and Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations 
Relevant to the Contemporary Governance of the Barbadian Flyingfish fishery 
 
Adapted from Source: (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; McConney et al., 2003a). 
 
Exhibit 4. Main Local Governmental Agencies/Departments Relevant to the 
Contemporary Governance of the Barbadian Flyingfish Fishery 
 
Adapted from Source: (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; McConney et al., 2003a). 
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Exhibit 5. Main Local Non-Governmental Organizations Relevant to the 
Contemporary Governance of Flyingfish 
 
Adapted from Source: (GOB Fisheries Division, 2003; McConney et al., 2003a). 
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Exhibit 6. Barbadian Legislations specific to the Governance of Barbadian 
Fisheries  
 
 
Adapted from Source: (McConney et al., 2003a, pp. 38). 
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Exhibit 7. Governance Structure of the Barbadian Fisheries Division (Sex 
Disaggregated) 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Source: (Burke, 2016) 
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Exhibit 8. Governance Structure of the Barbados Markets Division (Sex 
Disaggregated) 
 
 
 
Adapted from Source: (Burke, 2016) 
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Exhibit 9. The Composition of the Fisheries Advisory Committee  
 
Adapted from Source: (McConney, Mahon and Oxenford, 2003, pp. 38) 
 
